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I 
Abstract 
This thesis applies the market microstructure approach to investigate exchange rate 
dynamics, intervention and regime shifts in China’s exchange rate system.  This 
research first examines exchange rate determination and dynamics from a 
microstructural perspective. An index of order flow is constructed in the Chinese 
context to reflect excess demand pressure. A VAR model is then estimated to explore 
to what extent order flow may explain long-term determination and short-term 
fluctuations of the renminbi exchange rate. Focusing on the cointegrating relationship 
between cumulative order flow and the exchange rate of the RMB against the US 
dollar, this research find that in the new Chinese exchange rate regime in place since 
2005, order flow is able to explain a significant part of fluctuations in the RMB-dollar 
exchange rate.  
China is internationally noted for its intervention in the foreign exchange market. 
Based on high-frequency data this thesis adopt a multi-dimensional approach to 
explore how interventions are conducted in China, what the consequences are, and to 
what extent they are effective. This thesis identify evidence of China’s extensive 
intervention and find that the authority is more likely to intervene to curb devaluation. 
Decomposition analysis shows that the direct impact of intervention on the exchange 
rate is more important than the impact via order flow. Intervention via the central 
bank’s involvement in trading is effective in influencing both the exchange rate and 
order flow, but tends to increase volatility. Intervention by the central bank’s varying 
the central parity condition plays some role in ‘leaning against the wind’, but cannot 
reverse the trend. 
  
II 
 
China announced the reform of its exchange rate system in 2005.  The reform was 
disrupted by the breakout of the global financial crisis around 2008, but was reiterated 
in 2010. The thesis analyses the behaviour of China’s exchange rate policy since then. 
This research detect 21
st
 June 2010 as the date of regime shift, since when the RMB 
has been allowed greater room for flexibility, and consequently exchange rate 
volatility has increased. This research unearths evidence confirming that the renminbi 
no longer pegs only to the dollar. During the crisis period, deviations from the central 
parity rate (CPR) increase the possibility of government intervention, and the 
intervention correlates with bid-ask exchange rate spread. The Chinese monetary 
authority is found to act to keep the exchange rate stable. In the post-crisis period, the 
correlation becomes time-varying and the government prefers the RMB exchange rate 
to gradually appreciate. This research finds evidence that appreciation of the RMB 
exchange rate is order flow driven during the post-crisis period. 
There is a significant negative currency exposure during the financial crisis, caused by 
changes in the RMB exchange rate, indicating that the Chinese stock market exhibits 
a negative reaction in the period. However, no significant impact is found in the post-
crisis period. In order to modify the exchange rate exposure to fluctuations of the US 
dollar, the Chinese government seems to have adopted the relatively more efficient 
exchange rate regime to handle the effects of the global financial crisis. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction 
 
 
In this chapter begin by introducing the 
background to the study. Next, this chapter set 
out the main motivations behind the research and 
the potential contributions of this thesis to the 
literature. Key research problems to be tackled 
and the main findings of the thesis are then 
presented. Finally, this chapter outline the 
organisation and structure of the entire thesis. 
 
 
 
  2 
Chapter 1 
Introduction 
In recent decades, there has been much debate about China’s exchange rate policy. 
Given the nation’s rising importance in the world economy, and the growing 
complexity of economic and financial globalisation, it is desirable yet challenging to 
achieve a better understanding of how the value of China’s currency (renminbi, or 
RMB) is determined in the long run, and to identify the dynamics of RMB movement 
in the short run. In order to comprehend these fundamental issues, this research must 
first discern the evolving role of the government in the foreign exchange market and 
in driving the regime changes in China’s exchange rate system. 
Studies of exchange rate issues are conventionally shaped by the macro approach, 
which focuses on interactions between macroeconomic factors and the exchange rate. 
However, there is growing recognition that the market microstructural approach can 
shed additional light on many critical aspects of the exchange rate. Hence, this 
research will examine factors that affect the RMB exchange rate and its regime shifts 
from a microstructural perspective.  
1.1 Motivations and Contributions of this Research 
Over the last few decades, the application of macroeconomic models to the study of 
exchange rates has met with growing challenges, because of the models’ poor 
performance in capturing exchange rate movements (Meese and Rogoff 1983, Frankel 
  3 
and Rose 1995). In response to the poor explanatory power exhibited by conventional 
macro models, the market microstructure approach has been widely used in analysis 
of exchange rate determination. O’Hara (1995, p. 1) defines the market microstructure 
approach as one that studies ‘the process and outcomes of exchanging assets under 
explicit trading rules’. In recent studies of exchange rate economics, trading has been 
considered a central element in the process of price formation. In turn, the trading 
process is centred around order flow; hence order flow becomes the focal point of the 
microstructure approach. By testing for its capability to transmit information on price 
formation, recent empirical work has confirmed the explanatory power of order flow 
(Evans and Lyons 2002b).  
However, existing research has been primarily concerned with mature economies and 
with the world’s major currency pairs. Very few studies have investigated the 
potential role of order flow in foreign exchange markets of emerging economies. This 
research represents one of the first attempts to fill the gap in this field by applying the 
microstructure approach to China. Specifically, this research is motivated by the 
desire to shed light on the exchange rate determination and dynamics in China from a 
market microstructure perspective.  
In doing so, this study intends to make several potential contributions to the literature. 
First, this study is among the first to apply the market microstructural approach to the 
Chinese foreign exchange market. The market microstructural approach can supply 
more minutiae and can examine more closely the working of the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. A small number of studies have applied this approach to the case of 
China, but existing research fails to supply sufficiently detailed empirical analysis. 
This thesis fills towards that gap by applying the market microstructure approach with 
  4 
high-frequency transaction data. The thesis constructs a measurement of order flow 
that is based on all tick-by-tick transaction data from the CFETS (China Foreign 
Exchange Trading System), from which the cumulative daily order flow is computed. 
The research also takes into consideration the trading system reform and the 
consequent market evolution. The sample spans the periods before and after 21
st
 June 
2010 when the government re-launched a new ‘managed floating’ exchange rate 
system. 
This thesis is also motivated to research into intervention in the foreign exchange 
market, a feature for which China is noted internationally. Intervention is widely used 
as a powerful tool for central banks to control the level and change of their currencies. 
Given China’s growing economic power and the possible repercussions of its 
intervention, this thesis is interested to establish how China’s monetary governance 
manages the exchange value of renminbi and whether this management, or 
intervention, is effective.  
The second major contribution that this investigation intends to make is related to the 
Chinese intervention in the foreign exchange market, a feature for which China is 
noted internationally. Intervention is widely used as a powerful tool for central banks 
to control the level and change of their currencies. Given China’s growing economic 
power and the possible repercussions of its intervention, we are interested to establish 
how China’s monetary governance manages the exchange value of renminbi and 
whether this management, or intervention, is effective. The potential contributions of 
our investigation in this area include the follow aspects. Like many other governments, 
the Chinese monetary authority has wrapped its intervention in secrecy. Using a wide 
range of sources, this study identifies the dates and establishes the main types of the 
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secret intervention. The research gathers the newswire reports about intervention from 
one of the world’s biggest news databases, Factiva; it also uses Reuters China, and the 
SAFE (State Administration of Foreign Exchange) official website to estimate the 
Chinese monetary authority’s intervention action. The target data set of this research 
includes the major part of year 2012. This is an eventful year, as it includes both the 
Sino-America currency dispute, a central issue in the current world economy, and the 
change of leadership in some major powers. Hence it provides a rich context for our 
study, which aims at a better understanding of how the Chinese monetary authority 
intervenes in the foreign exchange market, and the consequences thereof. 
The third main motivation behind this study is to investigate what de facto regime has 
been operated in China. It is often the case that the exchange rate regime announced 
by a government differs from the one that operates in reality; in other words, the de 
jure regime could be fundamentally different from the de facto regime. This research 
intends to ascertain what de facto regime has been in operation in China since the 
regime shift announced by the Chinese monetary authority. As the regime shift 
happened to coincide with the periods during and just after the global financial crisis, 
the research also intends to look more deeply into the behaviours of the Chinese 
exchange rate regime across the global financial crisis.  
Thirdly, the research makes an important contribution to the literature regarding the 
regime shifts in China’s exchange rate system. It is often the case that the exchange 
rate regime announced by a government differs from the one that operates in reality; 
in other words, the de jure regime could be fundamentally different from the de facto 
regime. This research intends to ascertain what de facto regime has been in operation 
in China since the reform announced by the Chinese monetary authority. As the 
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regime change happened to coincide with the periods during and just after the global 
financial crisis, the research also looks deeply into the behaviors of the Chinese 
exchange rate regime across the crisis. In this regard, the contributions of this thesis to 
the literature can be categorized in terms of detection of the regime changes and its 
consequences. In order to detect the exact timing of exchange rate regime shifts and 
the currency weights in the reference basket of currencies, this research adopts two 
different regime shift models. One model is based on the variance frequency, i.e., low 
variance or high variance. The other is based on the currency weights. If the weights 
of reference basket currencies change we can define this as a regime shift. This thesis 
uses high-frequency transaction data from across the global financial crisis period. 
The data set covers the period from 22
nd
 July 2005 when the Chinese government 
announced adoption of a managed floating RMB exchange rate regime, until 9
th
 
October 2012. By applying the multiple GARCH model we are able to find the impact 
of China’s exchange rate regime shift during the financial crisis and post-crisis 
periods from various perspectives. 
1.2 Research Questions and Main Findings 
This thesis aims to improve our understanding of the Chinese exchange rate policy 
from a market microstructural perspective. To accomplish this aim, this research 
investigate the determination of the RMB exchange rate and its dynamics, the 
intervention in the foreign exchange market and its effectiveness, and the recent 
regime shifts in China’s exchange rate system, which are intertwined with the fallout 
of the global financial crisis. Using various techniques of the market microstructure 
approach, this research attempt to solve the following research problems:  
  7 
1. In the price formation process, to what extent can order flow analysis explain 
the long-term determination of the exchange value of the Chinese renminbi, or 
RMB, against other international currencies, particularly the US dollar?  
2. In a system with the variable space containing the exchange rate, order flow, 
international interest differential and risk premium, how do interactions 
between these variables determine the dynamics of the system and the short-
run dynamics of the Chinese exchange rate?  
3. In what ways does the Chinese monetary authority intervene in the foreign 
exchange market? Does intervention have a significant impact on exchange 
rate returns and order flow? 
4. What is the relative importance of different forms of intervention? How can 
we judge the extent to which Chinese intervention is successful? What are the 
costs? 
5. Given the possibility that the de jure system can be quite different from the de 
facto one, it is natural to ask whether China’s recently announced adoption of 
a new exchange rate regime represents a true regime break. If not, has there 
been a regime change subsequently, and if so, when?  
6. What are the consequences of the regime break in China? In particular, are 
there changes in the policy course after the detected date of regime switching 
in terms of the speed of exchange rate changes and the degree of flexibility of 
the exchange rate system?  
  8 
In order to explore these issues, this research first constructs a measure of order flow 
based on high frequency transaction data from the Chinese market, and computes the 
daily order flow. Then, this research add a control variable, the country risk premium, 
which prior studies have shown to have explanatory power with regard to exchange 
rate dynamics in emerging markets. Focusing on the cointegrating relationship 
between cumulative order flow and the exchange rate of the RMB against the US 
dollar, this thesis find that in the new Chinese exchange rate regime in place since 
2005, order flow is able to explain a significant part of fluctuations in the RMB-dollar 
exchange rate.  
Based on high-frequency data this research adopt a multi-dimensional approach to 
explore how interventions are conducted in China, what the consequences are, and to 
what extent they are effective. This work identify evidence of China’s extensive 
intervention and find that the authority is more likely to intervene to curb devaluation. 
Decomposition analysis shows that the direct impact of intervention on the exchange 
rate is more important than the impact via order flow. Intervention via the central 
bank’s involvement in trading is effective in influencing both the exchange rate and 
order flow but tends to increase volatility. Intervention by the central bank’s varying 
the central parity condition plays some role in ‘leaning against the wind’, but cannot 
reverse the trend. 
In order to detect the exact timing of the China foreign exchange rate regime change, 
this research adopt two contrasting methods, as introduced by Engel and Hamilton 
(Engel and Hamilton 1990) and by Zeileis et al. (2010). One of the regime shift 
models is based on the variance frequency, i.e., low variance or high variance. The 
other is based on the currency weights. If the weights of currencies in the reference 
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basket have changed it is then defined as a regime shift. Both methods identify 21
st
 
June 2010 as the regime shift date.  
Next, this research use the multiple GARCH model to examine the impact of 
exchange rate regime shift during the financial crisis (before 21
st
 June 2010) and post-
crisis (after 21
st
 June 2010) periods from various perspectives. This research find that 
since the date of regime shift the RMB has been allowed greater room for flexibility, 
and consequently exchange rate volatility has increased.  
The thesis unearths evidence confirming that the renminbi no longer pegs only to the 
dollar. During the crisis period, deviations from the central parity rate (CPR) increase 
the possibility of government intervention, and the intervention correlates with bid-
ask exchange rate spread. The Chinese monetary authority is found to act to keep the 
exchange rate stable. In the post-crisis period, the correlation becomes time-varying 
and the government prefers the RMB exchange rate to gradually appreciate. This 
research finds evidence that appreciation of the RMB exchange rate is order flow 
driven during the post-crisis period. 
1.3 Organisation of the Study 
This thesis comprises seven chapters. The structure of the thesis is as follows: 
 Chapter 2: Review of Related Literature. In this chapter, this research 
reviews the literature of the microstructure approach and the comprehensive 
surveys and critical assessments relevant to the research in this thesis. 
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 Chapter 3: Microstructure of the China FX Market. In Chapter 3, this 
research gives a general introduction to the background of the China foreign 
exchange market under the microstructural perspective.  
 Chapter 4: Exchange Rate Determination and Dynamics. In this chapter, 
this research investigates the relationship between order flow and exchange 
rate in the China FX market within the market microstructure framework. This 
chapter aims to shed some light on exchange rate determination in China. 
 Chapter 5: Chinese FX Intervention. Chapter 5 proposes the multiple 
perspectives framework to analyse the action of exchange rate and order flow 
when the Chinese government intervenes in the foreign exchange market.  
 Chapter 6: Exchange Rate Regime Shift. In Chapter 6, this research 
examines the different performance of the China exchange rate regime across 
the global financial crisis. This chapter aims to detect the exchange rate regime 
changes, in order to better understand the central bank de facto operations. 
 Chapter 7: Conclusions. In this final chapter this thesis summarise the results 
of this work. Then, this chapter give suggestions for future research. 
 
 
Chapter 2 
 
 
  
Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
 
This chapter reviews the comprehensive surveys 
and critical assessments relevant to the work in 
this thesis. First, this chapter give a brief 
overview of the related literature of the 
microstructure approach. Then, this chapter 
review the related literature of foreign exchange 
intervention. Finally, this chapter present a 
detailed survey of the studies on exchange rate 
regime shifts. 
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Chapter 2  
Literature Review 
2.1 Related Literature of Market Microstructure 
The first section briefly reviews previous literature on the microstructure approach to 
exchange rate dynamics. The microstructure approach underscores the central role of 
the trading process in the price formation in the foreign exchange market (Lyons 
1995). This process can be broadly grouped into three phases (Evans 2011). First, the 
customers trade with their personal dealers. Then, these dealers carry their own 
customer orders to trade with other dealers through the electronic interdealer market; 
the transactions in this market are known as interdealer trades. In the last round, 
dealers trade with customers again to balance their net inventory position.  
In this process, the trading size and transaction position are the most important factors 
for these transactions. These critical parameters of the market are summarized by 
order flow, which is the net balance of buyer-initiated and seller-initiated foreign 
exchange market transactions (Lyons 2001). Measured as the sum of the signed seller-
initiated and buyer-initiated orders in the empirical specification, order flow is 
considered an important information transmission mechanism linking price changes 
and dispersed information. Indeed, the explanatory role of order flow in exchange rate 
models has been the focal point of empirical studies in the market microstructure 
literature, which can be generally catalogued in terms of those using data of customer 
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order flow and those using interdealer order flow. However, the majority of empirical 
research focuses primarily on the customer order flow as it conveys private 
information about not only fundamentals but also monetary policy (Evans and Lyons 
2006, Bjønnes and Rime 2005, Rime 2000).  
Nevertheless, because of the availability of data, many studies have focused on the 
data of interdealer order flow from the electronic transaction market. For example, 
Danielsson et al. (2012) investigate 10-month order flow data from the Reuters 
D2000-2 data platform and find that order flow Granger causes the changes in 
exchange rate returns. Influential research by Evans and Lyons (2002b) use the 
interdealer order flow based on the 4-month data of the exchange rates between the 
deutschemark and the Japanese yen against the US dollar from Reuters D2000-1. In a 
radical departure from the conventional macro models, the authors develop a hybrid 
model that contains both a macro variable (interest differential) and a micro variable 
(order flow). They find that over 60% of the USD/DEM daily changes and 40% of the 
USD/JPY daily changes can be explained by order flow. In another study, Evans and 
Lyons (2002a) extend their dataset to seven currency pairs: the US dollar against the 
pound sterling, Belgian, French and Swiss francs, Swedish krona, Italian lira and 
Dutch guilder. They find that order flow may generate an R
2
 up to 78% on a daily 
frequency. However, Fisher and Hillman (2003) extend the research of Evans and 
Lyons (2002a) but get much lower R
2
 statistics results. Berger et al. (2008) show that 
interdealer order flow has a 0.65 correlation with the exchange rate of the EUR/USD.  
Osler (2006) summarize three explanations of order flow driving exchange rate 
movements: the inventory effect, information effect, and downward-sloping demand 
and liquidity effects. The inventory effect refers to the situation whereby any 
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deviation from the desired inventory level will expose dealers to risk. To avoid 
undesired risk, dealers will decrease (increase) their prices to attract more buying 
(selling) orders when their inventory positions are higher (lower) than desired levels.  
Inventory-based models can successfully explain the temporary changes in the 
exchange rate but fail to capture permanent exchange rate movements. Information-
based models imply that order flow should permanently affect market prices. Hence, 
exchange rates should be cointegrated with cumulative order flow. Recent research 
has uncovered evidence for such a stable long-term relationship for several currency 
pairs (Killeen, Lyons, and Moore 2006, Bjønnes and Rime 2005). However, Boyer 
and Van Norden (2006) point out that these results are selective and, in some cases, 
the results are statistically weak and suffer from a small sample bias. They conduct 
cointegration tests on the dataset of Evans and Lyons (2002b), which is commonly 
used in other research. Strikingly, they find no evidence of a long-run relationship 
between order flow and the exchange rate. Osler (2006) also introduce ‘downward-
sloping demand and liquidity effects’ to explain why order flow is important. He 
suggests where there is long-term downward-sloping demand with a growth in supply, 
price will decrease in the long run. If there are no changes in the fundamentals, then 
one country’s currency demand is equal to the other country’s currency supply. Rime 
et al. (2010), however, argue that order flow of other currencies should be included in 
the model specification, as they can greatly increase the explanatory power of 
interdealer order flow. 
In an early study of the New York Stock Exchange, Hasbrouck (1991) propose a 
simple linear VAR model for the microstructure study. Payne (2003) apply this 
modeling strategy to analyze the foreign exchange market. He draws on the 1-week 
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exchange rate of USD/DEM from Reuters D2000-2, covering the time period from 6 
October to 10 October 1997. The results show that 60% of the variation can be 
explained by the private information, suggesting that informed order flow has 
explanatory power for exchange returns. Froot and Ramadorai (2005a) also set up a 
VAR model to test order flow as a major medium of fundamentals and exchange rate 
movements. They divide the exchange rate returns into permanent and transitory 
shocks and study the interactions between them. They illustrate that order flow is 
related to short-term currency returns but that fundamentals better explain long-term 
returns and values. These findings highlight the importance of research on the role of 
order flow in short-term dynamics and long-term determination of the exchange rate.  
However, the extant literature has focused on the major currencies. For example, Ito 
et al. (1998) investigate the JPY/USD and find that the informed order flow can 
predict the exchange rate over the short time period. Rime (2000) examines five major 
currencies against the US dollar, DEM/USD, GBP/USD, CHF/USD CAD/USD and 
JPY/USD, from July 1995 to September 1999. The results of cointegration tests show 
that the exchange rates of DEM/USD, GBP/USD and CHF/USD have a cointegrating 
relationship with order flow, indicating that the lagged order flow has an explanatory 
power of exchange rate movements. Researchers have also explored the explanatory 
power of order flow for many other major currencies, including the euro (Evans and 
Lyons 2005), the deutschmark (Andersen et al. 2002), and the British pound (Berger 
et al. 2008). 
In recent decades, a growing number of studies have analyzed the explanatory power 
of order flow in emerging markets. Galati (2000) study the currencies of seven 
emerging markets—Colombia, Mexico, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Israel and South 
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Africa—with 18-month daily trading volume data and finds that most trading volumes 
are significantly and positively correlated with volatility. Froot and Ramadorai 
(2005a) examine 19 countries with more than four years’ daily data and include 111 
rates in their international portfolio flows. They find that these flows are strongly 
significant and positively correlated with contemporaneous exchange rate returns.  
Frankel (2010) survey the monetary policies of emerging markets and notes that many 
researchers have designed their models to take into account the unique features of 
emerging markets, such as imperfect institutions, moral hazard, default risk and 
illiquidity, asymmetric information, and government intervention. De Medeiros 
(2004) consider Brazil’s foreign exchange market and introduces the country risk 
premium as an additional control variable. He finds that Brazil’s order flow data have 
a weak performance compared with those in developed countries but that the country 
risk premium is more significant than other variables. Wu (2012) also add a risk 
premium as the control factor in his model. He examines both the temporary and 
permanent period behaviors of commercial and financial customer order flow in the 
Brazilian foreign exchange market with four years’ daily customer transaction data. 
His results show that financial and intervention flows are positively related with 
exchange rate movements but that commercial flows are negatively associated with 
the exchange rate and have feedback effects. 
Many other special conditions of emerging market figure prominently in such 
research. Gereben et al. (2006), for instance, explore the role of domestic and foreign 
customer flow in the Hungarian foreign exchange market and find that liquidity is 
largely determined by domestic customer flow while the information of foreign 
customer flows drives the fluctuations. Galac et al. (2006) study the role of market 
  17 
microstructures in explaining the relationship between trading volume, volatility and 
bid-ask spreads in Croatia. Ranjan et al. (2008) focus on the exchange rate 
movements of the Indian foreign exchange market. Duffuor et al. (2012) examine the 
role of end-user customer order flow in explaining the exchange rate changes in the 
Ghanaian market. They use the black and official market exchange rates to investigate 
the roles of expected and unexpected order flows and find that expected order flow 
has inefficient performance in the foreign exchange market.
1
 
Motivated by these empirical studies and findings, this research seek to determine in 
this thesis the extent to which order flow explains the behavior of the exchange rate of 
an emerging market currency against an international key currency, i.e., the exchange 
rate of RMB against the US dollar. To facilitate such an investigation, it is important 
to briefly outline the microstructure of the Chinese foreign exchange market centered 
on the China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) so as to establish the 
background knowledge for this system, which is essential for understanding China’s 
exchange rate movements from the market microstructure perspective (Zhang, Chau, 
and Zhang 2012). 
2.2 Related Literature of Foreign Exchange Intervention 
In this section this research review the related literature, focusing particularly on the 
intervention studies that take a microstructure perspective. The disintegration of the 
Bretton Woods system in the 1970s was a catalyst for large-scale exchange rate 
                                                 
1
 Outside the extant market-microstructure literature, Vygodina et al. (2008) documents that exchange 
rates overreact to changes in economic fundamentals over the short run but converge in a long run. 
Using an event-study methodology and the exchange rates of three MENA countries i.e., Egypt, 
Morocco and Turkey, Chortareas et al. (2012) shows that devaluation announcement caused excess 
volatility in these markets. 
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intervention. Subsequent to the interventions by the central banks of the Group of 
Five (G5), which engaged in joint interventions for nearly ten years until the end of 
the 1980s, many countries followed suit to use intervention as a useful instrument to 
stabilize their currencies. From the 1980s in particular, central bank interventions 
became an increasingly popular research area, with most economists seeing 
intervention as both costly and ineffective (Edison 1993).  The focal point at the time 
was sterilized intervention, and the main concern was whether intervention could 
significantly affect the exchange rate.  Mussa (1981) proposed the ‘signalling 
hypothesis’, and demonstrated that the future signal would affect exchange rate 
changes. While Dominguez and Frankel (1993) confirmed the existence of such an  
effect, most other researchers remained sceptical. For example Vitale (1999) argued 
that central banks would be reluctant to reveal their interventions, since their 
objectives might not be in alignment with what the fundamentals would suggest. In 
his view, secret interventions would send ‘wrong signals’ to the FX market. Rogers 
and Siklos (2003) summarized that central bank intervention produces portfolio 
effects and signalling effects to influence the exchange rate. By indirectly affecting 
the returns on foreign assets through exchange rate movements the central bank 
intervention causes portfolio effects whereby investors adjust their portfolios. In 
addition, the government intervention will convey policy information to the market, 
hence producing signalling effects inducing investors to adjust their expectations of 
future exchange rate returns. 
High-frequency data analysis has proved useful to identify, and provides a more 
accurate understanding of, central bank intervention, since high-frequency data are 
more comprehensive and precise (Menkhoff 2010). Vitale (2007) summarizes the 
microstructure literature on central bank intervention and, using a microstructure 
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model, suggests that secret interventions could impact exchange rate changes. Among 
the many researchers to have conducted microstructural studies, Goodhart and Hesse 
(1993) use Reuters headline news as high-frequency information. They establish the 
conditions for intervention, but no clear evidence of price impact. Dominguez (2003) 
applies an event study, and finds that interventions can significantly influence 
exchange returns of two major currencies (JPY/USD and DEM/USD). She also sets 
the data time to compare 2 hours before and after intervention and finds that 
intervention days have higher volatility. Chari (2007) follows Dominguez’s (2003) 
method to test the intervention responses of 125 banks and finds that following 
intervention the bid-ask spread normally increases and that top banks have different 
quotes reactions to intervention.  
Based on high-frequency news data, the literature is also able to distinguish actual 
intervention from reported intervention, and hence to establish the accuracy of news 
reports about intervention. Klein (1993) compares the Federal Reserve published 
daily data of actual intervention with the related press reports by the Wall Street 
Journal and the New York Times. He finds that the press reported only 72% of actual 
interventions, and of the reported interventions only 88% actually occurred. Fischer 
(2006) compares the data of the Swiss National Bank for four major currencies with 
Reuters news reports, and finds that all reported interventions did happen and nearly 
90% of actual interventions were reported. However, the Reuters news reports came 
after the actual interventions and the gap could often be measured in hours rather than 
minutes. In contrast, Galati et al. (2005) find that Reuters news reports are precise and 
accurate to catch the Japanese foreign exchange interventions.  
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Different countries have different intervention actions, according to their specific 
exchange rate regimes. For example, under a floating exchange rate a governing 
authority will occasionally intervene in the foreign exchange market. However, in the 
case where a particular country has ambitious stabilization objectives, the government 
will intervene frequently. Payne and Vitale (2003) use tick-by-tick transaction data 
with an event study approach to analyse intervention by the Swiss National Bank. 
They apply Hasbrouck’s (1991) structural VAR approach to analyse the price impact 
in terms of two distinct aspects: information effects and liquidity effects. Pasquariello 
(2010) expands the previous Swiss data set to 1998 and uses 5-minute interval quotes. 
He finds that interventions are significant in affecting market volatility and spreads, 
and the effects are persistent. Like the Swiss National Bank, the Bank of Canada also 
provides its intervention data to the public. Fatum and King (2005) analyse the 
behaviour of the Canadian dollar against the US dollar, and find that intervention can 
reduce exchange rate volatility but is ineffective in controlling currency co-
movements. With regard to the impact on market behaviour, the Japanese central bank 
always intervenes around the lunchtime in the Tokyo time zone.  
Kim (2007) sets two intervention time periods of 24 hours, both starting overnight but 
with one ending at the London closing time and the other during the New York 
afternoon hours. He finds that the first horizon intervention has unwanted results, but 
the second horizon intervention impacts returns immediately and reduces the volatility 
effectively. Fatum and Pedersen (2009) use intervention information from the Danish 
central bank and demonstrate that interventions significantly influence exchange rate 
returns. They also show that intervention, as a short-term instrument and without 
previous announcement, cannot affect the exchange rate immediately. 
  21 
Overall, use of high-frequency data in intervention analysis has performed better, and 
achieved more effective and significant results. Most studies provide strong evidence 
that intervention can move the exchange rate in the required direction in the short 
term and effectively reduce volatility. Recent research has used even higher frequency 
data to analyse central bank intervention. This has proved to be more precise and 
helpful to direct policy-makers, and could be instrumental for analysing China’s 
intervention in the foreign exchange market.  
For emerging markets, the lack of sufficiently high-frequency data before the late 
1990s obstructed the development of the intervention literature. The two major 
electronic trading platforms and data vendors, EBS and Reuters, now provide detailed 
and global-scale high-frequency data on major currency pairs, which facilitates the 
microstructure study in the field (Berger et al. 2008). The microstructure approach is 
now widely applied.  
Evans and Lyons (2003) bond intervention and order flow together. They show that 
interventions contain current/future FX policy information, which is conveyed by 
order flow to impact the price. They highlight that the whole day trading process 
would reveal how order flow conveys information to affect the portfolio balance and 
transaction price. In their view, if the intervention trades are sterilized, secret, and 
provide no policy signal, the intervention will be effective. Vitale (2011) formulates a 
model to analyse market conditions for interventions and the impact of the 
interventions on exchange rate values from the microstructural perspective. In testing 
the model, he notes the importance of choosing the best route for intervention, 
because it not only changes the exchange rate, but also impacts on the market 
conditions. 
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Menkhoff (2013) points out that some emerging market interventions differ from 
those in advanced economies. Many emerging economies have under-developed 
institutions and less diversified economic environments, but they hold huge amounts 
of foreign reserves and actively seek the best ways to manage intervention for 
maintaining market stability. This has rekindled researchers’ interest in looking for 
evidence on the effectiveness of interventions in these countries. Disyatat and Galati 
(2007) use daily information from 2001 to 2002 to study the effect of intervention in 
the Czech market. They find that intervention impact on the spot rate is slightly 
significant, but there is no direct effect on short-term volatility. Scalia (2008) uses 
daily and hourly information to analyse Czech intervention in the CZK/EUR rate 
during the period 1
st
 July to 30
th
 December 2012. He finds that order flow 
significantly affects the exchange rate. Scalia (2008) divides the Czech Republic 
intervention regime into three types. For totally secret intervention, the price impact 
on the exchange rate is 6.6 basis points per 10 million euro of order flow. This rises to 
9.3 basis points for partially expected intervention, while for expected intervention it 
is nearly double, at 12.2 basis points per 10 million euro order flow.  
With regard to Asia, Marsh (2011) examines the effectiveness of Japanese  
intervention during the period August 2002 to March 2006, covering 890 trading days. 
He notes that there is limited evidence of correlation between the customer and 
interventions, but on intervention days the customer prefers to be the net buyer. Marsh 
(2011) also indicates that the correlation between order flow and exchange rate 
disappears when the Bank of Japan intervenes. 
Informed by the development of this literature, in particular the work within the 
microstructural approach using high frequency data, this chapter examines from a 
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microstructural perspective to what extent the Chinese intervention is effective. 
Emphasis is placed on the role of order flow in the process. In particular, this research 
explores how order flow transmits signals between intervention operations and the 
exchange rate via the information and liquidity effects. 
2.3 Literature Review of Exchange Rate  Regime Shifts 
In Section three, this chapter review the relevant literature including those on the 
classification of exchange rate regimes, the methods of identifying the timing of 
regime shifts and the economic significance of currency risk exposure. 
2.3.1 De Jure and De Facto Exchange Rate Regimes 
Since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system, exchange rate volatility has been a 
major topic in economics. In the more recent literature, the debate has centred in 
particular on de facto exchange rate arrangements. Klein and Shambaugh (2010) note 
that since 1950, what the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have presented in its 
annual report on members’ exchange rate arrangements have been the de jure 
exchange rate regimes, which may differ from the actual regimes. Calvo and Reinhart 
(2002) state that although governments may announce the adoption of floating 
exchange rate regimes, in general they have a ‘fear of floating’. As a result, the actual 
practice of central banks often differs from the stated exchange rate regime. For 
example, if a government is seeking to keep the exchange rate stable under a flexible 
exchange rate regime, it might intervene to limit the exchange rate volatility.  
Alternatively, if a government is unable to maintain a reportedly fixed exchange rate 
regime, the exchange rate might exhibit variability. This gap between the government 
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announced (de jure) and the actual (de facto) operations has prompted many 
researchers to attempt to classify the de facto exchange rate regime (e.g., Levy-Yeyati 
and Sturzenegger, (2005) Reinhart and Rogoff, (2004)Eichengreen and Razo-Garcia,  
(2011). In one of the first studies to classify exchange rate regimes using an approach 
different than that of the IMF, Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) focus on the 
behaviour of macro-variables. They find that the slower economic growth and much 
greater output volatility in the developing countries are related to governments’ use of 
less flexible exchange rate regimes. Reinhart and Rogoff (2004) develop a new 
classification of exchange rate regimes and find that the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods system had less impact on changes to the regimes than suggested in previous 
studies. Shambaugh (2004) uses the real behaviour to classify exchange rate regimes, 
and finds that the fixed rate countries follow the base country’s interest rate more 
closely than do countries where there is no peg. Benassy-Quere, Coeure and Mignon 
(2006) examine 139 countries with regard to their exchange rate pegging to basket 
currencies, and find that the hard peg regimes do not have any diminishing trend even 
after the financial crisis period.  
The U.S. dollar is still the major fixed currency. Patnaik et al. (2011) argue that 
during the financial crisis ‘fear of floating’ caused Asian countries to reduce the 
flexibility of their exchange rate regimes, but after the crisis exchange rate flexibility 
became greater than in the prior period. Meanwhile, most of the Asian countries 
continue to reduce the role of the U.S. dollar and slowly increase the flexibility of 
their currencies. Aizenman and Sun (2012) maintain that in recent decades, the fear of 
floating has induced governments to hoard huge amounts of international reserves. 
However, during the global financial crisis, ‘fear of losing international reserves’ 
proved stronger than ‘fear of floating’. 
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Some researchers have focused their attention on the de facto exchange rate regimes 
of emerging markets, especially China (Eichengreen 2007, Williamson 2000). Frankel 
and Wei (2007) assess the nature of China’s exchange rate regime after the changes 
introduced by the government in July 2005. They find that after that announcement, 
the de facto regime of China is such that the RMB is still pegged to the dollar. 
Goldstein and Lardy (2008) summarise the debate on the advantages and 
disadvantages of China’s exchange rate policy since July 2005. Frankel and Wei 
(2008) use a new approach with two techniques on 20 currencies to estimate the de 
facto exchange rate regimes in China over the period 1980 to 2007. Frankel (2009) 
examines the China foreign exchange regime based on currency weights in, and 
flexibility of, the reference basket. He finds that in mid-2007, the RMB exchange rate 
switched from a dollar peg to a peg mainly to the euro, but without additional 
currencies in the reference basket.  
Fidrmuc (2010) applies the Kalman filter to investigate the weights of the unpublished 
reference basket currencies over the period 2005-2009. He finds that the U.S. dollar 
maintained a greater weight until the breakout of the recent global financial crisis 
around 2007. Frankel and Xie (2010) use two approaches to estimate the de facto 
weights of the reference basket and the de facto degree of exchange rate flexibility. 
They find that the real world data allows the regimes to change frequently. Meanwhile, 
Zeileis et al. (2010) employ a unified toolbox to estimate, among others, the exchange 
rate regime of China since July 2005. Zhang et al. (2011) develop a formal model to 
investigate the optimal weights of the basket currencies for China, which gives 
normative indications of the possible currency composition of the basket China uses 
as a central element of the new exchange rate regime.  
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2.3.2 Regime Shift Models and Exchange Rates 
To capture the exact timing of the regime shift, this research must first find the 
structural break points.  The conventional test for structural break points (Chow 1960) 
is conditional upon knowing the dates of the structural breaks. Andrews (1993) 
extends the Chow test to identify the structural breaks without knowing the break 
points in advance. Alternatively, Hamilton (1989) and Engel and Hamilton (1990) use 
a new and different approach to discern structural breaks, based on exchange rate 
dynamics.  
In the literature, the Markov regime switching model has been widely used to 
characterise the behaviour of the real interest rate, for example in the work of Garcia 
and Perron (1989). Engel and Hamilton’s (1990) pioneering work introduces an 
entirely new statistical model of exchange rate dynamics in two regimes. Engel (1994) 
shows that the Markov switching model can explain the dynamic changes of 18 
currencies and finds the model to have better performance in predicting exchange rate 
changes.  
However, applying the Markov switching model to daily exchange rate data, Marsh 
(2000) finds that this model has poor forecasting capability for out of sample 
exchange rates. Clarida et al. (2003) show better prediction of the out of sample 
exchange rates with the MS-VECM model (i.e. Markov switching vector error 
correction model).  
Using the Markov regime switching model for three major exchange rates, Frömmel 
et al. (2005) reveal the relation between the underlying fundamentals (such as the real 
interest rate differential) and the exchange rate based on a microstructure approach. 
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However, they find the out of sample forecasting power of the Markov model to be 
poor. Dueker and Neely (2007) employ the Markov switching model to explore the 
trading rules to predict the trend of exchange rate returns. They find no evidence to 
prove that higher moments of the exchange rate can increase the returns. Yuan (2011) 
proposes a multi-state Markov switching model to model exchange rate trends with 
filtering techniques. The findings indicate that the model has significant forecast 
performance for both in sample and out of sample exchange rates. Khemiri (2012) 
uses the Markov switching model to explore the relation between exchange rates and 
the underlying fundamentals. In order to examine the exchange rate dynamics, he 
employs the Markov switching model to take the exchange rate volatility and the 
regime switching into consideration. He finds that a positive relation between the 
volatility and volume and order flow has a positive impact on exchange rate returns. 
2.3.3 Economic Significance of Currency Exposure and Multiple GARCH Models 
Under the new Chinese exchange rate regime, the RMB exchange rate has become 
more variable. Consequently, currency risk exposure has become a matter of growing 
interest. The seminal paper of Adler and Dumas (1984) defines the currency exposure 
as the sensitivity of asset price to changes in the exchange rate.  In a later study, Adler 
et al. (1986) develop a capital market approach to examine the currency exposure 
issue, using the coefficient of regression on exchange rate changes and the stock 
returns to measure the currency exposure. De Santis and Gerard (1998) employ the 
multivariate GARCH model to estimate whether exchange risk significantly impacts 
international returns. They find that in all equity markets, excluding that of the U.S., 
the currency risk premium is an economically significant part of the total premium.  
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Doidge et al. (2006) use a portfolio approach to examine the nature of the relation 
between firm values and economic significance of exchange rate exposure, using data 
of 18 countries’ non-financial firms. Their results suggest that the exchange rate plays 
a sizeable economic role in explaining stock returns. Muller and Verschoor (2007) 
assess the exchange risk exposure of Asian  firms. They find that appreciation of the 
Asian currency against foreign currencies has a positive impact on stock returns, and 
vice versa.  
Meanwhile, Aloui (2007) uses the multivariate EGARCH model to study the interplay 
between the  stock price indexes and the exchange rate over the periods of EMS 
(European Monetary System) and EMU (European Monetary System). The results 
show that stock prices have a significant impact on exchange rate changes during 
these two periods. Wong and Li (2010) apply the DCC-GARCH model to examine 
the linkage between the exchange rate and the stock returns during two financial 
crises. Their results not only show a strong relation between stock prices and the 
exchange rate, but also suggest that maintaining exchange rate stability is a crucial 
problem during financial crises.  
Meanwhile, Karunanayake et al. (2010) use the multivariate GARCH model to 
investigate stock market volatility during financial crises. Their results indicate that 
during the 1997 financial crisis the Asian countries’ impact on their own market 
volatility was greater than their influence across markets. There is significant 
evidence to show that stock market volatility has been increased by the 2008 crisis. 
Walid et al. (2011) propose the MS-EGARCH model to explore the relation between 
stock market volatility and exchange rate changes in emerging market countries 
across the periods of two different regimes. The results demonstrate that relations 
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between the stock and exchange market are regime dependent; in particular, exchange 
rate change significantly influences the probability of regime transition. Zhang et al. 
(2011) apply the portfolio method to examine the currency risk exposure of Chinese 
firms. They find that many listed firms have significant exposure to currency risk. 
Chortareas et al. (2012) find evidence from three Middle East and North African 
countries that floating exchange rates cause abnormal returns and volatility.  
This study differs from the previous studies. Specifically, this research propose 
application of Engel’s (2002) DCC-GARCH model (Dynamic Conditional 
Correlation Generalised Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity) to explore 
the economic significance of the RMB exchange risk exposure across the global 
financial crisis, covering the period from 9
th
 Dec 2009 to 9
th
 Oct 2012. 
This chapter has surveyed the research relevant to this thesis, covering the topics of 
exchange rate determination and dynamics, foreign exchange intervention, and 
exchange rate regime shifts in China. All these will be further discussed in the 
following chapters. 
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Chapter 3 
Microstructure of the Chinese Foreign 
Exchange Market 
This chapter reviews the literature relevant to this research. It contains three main 
parts. First, it presents an overview of the market microstructure research. Second, it 
reviews the intervention studies from a microstructural perspective. Finally, this 
chapter reviews the relevant literature on the de jure and de facto exchange rate 
regimes, the regime shift models and exchange rate exposure. 
3.1 Historic Evolution of China’s Foreign Exchange Market 
The development of China’s foreign exchange market has been heavily influenced by 
government exchange rate policy. Zhang (2001 a, b, c) shows that the main feature of 
China’s exchange rate policy in the reform years is the adoption of a strategy that 
follows a variant of Corden’s (1993) ‘real targets’ approach. The target or the mission 
of the exchange rate policy is to promote exports by adjusting the official exchange 
rate to the domestic cost of earning foreign exchange through exporting. This 
necessitates not infrequent changes in the nominal exchange rate, openly or covertly. 
With different degrees of success, the Chinese authorities have experimented with 
various reform efforts that aim to bring realism into China’s exchange rate regime. 
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In December 1978, China announced its intention to reform the economic system. 
Before that time, the country had no financial interaction with the wider world, and 
very limited external trade. Since the 1970s, China’s exchange rate regime has 
evolved in “an experiment of gradualism” (Mehran 1996). Botterlier (2004) and 
Huang and Wang (2004) state that the regime changed from a dual-rate system to a 
managed float with a de facto peg to the US dollar within a very narrow band. 
Under the earlier dual exchange rate system, foreign and Chinese enterprises were 
permitted to trade foreign exchange with their own negotiated exchange rates in swap 
centres. This research created opportunities for arbitrage between swap centres. In the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, increasing amounts of corruption generated further market 
distortions. By the end of 1993 the authorities unified the official and swap market 
exchange rates (Truman 2008). On the first day of 1994, China adopted the managed-
float regime with a narrow band. This reform process was disrupted by the outbreak 
of Asian financial crisis leading China to becoming cautious against excessive 
exchange rate fluctuations. Increasingly the Chinese currency was pegged to the US 
dollar. But the Chinese authorities have repeatedly stated that they are committed to 
allowing more flexibility to the exchange rate arrangements. 
With the reforms, the Chinese foreign exchange market gradually becomes mature. In 
1979, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) was established as a sub-
institution of the Bank of China (BOC). In 1982 it became part of the central bank, i.e. 
People’s Bank of China (PBC). 
In 1978, the foreign exchange retention system was introduced. The retention 
schemes allowed domestic exporters to retain a certain portion of their foreign 
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exchange earnings, according to the quotas specified by the government. These 
retained foreign exchange earnings could be used to import goods and service. Two 
years later (1980), the BOC established trading facilities for foreign exchange 
retention quotas in Beijing, Guangzhou, Tianjin and Shanghai. Authorized domestic 
enterprises were able to transfer their quotas to other domestic enterprises at 
negotiated price. In parallel to the introduction of retained foreign exchange 
programme, the State Council introduced the renminbi (RMB) internal settlement rate 
for trade (ISR), effective from January 1, 1981. The ISR was established at RMB 2.8 
per USD, while the official rate at that time was 1.53 per USD, implying a 83% 
devaluation for RMB. Foreigners meanwhile were able to get the official rate with 
their foreign exchange certificates (FECs). 
Despite its importance as an avenue for devalue the then overvalued official exchange 
rate, Lin (1997) shows that ISR was not really determined by market forces. In 
December 1984, the PBC announced the abolishment of the ISR and the official RMB 
exchange rate was devalued to RMB 2.8 per USD. 1984 saw the launch of the second 
round of foreign exchange reform in China. In order to encourage foreign investment 
the Chinese government opened up major coastal areas in April. While the previous 
reform had sought to decentralize foreign trade management, this second round was 
intended to lessen government controls over foreign trade enterprises, or the trade 
liberalization. 
Financial liberalization was also underway. With the foreign exchange retention 
programme, the foreign exchange swap market developed rapidly. By the end of 1988, 
there were 90 foreign exchange swap centres across the country. The value of 
transactions increased from USD 4.7 billion, to USD 86 billion in 1989, with the swap 
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exchange rate being more or less determined by the trading partners freely through 
negotiation. An IMF survey noted that after 1987, China’s foreign exchange rate was 
under a more flexible arrangement. 
From the end of 1991, the government allowed domestic individuals to participate in 
swap market transactions. In 1993, the number of foreign exchange swap centres 
increased to 108, and the swap transaction accounted for the share of China’s total 
external transactions rose from 50% in 1991 to 80% (Lardy 1993, Zhang 2001c). On 
April 4, 1994 an interbank market established in Shanghai, known as the China 
Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) and the previous swap centres were 
transformed into local branches of the CFETS which are linked to the Shanghai centre 
through a nationally integrated electronic network (see table 3.1 for Major event from 
1994 to 2012). 
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Table 3.1 Major Events of China’s Foreign Exchange Trading System 
Year Major Event 
1994 
 Major reforms initiated, unification of the official and swap market rate to ￥8.7 per US$. 
 Swap market participation by domestic entities and individuals no longer permitted. 
 Interbank market established as the CFETS based in Shanghai (April 4). 
 Domestic firms commence purchase/sale of current account foreign exchange balances at 
designated foreign exchange banks. 
 HKD/RMB trading added in the interbank FX market. 
1995 
 Interbank trading in the Japanese yen commences (March). 
1996 
 China accepts IMF Article VIII obligations for current account convertibility (December 1). 
Liberalization of foreign exchange restrictions on residents. 
1998 
 Swap centres permanently closed (FFEs had been the only remaining participants). 
1999 
 IMF classifies RMB exchange rate as a conventional peg (to the U.S. dollar). 
2001 
 China accedes to the WTO (November 10). 
2002 
 Trading in euro commences in interbank market (April). 
2003 
 With approval from the SAFE, the CFETS service hours for interbank FX trading extended 
to 9:30-15:30. 
 The new RMB Electronic Trading System (ET03) formally put into operation, with the F-
system and the new www.chinamoney.com.cn simultaneously coming into play. 
 Hong Kong RMB business clearing banks become members of CFETS, extending CFETS 
services abroad. 
 Yearly turnover of the interbank RMB and FX markets reaches new heights, with 
accumulated FX market volume amounting to US$151.13 billion and interbank lending and 
bond market volume amounting to 17.2 trillion Yuan. 
2004 
 Bank of China (Hong Kong & Macau) Ltd. enters the national interbank FX market to adjust 
its position, indicating that the network and service of CFETS extends abroad for the first 
time. 
 CFETS joins SWIFT. 
 CFETS publishes the 7-day repo index as the reference index for the benchmark interest rate 
of the money market. 
2005 
 The Bank of China Ltd. (BOC) and CFETS sign agreements on comprehensive FX 
cooperation. 
 The PBOC announces the reform of the RMB exchange rate system to a managed floating 
exchange rate regime based on market supply and demand with reference to a basket of 
currencies. 
 Interbank FX forward trading introduced. 
2006 
 The PBOC announces the introduction of market makers and OTC transactions to the inter-
bank spot foreign exchange, and authorizes CFETS to announce the central parity of RMB 
against US dollar, Euro, Japanese Yen and HK dollar on each business day. 
 Interbank FX swap introduced. 
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2007 
 Shanghai Interbank Offered Rate (SHIBOR) officially published. 
 Formal introduction of new generation FX trading system, which integrates products of 
CNY/FX spot, forward and swap and G7 currency pairs trading into a unified trading 
platform. 
 Currency pairs trading introduced in the new generation FX trading system. 
 Opening ceremony of Shanghai CFET-ICAP International Money Broking Co. Ltd., a 
holding subsidiary of CFETS. 
 FX deposit quoting and broking system formally put into operation. 
2008 
 State Administration for Foreign Exchange, Commerce Department and Customs 
Department jointly enact "Online Verification Method of Exchange Rate Settlement of 
Export", enhancing the supervision of cross-border capital flow. 
2009 
 New generation of RMB trading system in spot market has launched. 
 The CFETS Market Data Service has launched for RMB part. 
 The Shanghai Clearing House has established. 
2010 
 The PBOC announces to further promote the RMB exchange rate formation mechanism 
reform and enhance the RMB exchange rate flexibility.  
 The trading between RMB and Ringgit has started in the interbank market. 
 The closing time of interbank market adjusts to 16:30. 
2011 
 The foreign exchange option start trading in the interbank market. 
 The trading between RMB and Australian dollar start trading in the interbank market. 
 The trading between RMB and Canadian dollar start trading in the interbank market. 
2012 
 The RMB against U.S. dollar exchange rate floating band has widened from 0.5% to 1%. 
 The RMB against Japanese Yen can be directly trading in the interbank market. 
Source: ChinaMoney. http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/en/index.html, last accessed on 10 May 2013. 
 
3.2 The Current Trading System 
The China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) is under the administration of 
the People’s Bank of China (PBC) and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange 
(SAFE). The fundamental guidelines for its functioning are that of “adopting multiple 
technological means and trading patterns to meet market demands of various levels”. 
CFETS introduced the FX trading system in April 1994, the RMB credit lending 
system in January 1996, interbank bond trading in June 1997, the trading information 
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system in September 1999 and the official website http://www.chinamoney.com.cn in 
June 2000.  
RMB voice brokering began in July 2001 and the monthly periodical 
CHINAMONEY went into publication in October 2001. FX deposit brokering 
debuted in June 2002, and in June 2003 the paper quotation system was introduced. In 
May 2005, interbank trading in foreign currency pairs was introduced, followed in 
June of that year by interbank bond forward trading and in August by RMB/FX 
forward trading. Through the modes of electronic trading and voice brokering, 
CFETS provides the interbank FX market, RMB lending, bond market and paper 
market with trading, clearing, information and surveillance services. CFETS has 
played a significant role in safeguarding RMB exchange rate stability, transmitting 
Central Bank monetary policies, serving financial institutions and supervising market 
operations. 
CFETS is the interbank trading and foreign exchange division of China's Central 
Bank. The CFETS and the National Interbank Funding Centre are subordinate to 
direct control of the PBC. CFETS’ main functions include interbank foreign exchange 
trading, RMB interbank lending, bond trading, and the organization of interbank 
foreign exchange transactions. It also provides settlement facilities for foreign 
exchange transactions, delivery and settlement services for RMB interbank lending 
and bond trading, online bill pricing system, information services for foreign 
exchange, bond and money markets. With approval of the PBC, it may also initiate 
developing other businesses. 
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The CFETS has its headquarters in Shanghai and a back-up centre in Beijing. There 
are 18 sub-centres throughout the country, in Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Tianjin, Jinan, 
Dalian, Nanjing, Xiamen, Qingdao, Wuhan, Chongqing, Chengdu, Zhuhai, Shantou, 
Fuzhou, Ningbo, Xi'an, Shenyang, and Haikou. At the end of April 2013, the CFETS 
had a total of 5851 members, made up of 40 solely state-owned banks, 79 joint stock 
commercial banks, 3 policy banks, 149 urban commercial banks, 66 Foreign banks, 
80 foreign-funded banks, 60 trust and investment companies, 492 rural credit co-
operatives, 1056 corporate pensions and 88 social security funds (see Table 3.3). Its 
affiliated institution, the Interbank Lending Market has a total membership of 955 
(see Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2 Members of the National Interbank Lending Market  
Financial Institution Num. 
Solely state-owned bank 35 
Joint stock commercial bank 76 
Policy bank 3 
Urban commercial bank 122 
Insurance company, Securities company 91 
        Foreign-funded bank, Trust & investment company 116 
Rural credit co-operative 250 
Rural commercial bank and cooperative bank 144 
Others 118 
Total 955 
Source: ChinaMoney. http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/fe/Channel/2802537, last accessed on 10 May 
2013. 
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Table 3.3 Members of the Chinese Foreign Exchange Trading System 
Financial Institution Num. 
Solely state-owned bank 40 
Joint stock commercial bank 79 
Policy bank 3 
Urban commercial bank 149 
Foreign bank 66 
Foreign-funded bank 80 
Financial leasing company 18 
Insurance company  113 
Securities company 113 
Fund 1108 
Financial company 86 
Rural credit co-operative 492 
Trust & investment company  60 
Fund management company 61 
Urban credit co-operative 4 
Social security fund  88 
Asset management company 5 
Investment company 1 
Corporate pension 1056 
Auto financing company 8 
Others 2221 
Total 5851 
Source: ChinaMoney. http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/fe/Channel/2802537, last accessed on 10 May 
2013. 
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3.3 Products and Services 
The CFETS offers services that cover RMB/foreign currency spot trading, foreign 
currency/foreign currency spot trading, RMB/foreign currency forward trading, RMB 
interbank lending, and RMB bond trading (see Table 3.4). 
 
Table 3.4 Products and Services of CFETS 
Membership 
All the banks, non-banking financial institutions and non-financial corporations 
that satisfy the qualifications set by the regulators for interbank FX spot trading 
can apply for membership of CFETS and conduct principal trading in the 
interbank spot FX market. 
Trading 
mode 
Electronic matching system: members quote independently and the trade system 
matches the quotations in priority of price and order. 
Over The Counter (OTC) trading system: members negotiate directly according 
to the principle of “bilateral credit, bilateral clearing”. 
Trading 
Hour 
(Beijing 
Time) 
Monday- 
Friday 
(Chinese 
holidays 
excluded) 
RMB/foreign currency spot 
trading 
Automatic price-matching 
transactions 
9:30 to 15:30 
OTC transactions 9:30 to 17:30 
Foreign currency/ foreign currency spot 
trading 
    7:00 to 19:00 
RMB/foreign currency forward trading 
  
9:30 to 17:30 
RMB interbank lending     
9:00 to 12:00 
13:30 to 16:30 
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Trading 
Currency 
RMB/foreign currency 
USD, HKD, JPY, EUR, GBP, AUD, 
CAD; MYR, RUB 
Foreign currency/ foreign currency 
EUR/USD, AUD/USD, GBP/USD, 
USD/JPY, USD/CAD, USD/CHF, 
USD/HKD, EUR/JPY 
Clearing 
RMB/ foreign  
Currency spot trading 
Automatic price-matching 
trade system 
Centralized, two-way 
and netted 
T+2 
OTC transactions T+2, T+1, T+0 
For foreign currency/ foreign currency spot trading 
Centralized and netted 
T+2 
RMB/foreign currency 
forward trading 
Delivery at maturity or netted delivery based on the 
difference between the agreed forward rate and the 
spot rate at maturity. 
RMB interbank lending 
Bilateral gross clearing according to the transaction 
notice 
T+ 1, T+0 
RMB bond trading 
Payment after delivery 
Delivery after payment 
Delivery vs. payment 
Source: ChinaMoney, http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/fe/Channel/2799974, last accessed on 10 May 
2013. 
 
All financial or non-financial institutions that satisfy the regulatory qualifications can 
apply for membership of CFETS and conduct business accordingly. The interbank FX 
market employs an electronic matching system and an OTC (over-the-counter) trading 
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system. Members can choose either mode. For electronic matching, members quote 
independently and the trade system matches the quotations in priority of price and 
order. For OTC trading, the system provides technological facilities for members to 
negotiate directly on such trading factors as trading currencies, exchange rate and 
amount, according to the principle of “bilateral credit, bilateral clearing”.  
Trading hours for RMB/ foreign currency spot trading are from 9:30 to 15:30 for  
automatic price-matching transactions and 9:30 to 17:30 for OTC transactions. 
For foreign currency/ foreign currency spot trading, the system is open from 7:00 to 
19:00. The business hours for RMB/foreign currency forward trading are from 9:30 to 
17:30. Finally, the RMB interbank lending operates from 9:00 to 12:00 for the 
morning session, followed by a lunch break, and then by an afternoon session from 
13:30 to 16:30. The business hours are in Beijing time and all the transactions are 
open Monday to Friday, excluding Chinese holidays. 
The system offers spot trading in RMB against the USD, HKD, JPY and EUR; 
CNY/MYR and CNY/RUB. For foreign currency/ foreign currency spot trading, the 
currency pairs include EUR/USD, AUD/USD, GBP/USD, USD/JPY, USD/CAD, 
USD/CHF, USD/HKD and EUR/JPY. A membership system applies for 
RMB/foreign currency forward trading. Participants are confined to those who are 
licensed for financial derivatives trading issued by the supervisory department. 
The clearing of RMB/ FX spot trading on the automatic price-matching system 
follows the principles of “centralized, two-way and netted”. CFETS handles clearing 
for all trading members, with a clearing speed of T+2. While RMB clearing goes 
through the payment system of the PBC, foreign currencies are cleared through 
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overseas clearing systems. OTC transactions are to be settled with the clearing speed 
of T+2, T+1 or T+0 depending on own arrangements between the parties involved. 
The foreign currency pairs business follows the “centralized and netted” principle for 
their clearance. The clearing speed is T+2.  The forward trading in RMB/foreign 
currencies adopts the bilateral clearing mode, which can be either gross principal 
delivery at maturity or netted delivery based on the difference between the agreed 
forward rate and the spot rate at maturity.  
The Chinese foreign exchange trading system is a computerized, real-time electronic 
trading system across the whole country. A digital certification centre was established 
in 2002, with seven relay stations in Shanghai, Beijing, Guangzhou, Shenzhen, Jinan, 
Tianjin and Dalian through which all members of CFETS are connected to the 
network. CFETS adopts a double-backup structure (in Shanghai and Beijing), while 
the national communication networks operated by different telecommunication 
companies are backups to each other. 
3.4 Order Flow and its Measurement 
To better our understanding of the Chinese exchange rate policy, this research follow 
the microstructure approach to analysing exchange rate dynamics in the Chinese 
foreign exchange market, as opposed to traditional macro models. At the core of this 
approach is the variable of order flow, which this research will first construct a new 
index as its proxy reflecting excess demand pressure in the Chinese foreign exchange. 
In a VAR modelling framework, this thesis try to answer the following questions:  
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1) Does order flow have explanatory power in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market? 
2) To what extent does order flow capture the behaviour of the RMB exchange 
rate against international currencies, particularly the US dollar? 
3) To what extent can order flow analysis explain the price formation process in 
the Chinese foreign exchange market?  
Lyons (2001) points out that order flow and bid-ask spread are the core microstructure 
variables to transmit and reflect private information. These microstructure attributes 
define, respectively, the volume and price of foreign exchange transactions. In 
particular, order flow, as the aggregator of dispersed information regarding macro 
fundamentals, is the medium between macroeconomic fundamentals and exchange 
rates hence is the critical driving force behind exchange rate dynamics. However, this 
variable is not directly observable, so this research needs to construct a measure of 
order flow as our first step in the order flow analysis of the Chinese foreign exchange 
market.  
3.4.1 Definition of Order Flow 
O’Hara (1995, p. 1) defines market microstructure as “the process and outcomes of 
exchanging assets under explicit trading rules”. This definition broadly explains the 
microstructure approach that looks at participants in the market and their constraints 
in the trading process. The application of this approach to foreign exchange market 
has produced some promising results in explaining exchange rate changes. Central to 
this progress is the application of the order flow analysis.  
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Order flows are a variable that may reveal the ‘motive’ of the participant initiating the 
transaction in foreign exchange. Evans and Lyons (2002a) show that order flows 
provide information about the necessary risk premiums required to clear the market. 
They can also reflect return-relevant information that is dispersed among market 
participants (Evans and Lyons 2003). Given that macro statistics are an aggregate of 
an array of micro information and are usually announced with a lag, it is also possible 
such micro information may be released to the market through customer order flows. 
Consequently, order flows may reflect dispersed micro elements of information that 
will be aggregated and published as macro fundamentals. By observing order flows, 
market-makers who determine the exchange rate can collect such information from 
traders, and therefore can aggregate information, which they previously did not have, 
into the exchange rate (Bjønnes and Rime 2005). Empirical analysis shows that order 
flows are able to explain a significant part – one half to two-thirds – of the exchange 
rate fluctuations (Evans 2002). The following figure 3.1 shows the information 
processing stages.  
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Figure 3.1 Information processing 
Order flow is different from transaction volume in that it is signed (Lyons 2001). 
Where the initiator of the transaction is on the sell side, the order flow takes a 
negative sign and the order flow takes on a positive sign while the initiator is on the 
buyer side.  Then order flow can be measured as the sum of the signed seller-initiated 
and buyer-initiated orders. A negative sum indicates net selling pressure over the 
period. Evans and Lyons (2002a, b) therefore regard order flow as the net balance of 
buyer-initiated and seller-initiated foreign exchange market transactions. Given its 
nature, order flow can be considered as an indicator of buying and selling pressure on 
a given currency that will affect its spot exchange rate. 
3.4.2 Construction of the Measure of Order Flow 
Order flows are not directly observable. One way to capture the order flow is from the 
transaction records (Lyons 2001). However, in the real world, confidentiality means 
that complete transaction records are not available to researchers. In this situation, 
there are two proposed methods for computing order flow. One is to estimate one 
Stage 1 
Not know fundamental 
information from direct 
source. 
Stage 2 
Learn fundamental 
information from order 
flow. 
Price 
Order Flow 
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period and the next period end-user currency holdings from portfolio holdings. The 
other is to compare two sequential time periods, quoting price from transaction price 
(Evans 2011). In this section this work follow the latter method to construct measures 
of order flow without details of every transaction. 
Order flow is transaction volume that is signed. So in order to obtain the order flow, it 
is necessary to get the transaction volume. In the foreign exchange market, there are 
two major electronic trading platforms: Thomson Reuters and the Electronic 
Brokerage System (EBS). Reuters generally provides data only on the number, not the 
volume, of trades. However, since, as shown in Bjønnes and Rime (2005) and Killen 
et al. (2006), analyses based on trade size and numbers of trades are not qualitatively 
different, our not having the trade volume should not influence the empirical analysis 
and results. 
On the other hand, in order to figure out the order flow this work need to identify 
whether the trade is buyer or seller initiated, and most data do not supply the trade 
direction. This research now first tackle this problem by finding different methods to 
infer trade direction from adjacent prices and quotes. 
To understand how these algorithms work, Let S
B
t and S
A
t denote the most recent bid 
and ask quotes for FX before a trade takes place at time t with a transaction price of St. 
There are two major methods of inferring trade direction (Evans 2011), as follows:  
(1) Tick test, which use changes in trade prices to infer direction. For this test this 
thesis compare the previous trade price and current trade price.  If the trade occurs at a 
higher price than the previous trade (an uptick), it is classified as a buy. If the trade 
occurs at a lower price than the previous trade (a downtick) it is classified as a sell. 
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When the price change between trades is zero (a zero tick), the trade is classified 
using the last price that differs from the current price. Lyons (1995) and Sias and 
Starks (1997)  have used the tick test. The rules used to identify whether the buyer 
initiates the trade or seller of FX are laid out in the following table 3.5. 
 
Table 3.5 Identification Algorithms: Tick Test 
Conditions Inference for trade at   
        Buyer-Initiated 
        Seller-Initiated 
Source: Evans (2011) , Exchange Rate Dynamics :Princeton University Press.. 
 
The reverse tick test is similar, but uses the next trade price to classify the current 
trade. If the next trade occurs on an uptick or zero uptick, the current trade is 
classified as a sell. If the next trade occurs on a downtick or zero downtick, the 
current trade is classified as a buy. 
 
(2) The Lee and Ready Method. Lee and Ready (1991) extend the tick test to infer 
trade direction by comparing trade prices to quotes. For this test this research need the 
bid-ask price and account the midpoint price data. Trades above or below the 
midpoint are classified as buys or sells. Here the current transaction price, St, is first 
compared against the midpoint of the prevailing quotes, 1/2(S
A
t + S
B
t). If this 
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comparison fails to identify the initiator because St = 1/2(S
A
t + S
B
t), the trade is then 
classified using the tick test. The rules used to identify whether the buyer initiates the 
trade or seller of FX are displayed in the following table 3.6. 
 
Table 3.6 Identification Algorithms: Lee and Ready Test 
Conditions Inference for trade at   
   
 
 
   
    
   
Buyer-Initiated 
   
 
 
   
    
   
Seller-Initiated 
   
 
 
   
    
             Buyer-Initiated 
   
 
 
   
    
             Seller-Initiated 
Source: Evans (2011), Exchange Rate Dynamics :Princeton University Press. 
 
For this research, the original foreign exchange transaction data are from Reuter 3000 
Xtra. However, they only supply the 30,000 transactions price data and updated with 
every new tick occur. This research contributes to the literature by identifying how to 
use the bid and ask price in construct the index of order flow in this setting. In the 
definition of order flow, two things are important: trade direction and the sum of 
transaction volume. Evans (2011, p. 19) stated that order flow data comes in the form 
of the imbalance between buy and sell orders for FX: “True this is no actual order 
flow, but in reality it appears to be a close proxy because there is comparatively little 
variation in the size of individual currency orders.” 
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The task of this research then is to solve two major problems, i.e. finding the trading 
direction and summing up the tick trading direction of intraday data. This work 
combines the tick test with Lee and Ready’s method. Take one day’s data, 05/01/2009 
for example. First, this work use every tick bid and ask observation to calculate every 
midpoint data. Second, this research compare St = 6.8367(05/01/2009) with every 
midpoint data of that day. If the dealer buys, the order flow for that trade can be 
signed as +1. If the dealer sells, the order flow for that trade can be signed as -1. Next, 
depending on the situation this research use a suitable model from the above table to 
get each trading direction of that day, and then sum them up; for 5
th
 January 2009 we 
get +372.  This is called the “order imbalance” (Evans 2011). As can be seen, if this 
work cannot get order flow directly, period by period changes in order imbalance are 
the main factors driving order flow, so serial correlation in order flow closely follows 
that in order imbalance. Following the above algorithm, this research can construct 
the measure of order flow for time periods of one month and longer. 
3.5 China Special foreign exchange ‘Management’ Policy 
In this section, this research first introduces the background of the China special 
foreign exchange rate ‘management’ policy.  Then, this section explains the trading 
mechanism of the Chinese foreign exchange market in this study. 
3.5.1 The China’s FX Market Intervention 
From 21
st
 June 2005, the People’s Bank of China ended the fixed regime whereby the 
Renminbi (RMB) exchange rate was pegged to the US dollar, and began to implement 
a managed exchange rate regime in which the RMB is allowed to float with reference 
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to a basket of currencies, based on market supply and demand.
2
 The basket currencies 
are selected and weighted based on the domestic and international economic situation 
(PBOC 2005). In this ‘managed floating’ regime, the following points apply: 
(1) To manage the international balance of payments the current and capital 
accounts are treated as different sets. 
(2) Foreign exchange settlement is no longer compulsory.3 
(3) Strict qualifying conditions limit the number of members of the interbank 
foreign exchange market in the China Foreign Exchange Trade System 
(CFETS).  In addition, members are subject to limitation on the scale of their 
foreign exchange holding, and there is a restriction on the daily exchange rate 
fluctuation range.
4
 
 
In order to control the daily exchange rates within crawling bands,
5
 on each business 
day the Central Bank announces the CPR. Under this regime, the People’s Bank of 
China (PBOC) in the Shanghai CFETS implements foreign exchange sterilized 
intervention on behalf of the Chinese government. The PBOC, as a member of 
                                                 
2 See the People’s Bank of China official website: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/, last accessed on 10 May 
2013. 
3 On August 13, 2007, The State Administration of Foreign Exchange announced the lifting of the limit 
on domestic institutions’ foreign exchange accounts management.  Domestic institutions are now free 
to retain their own current account foreign exchange incomes. 
4 From 4th January 2006, the People’s Bank of China has announced the daily CPRs of CNY (Chinese 
Yuan, international term for renminbi [RMB]) against the USD on every trading day. Before business 
opens, the CFETS collects all the members’ quotes, cuts off the highest and lowest, and calculates the 
weighted average of each member’s price as the CPR of USD/CNY. The other currencies, such as 
CNY against EUR, JPY, HKD, GBP, MYR, RUB, AUD and CAD are calculated by cross rates 
between USD/CNY.  
5 The CNY against USD used to float within a narrow band of 0.3% around the CPR published by 
CFETS. On 18th May 2007, this band changed to 0.5%. On 16th April 2012, the Central Bank of China 
changed it to 1%. 
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CFETS, buys and sells the Renminbi against the US dollar, euro, Japanese yuan and 
other major foreign currencies with the other members in the FX spot market.
6
  
 
Table 3.7 International Balance of Payments and FX Reserves in China 
International Balance of Payments and FX Reserves in China 
Year 
Current 
Account 
Balance 
Net Capital 
Inflows 
Reserves 
Change
7
 
Net Errors and 
Omissions 
Foreign 
Exchange 
Reserves 
2005 1,324 953 -2,506 229 8188.72 
2006 2,318 493 -2,848 36 10663.44 
2007 3,532 942 -4,607 133 15282.49 
2008 4,206 401 -4,795 188 19460.30 
2009 2,433 1,985 -4,003 -414 23991.52 
2010 2,378 2,869 -4,717 -529 28473.38 
2011 2,017 2,211 -3,878 -350 31811.48 
Sources: Cumulated sum of years, in billions of US dollars. Published by State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE), http://www.safe.gov.cn, last accessed on 10 May 2013. 
 
Table 3.7 shows China’s international balance of payments and foreign exchange 
reserves from 2005 to 2011. As can be seen from the table, the reserve accumulation 
has grown rapidly in recent years. Before 2009, the current account balance is much 
higher than the net capital inflows. This reflects the influence of the net private capital 
inflows. The huge current account surplus places the exchange rate under appreciation 
                                                 
6 See China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) official website: 
http://www.chinamoney.com.cn, last accessed on 10 May 2013. 
7 The negative sign on reserve changes means that the Chinese foreign exchange authority (SAFE) has 
drawn on the reserves. 
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pressure. In the most recent two years shown in the table, the current account becomes 
lower than the net capital inflows. This indicates the deficit in China and shows the 
impact on China of the financial crisis. However, this does not ease the upward 
pressure on the Renminbi (RMB). While the foreign exchange reserves have also 
increased rapidly over the past seven years, 2008 can be seen as a turning point.  This 
is because, before August 2007, China applied the compulsory foreign exchange 
settlement system, under which only the state-regulated foreign exchange accounts 
could be retained, while businesses and individuals were obliged to sell their excess 
foreign exchange to the designated banks, and if the designated banks held foreign 
exchange higher than the national foreign exchange management positions, they must 
sell their excess foreign exchange in the interbank market.  Under this system, the 
Central Bank was the largest in the interbank buying consortium to form the country’s 
foreign exchange reserves. After 2008, we can find that the foreign exchange reserves 
follow a declining trend. 
Figure 3.2 shows the relation between the monthly changes of foreign exchange 
reserves and exchange rate price (USD/CNY). From the figure, we can see that the 
foreign exchange reserves increase rapidly during these years but the exchange rate 
prices are fairly stable during the financial crisis period. This suggests that the Central 
Bank of China might have engaged in large-scale foreign exchange intervention 
during these years. 
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Figure 3.2 USD/CNY and China Foreign Exchange Reserves  
(July 2005-July 2012) 
 
Since the 1980s, most intervention studies have focused on the effectiveness of 
interventions and accuracy of intervention news reports (Menkhoff 2010). This study 
aims to formulate a microstructure model in the China FX spot market to illustrate the 
effect of Chinese government foreign exchange intervention via order flow that has 
information content. The research demonstrates how order flow that has information 
and liquidity effects transmits signals between the governing authority intervention 
operation and exchange rates. 
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3.5.2 The China’s FX Market Trading Mechanism 
The China spot foreign exchange markets are interbank (interdealer) markets, where 
authorized members can trade spot foreign currencies with other members in the 
China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS). The People’s Bank of China 
(PBOC) authorizes the CFETS to publish a central parity rate before the market 
opening time of every business day. The members usually quote bid and ask prices no 
more than 1% above or below this CPR.
8
 The other members can then search their 
fitted quotes and contact the quoted members to complete the transactions. Individual 
institution customers can only contact the authorized banks as dealers to trade their 
currencies in private. When the customer’s contract or order is executed, the dealer 
will try to find the best quotes in the interbank RMB/FX trading system and trade 
with other members to release their position.  
Each member can negotiate via the electronic bilateral communication system 
supplied by the CFETS, similar to the Reuters Dealing 3000 Spot Matching. The 
CFETS also centralizes limit orders; trading price, size, direction, process and 
member’s information are available, exclusive of trader’s identity. Even after the 
transaction is executed and cleared through the CFETS as the central trading centre, 
the counter parties will still not know each other’s identity. This clearing method 
releases the credit risk, and is convenient and very suitable for extremely price 
sensitive users in the spot FX market. 
                                                 
8 On April 4th 2012, the People’s Bank of China announced that, starting from April 16th 2012, it would 
extend the exchange rate floating band of the RMB against US dollar trading price from 0.5% to 1% in 
the interbank spot foreign exchange market. 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter introduces the general background of the Chinese foreign exchange 
market under a microstructure perspective, including historic evolutions, trading 
system, products and service, core concept of order flow, and special management 
policy. The main topics discussed in this thesis are all based on this background. 
Chapter 4 will discuss the exchange rate determination and dynamics in China. 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 Exchange Rate Determination and 
Dynamics in China: A market microstructure 
analysis 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to shed light on 
exchange rate determination in China. This 
research use a VAR model to investigate the 
relationship between order flow and exchange 
rate in the China FX market. 
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Chapter 4  
Exchange Rate Determination and Dynamics 
in China: A market microstructure analysis 
4.1 Introduction 
With increasing empirical evidence showing that macroeconomic models of exchange 
rate determination perform poorly in capturing foreign exchange rate movements 
(Meese and Rogoff 1983, Frankel and Rose 1995), the market microstructure 
approach to the exchange rate has emerged as a new avenue to explore the forces 
driving exchange rate movements. Focusing on the pivotal role of order flow in the 
transaction process, recent theoretical and empirical works based on this approach 
have demonstrated that this new methodology has promising explanatory power for 
exchange rate changes (Evans and Lyons 2002b).  
However, prior studies in this field have been primarily concerned with key currency 
pairs of mature economies, and little research has been conducted on the potential 
influence of order flow on the emerging markets.
9
 Given China’s growing importance 
in the world economy in general and international currency relations in particular, 
                                                 
9
 A notable exception is the recent work of Duffuor et al. (2012) who, by adopting the microstructure 
approach, examine the explanatory power of order flow in Ghanaian foreign exchange market and find 
that order flow has a significant, positive effect on the official exchange rate in both stable and crisis 
periods. Wu (2012) and Gereben et al. (2006) are two other studies on emerging markets that adopt a 
microstructure framework. 
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there is a pressing need for applying the recent research methodology to further our 
understanding of the Chinese exchange rate policy. The current research represents 
the latest attempt of such efforts. 
This chapter aims to shed some light on exchange rate determination in China using a 
VAR model, generated within the market microstructure framework, to estimate the 
relationship between order flow and the exchange rate in the Chinese foreign 
exchange market. Specifically, this chapter seek to address the following questions:
 
 
(1) Does the order flow help to capture the exchange rate movements of Chinese 
currency, the renminbi (RMB) against the US dollar as representative of 
China’s exchange rate?   
(2) How do the long- and short-term factors influence the relative value of the 
Chinese currency in the foreign exchange market?  
The results of this chapter’s analyses are of direct interest to regulators and policy 
makers in evaluating the potential role of order flow in influencing the exchange rate 
movements and to practitioners who invest on the basis of market microstructure 
variables, treating them as principal indicators for future market movements.
10
  
Furthermore, this chapter adds to the growing literature studying the determinants of 
foreign exchange rates in a number of ways. First, while the microstructure approach 
has been used to investigate exchange rate dynamics for a range of major international 
currency pairs (Osler 2006, Rime, Sarno, and Sojli 2010), academic studies of 
                                                 
10 An increasing number of studies have found evidence of a relationship between microstructure 
variables such as order flow and exchange rates. This idea has drawn additional support from 
practitioners who believe that, aside from macroeconomic factors, such as interest rates and inflation, 
order flow is one of the most important forces behind major exchange rate movements. 
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Chinese foreign exchange markets using such an important framework are limited. 
This lack of research is, perhaps, surprising given the importance of the Chinese 
markets in terms of both the volume and the value of trade and the growing popularity 
of the market microstructure approach to exchange rate research. Sheng (2013) notes 
that China has become the world’s largest foreign reserve holder, with most of its 
holdings in the US dollar (67.3%). China is also playing an increasingly important 
role in the world’s economy. 
This study presents one of the very few attempts to fill the gap in the literature. The 
results obtained may be particularly relevant in providing a deeper understanding of 
foreign exchange market in such an important economy. Second, unlike many 
previous studies, this research employs a measure of country risk premium as an 
exogenous variable to control for the potential sources of common shocks on the 
exchange rate fluctuations, which appears to be another novelty in the literature.
11
 
Indeed, this may be a reason why the portion of the exchange rate movements 
explained by order flow is lower than what has been documented in more developed 
markets, but unlike previous studies in emerging markets, order flow remains a 
significant factor in the results.
12
 Finally, this study takes into account a unique 
feature of emerging markets, namely, the existence of a strong government 
intervention and its impact on the exchange rate dynamics.  
Overall, this thesis contributes to the microstructure approach to the exchange rates 
research by taking a closer look at the behavior of the exchange rate in China, 
                                                 
11 Wu (2012) argue that macroeconomic variables such as the interest rates, the exchange rates, and 
the country risk premiums may affect the order flow. Thus, careful attention needs to be paid to these 
potential sources of common shocks when studying the relationship between order flow and exchange 
rate movement.    
12 The authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for pointing this out. 
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focusing on the impact of order flow on the exchange rate dynamics. This chapter first 
construct a measure of order flow that is based on high frequency transaction data 
from the Chinese market, from which the cumulative daily order flow is calculated. In 
addition, this research also considers the trading system reform and incorporates the 
consequences of market evolution into our analysis. This chapter’s sample period 
begins with June 2010 to take into account a new “managed floating” exchange rate 
system re-launched in mid-2010. Furthermore, a control variable (i.e., the country risk 
premium) is included in the empirical model because prior studies have shown that 
this risk factor is an important influence of exchange rate dynamics in emerging 
markets.
13  
Finally, using the VAR modeling framework, this chapter investigate 
whether the cumulative order flow is cointegrated with the exchange rate in the 
Chinese foreign exchange market. 
The main findings of this chapter’s investigation can be summarized as follows. First, 
the results of this research indicate that unidirectional causality exists from order flow 
to exchange rate movements. Moreover, this research find that a long-term 
cointegrating relationship exists between the USD/CNY exchange rate and its main 
determinants, i.e., the order flow, the proxy for macro influences and the country risk 
premium. More specifically, the estimated results show that order flow not only 
Granger causes exchange rate movements but also is a significant determinant of the 
exchange rate in the short run. In this chapter’s sample, order flow explains 
approximately 19% of exchange rate movements for every $0.1m USD/CNY 
purchase. Overall, all the findings of this research are consistent with the view that in 
the Chinese market, order flow as a 'signed' measure of trading volume is able to 
                                                 
13 See, for instance, De Medeiro (2004) who find that the country risk premium is a significant factor 
in influencing the Brazilian foreign exchange market. 
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explain a significant proportion of fluctuations in the spot exchange rate between the 
Chinese RMB and the US dollar (USD/CNY). 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section two, this research 
outline China’s exchange rate policy to establish the background for the ensuing 
analysis. Data and methodological issues relating to my empirical investigation are 
discussed in section three. Section four presents the estimation results and discusses 
their main implications. Finally, section five provides a summary and concluding 
remarks. 
4.2 Foreign Exchange Market in China 
The Chinese foreign exchange market is centered on the China Foreign Exchange 
Trading System (CFETS). Founded in April 1994, the CFETS is an institution that is 
under the direct control of China’s central bank, the People’s Bank of China (PBOC). 
As the central bank’s interbank trading and foreign exchange division, the CFETS is 
authorized to organize all aspects of China’s foreign exchange market under the 
guidelines to ‘[adopt] multiple technological means and trading patterns to meet 
market demands of various levels’. The core of the CFETS’ functionality is the 
organization of China’s foreign exchange transactions. The CFETS introduced a FX 
trading system in April 1994, first, for the currency pair of USD/CNY and, then, for 
other pairs between Chinese and other non-USD currencies and for foreign pairs 
between international currencies.
14
 
                                                 
14 
The operation then expands to interbank short-term financing activity, with the RMB credit lending 
system setting up in January 1996 and interbank bond trading in June 1997. In September 1999, 
CFETS’ trading information system was operating, and its official website launched in June 2000. 
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The CFETS has played a significant role in safeguarding RMB exchange rate stability, 
transmitting Central Bank monetary policies, serving financial institutions and 
supervising market operations. The voice brokering began in July 2001, FX deposit 
brokering debuted in June 2002, and in June 2003, and the chapter quotation system 
was introduced. In May 2005, interbank trading in foreign currency pairs was 
introduced, followed in June of that year by interbank bond forward trading and in 
August by RMB/FX forward trading. Through the modes of electronic trading and 
voice brokering, the CFETS provides the interbank FX market, RMB lending, bond 
market and paper market with trading, clearing and surveillance services, and with the 
approval of the PBOC, it may also initiate developing other businesses (see Table 3.4 
in Chapter 3). 
Although the CFETS has its headquarters in Shanghai and a back-up center in Beijing, 
there are a total of 18 sub-centers throughout the country. At the end of April 2008, 
the CFETS had 270 members, while its affiliated institution, the National Interbank 
Funding Centre (NIFC) had a total membership of 1564 as of 2010 (see Table 4.1; 
and for the continuation information see Tables 3.2 and 3.3 in Chapter 3). 
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Table 4.1 Memberships of CFETS and NIFC 
Financial Institution Number Financial Institution Number 
Panel A: CFETS  
Solely state-owned bank 5 
Foreign-funded bank, trust & 
investment company 137 
Joint stock commercial bank 12 Rural credit co-operative 41 
Policy bank 3 Non-banking financial institution 2 
Urban commercial bank 56 Non-financial institutions 1 
Authorized branch of a 
commercial bank 13 Total 270 
Panel B: NIFC  
Solely state-owned bank 4 Financial company 57 
Joint stock commercial bank 14 Rural credit co-operative 395 
Policy bank 3 Trust & investment company  40 
Urban commercial bank 111 Fund management company 53 
Authorized branch of a 
commercial bank 
144 Urban credit co-operative 34 
Foreign-funded bank 77 Social security fund  1 
Financial leasing company 4 Asset management company 5 
Insurance company  82 Investment company 1 
Securities company 90 Corporate pension 57 
Investment fund 390 Auto financing company 1 
Other 1 Total 1564 
Notes: This table details the memberships of the China Foreign Exchange Trading System (CFETS) 
and that of its affiliated institution, the National Interbank Funding Centre (NIFC). Source: China 
Money. http://www.chinamoney.com.cn, last accessed on April 2010. 
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All financial or non-financial institutions that satisfy the regulatory qualifications can 
apply for membership to the CFETS and conduct business accordingly. The interbank 
FX market employs an electronic matching system and an OTC (over the counter) 
trading system. Members can choose either mode. For electronic matching, members 
quote independently, and the trade system matches the quotations in priorities of price 
and then time.  
For OTC trading, the system provides technological facilities for members to 
negotiate directly on trading factors such as trading currencies, the exchange rates and 
amounts, according to the principle of ‘bilateral credit, bilateral clearing’. Trading 
hours for RMB/foreign currency spot trading (including the trading in RMB against 
the USD, HKD, JPY, GBP, AUD, CAD and EUR) currently are from 9:30 to 15:30 
for automatic price-matching transactions and from 9:30 to 16:30 for OTC 
transactions. The business hours are in Beijing time, and all the transactions are open 
Monday to Friday, excluding public holidays.
15
 The business hours for RMB/foreign 
currency forward trading are from 9:30 to 17:30. A membership system applies for 
RMB/foreign currency forward trading, and the participants are confined to those who 
are licensed for financial derivatives trading issued by the supervisory department.  
The clearing of RMB/FX spot trading on the automatic price-matching system 
follows the principles of ‘centralized, two-way and netted’. CFETS handles clearing 
for all trading members, with a settlement period of T+2 (two days after the 
transaction). While RMB settlement goes through the payment system of the PBOC, 
foreign currencies are cleared through overseas clearing systems. OTC transactions 
                                                 
15 For foreign currency/foreign currency spot trading, the system is open from 7:00 to 19:00. The 
currency pairs include EUR/USD, AUD/USD, GBP/USD, USD/JPY, USD/CAD, USD/CHF, 
USD/HKD and EUR/JPY. Finally, the RMB interbank lending operates from 9:00 to 12:00 for the 
morning session, followed by a lunch break, and then an afternoon session from 13:30 to 16:30. 
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are to be settled with the settlement periods of T+2, T+1 or T+0 depending on the 
arrangements between the parties involved.
16
 The CFETS is a computerized, real-time 
electronic trading system across the whole country. A digital certification center was 
established in 2002, with relay stations in seven major cities through which all 
members of CFETS are connected to the network. CFETS adopts a double-backup 
structure (in Shanghai and Beijing), while the national communication networks 
operated by different telecommunication companies serve as backups to each other. 
4.3 Data and Methodology 
4.3.1 Sample and Variables Constructions 
Of the two major electronic trading platforms in the foreign exchange markets (EBS 
and Reuters), Reuters provides data not only on the number but also on the volume of 
trades. Thus, the original foreign exchange rate transaction data for this research is 
sourced from Reuter 3000 Xtra, which provides the entire Chinese market information 
and updated news.
17
 This database supplies tick-by-tick prices, including the high-
frequency data for foreign exchange, futures, interest rates and other markets. In this 
chapter, the research focus on the Chinese foreign exchange spot market and trades 
from the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS). In particular, the initial 
dataset of this research comprises foreign exchange transactions data of the Chinese 
RMB against the US dollar between 8 December 2009 and 2 June 2011, covering 360 
trading days. Trades are recorded for the opening hours of each working day, in 
                                                 
16 The trading in foreign currency pairs follows the ‘centralized and netted’ principles for settlements. 
The settlement period is T+2. The forward trading in RMB/foreign currencies adopts the bilateral 
clearing mode, which can be either gross principal delivery at maturity or netted delivery depending on 
the difference between the agreed forward rate and the spot rate at maturity.  
17 For further information, please see Reuters 3000 Xtra Spotlight China. 
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Beijing Time (GMT+8). The opening time before 13 December 2010 is from 9:30 to 
17:30. After this date, the working time changes to from 9:30 to 16:30.
18
 The spot 
exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and the US dollar (USD/CNY)    is the log 
of the exchange rate transaction price at the end of each working day’s opening-time 
period. This dataset excludes public holidays. 
The daily exchange rate movements are displayed in Figure 4.1. This figure shows 
that there are both oscillation and stabilizing periods during the whole sample period. 
Specifically, the exchange rate was almost fixed during the global financial crisis 
period. Therefore, this research decided to move this chapter’s starting period to 21 
June 2010, the date on which the PBOC announced a new “managed floating” 
exchange rate policy (PBOC 2010).
19
 The estimation period ends on 2 June 2011 
when the latest data are available, and after excluding public holidays, a total of 232 
observations are finally included in this sample period.  
                                                 
18 On 12 December 2010, the interbank foreign exchange market changed its closing time to 16:30. 
Initially, the order flow data are high frequency tick-by-tick data so this research converts them into the 
daily order flow variable. 
19 On 19 June 2010 (Saturday), the PBOC announced that the RMB exchange rate fluctuation would 
follow a “managed floating” regime with reference to a basket of currencies (PBOC 2010). 
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Figure 4.1 The Daily Exchange Rate Movements, USD/CNY 
 
Measurements of three further variables, accumulated order flow   , short-term 
interest rate differential       
  , long-term interest rate differential       
  , and 
country risk premium difference       
  , are as follows. First, to construct a spot 
order flow, a value of +1 is assigned to each buy trade and -1 to each sell trade. One-
day spot order flow is then equal to the sum of the trade signs over the whole working 
period. The daily order flow    is the imbalance of the buyer-initiated orders and 
seller-initiated orders during the opening time of the working day (Evans and Lyons 
2002b). Second, the short-term interest rate differential       
   is the domestic daily 
overnight interest rate minus the foreign (US) daily overnight interest rate. The long-
term interest rate differential       
   is the Chinese daily 12-month interbank 
lending interest rate minus the US daily 12-month interbank lending interest rate. 
These interest rate data are annualized and sourced from DataStream. In addition, this 
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chapter include another variable, the country risk premium. A country’s daily risk 
premium    on lending is equal to the prime-lending rate
20
 minus the 3-month 
Treasury bill rate.
21
 Therefore, the country risk premium difference       
   is the 
domestic minus the foreign risk premium. The descriptive statistics and correlation for 
the main variables of this research are reported in Table 4.2.  
Table 4.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of the Key Variables 
 
Exchange 
Rate    
Order Flow 
   
Short-term 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
      
   
Long-term 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
      
   
Country Risk 
Premium 
Difference 
      
   
Panel A: Summary Statistics 
Obs. 232 232 232 232 232 
Mean 1.8940 -39.3580 0.0198 0.0265 0.1437 
Std. Dev. 0.0150 23.6460 0.0107 0.0095 0.0616 
Skewness 0.1416 -0.2556 2.8379 0.2346 -0.61522 
Excess kurtosis -1.1800 0.0997 9.0617 -1.5225 -1.1815 
JB Normality 
test 
25.841 
[0.0000]** 
2.6163 
[0.2703] 
616.60   
[0.0000]** 
67.1850 
[0.0000]** 
112.98  
[0.0000]** 
Panel B: Correlation Matrix 
   1.0000 0.3005 -0.5175 -0.9605 0.8597 
   0.3005 1.0000 -0.1723 -0.1342 0.0485 
      
   -0.5175 -0.1723 1.0000 0.4821 -0.3505 
      
   -0.9605 -0.1342 0.4821 1.0000 -0.9248 
      
   0.8597 0.0485 -0.3505 -0.924822 1.0000 
Note: This table reports the descriptive statistics and correlations of the five key variables i.e., the log 
of spot exchange rate Pt, the order flow xt, the short-term interest rate differential (it - it*), the long-term 
interest rate differential (rt - rt*) equation, and the country risk premium difference (Rt - Rt*). The 
interest rate data are all transformed according to this formula:  og          . 
                                                 
20 This chapter use US bank prime loan and Chinese one-year lending rates. 
21  This chapter chose China Central Bank 3-month bills and US 3-month Treasury bills (from 
Financial Times). 
22  The correlation between the long-term interest rate differential and the country risk premium 
difference is high. This means the value of the long-term interest rate differential can be predicted by 
the value of the country risk premium difference and inclusion of the both will cause multicollinearity 
which will bias the estimation. Therefore, this correlation is not included in the same model for 
estimation when we construct the structural VAR model. 
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The table 4.2 shows clear evidence of a departure from normality, with most of 
variables failing to pass the JB normality test exclusive of order flow. The skewness 
for every variable under examination is under 3.
23
 From the correlation matrix, we can 
see that the associations between the long- and short-term interest rates and the 
exchange rate are all negative. More important, both the order flow and the country 
risk premium difference have a positive relation with the exchange rate. However, the 
interaction among these variables may be more complex than a simple correlation can 
capture. It is, therefore, interesting and informative to further investigate the extent to 
which these key variables interact in the subsequent sections. 
4.3.1.1 The Exchange Rate and Order Flow 
Evans and Lyons (2002b) argue that a microstructure variable, order flow, has a 
strong positive correlation with the nominal exchange rate. Their original portfolio 
shift model is a very simple exchange rate determination model that contains the order 
flow information. The dynamics of exchange rates are determined by the accumulated 
signed order flow and by the macroeconomic information (such as changes in the 
interest rate differential). This model can be presented as: 
                    (4.1) 
where     is the log spot exchange rate changes;     is the innovations that capture 
the macroeconomic information (e.g., changes in the interest rate differential);     is 
the accumulated signed order flow. Figure 4.2a plots the original levels of the 
                                                 
23 The skewness is used to measure the symmetry of a random variable’s probability distribution. It 
can be positive or negative (von Hippel, 2005). 
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exchange rate and order flow, whereas Figure 4.2b displays the log spot exchange rate 
(  ) and accumulated order flow, denoted by   .  
a)  
 
b)  
 
Figure 4.2 a: Chinese Exchange Rate and Order Flow, 2010/06/21-2011/06/02. 
b: Log Exchange Rate and Accumulated Order Flow, 2010/06/21-2011/06/02 
 
4.3.1.2 The Exchange Rate and Interest Rate  
According to the uncovered interest rate parity (UIP), in equilibrium, the expected 
returns on foreign assets, measured by domestic currency, are equal to that of the 
domestic assets. Thus, for one period, this research has: 
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       (4.2) 
For multiple periods, the UIP implies: 
              
    (4.3) 
Considering the order flow and UIP, this model can be modified as: 
             
           (4.4) 
where    is the log of the exchange rate transaction price, and it is the spot exchange 
rate between the Chinese RMB and the US dollar. It is officially designated as 
USD/CNY. The macroeconomic information     has been replaced by the change of 
the long-term interest rate differential        
  . The reason is that the interest rate 
not only is the major driver of exchange rate changes but also is available in daily 
frequency and is, hence, convenient for empirical research.     is the accumulated 
order flow, and    is the error term. Figure 4.3 displays the short- and long-term 
interest rates and country differences in China and the US. The short-term interest rate 
is clearly non-stationary. The interest rates of the two countries differ greatly. 
Therefore, this research introduces the country risk premium for lending in our 
estimation. 
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Figure 4.3 Nominal Short and Long-term Interest Rates in China and the US 
 
4.3.1.3 Term Spread and Country Risk Difference 
One contribution of our model is the introduction of an additional variable, country 
risk premium, which is not present in the original Evans and Lyons’ (2002a, b) model. 
This variable is used in studies of emerging markets (Duffuor, Marsh, and Phylaktis 
2012, Wu 2012). Theoretically, the external borrowing cost spread represents a 
marginal loan for country   during the year  . In this study, China’s risk premium for 
lending is equal to the prime-lending rate minus the 3-month Treasury bill rate. The 
country risk premium difference       
   then is the domestic risk premium minus 
the foreign risk premium. Evans (2011) outlines a micro-based macro model. In the 
model, the risk premium reflects the fact that the two risk-averse dealers play the role 
of market makers rather than individual investors in the two countries’ economies.  
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For the exchange rate of a pair of currencies, the (log) spot exchange rate    is 
determined by the settings of the short-term interest rate according to the monetary 
policy of the two central banks (Evans 2011). In this study, this research defines the 
domestic and foreign countries as China and the US, and the central banks of these 
two countries are the PBOC and the Federal Reserve (FED), respectively. All dealers 
quote a price of USD/CNY (in log) that is equal to:  
              
      (4.5) 
where    stands for the log of exchange rate;       
   is the short-term interest rate 
differential;    indicates the country risk premium.  
Combining equation (4.5) with equation (4.3), the long-term interest rate can be 
described as:  
 
   
 
 
∑        (4.6) 
Thus, the term spread between the short-term    and the long-term    is equal to:  
       
         
         
   (4.7) 
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The term spread is equal to the country risk premium difference       
  . The term 
spread, the Chinese and US risk premiums and their differences are plotted in Figure 
4.4. 
 
 
Figure 4.4 Term Spread, China and US Risk Premium and Their Differences 
 
4.3.2 Methodological Issues 
The original model developed by Lyons (1995) and Evans and Lyons (2002b) has 
provided a foundation for the market microstructure approach to studying the 
exchange rate. However, in the empirical research, criticism against the linear 
regression model that is used by Evans and Lyons (2002b) in their original format has 
emerged. This criticism is not unreasonable given that if simultaneity bias exists, their 
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model cannot explain it. In the context of the analysis of determinants of exchange 
rate movements, one should consider the feedback effect of the order flow’s 
coefficient. In this case, a positive coefficient on order flow can be explained as either 
a positive exchange rate move or a positive feedback effect. Therefore, Evans and 
Lyons’ estimation method can be inaccurate. In addition, Lyons’ (1995) model is 
based on a single-dealer structure that is quote driven. The CFETS is, however, a 
multi-lateral system that is both order-driven and quote driven. 
In this chapter, this research extend Evans and Lyons’ (2002b) model and apply 
Hasbrouck’s (1991) VAR framework to analyze the microstructure determinants of 
Chinese exchange rate movements.
24
 The vector autoregressive model (VAR), as a 
system regression model implied by Sims (1980), was widely used in the recent 
literature (Payne 2003, Froot and Ramadorai 2005b, Danielsson and Love 2006, Wu 
2012) because VAR modeling is suitable for examining not only the long-run 
relationship between the exchange rate and order flow but also how the long-run 
structure affects the short-term feedbacks. More important, it takes into account the 
potential feedback effect on the standard OLS regression of the order flow’s 
coefficient.  
Therefore, this research start the current research by testing the empirical implications 
of the portfolio shift model (Evans and Lyons 2002b) in a static framework. First, this 
chapter conduct a cointegration analysis with the Johansen’s (1995) trace test under 
the VAR setting. Then, this research apply the graph-theoretic approach to examine 
the instantaneous causality relations between each variable (Demiralp and Hoover 
                                                 
24
 This modeling framework not only has been applied for exchange rates research but also has been 
commonly used to analyze the microstructure of security market (Hasbrouck 1991). 
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2003). Next, this chapter extend the VAR framework to estimate the explanatory 
power of order flow for exchange rate movement in China.
25
  
4.3.2.1 The VAR Model 
Before estimating the VAR approach, this research consider the assumptions of the 
model: 
1. The public information is immediately reflected by the quotes, and 
2. The informed traders exploit their profit through using their market orders. 
Let    represent a vector of transaction characteristics and    be the lag of each 
transaction characteristic, where   is an event-time observation counter. The VAR 
model is as follows: 
           (4.8) 
and, 
                                                 
25
 In the modeling process, this chapter follow the general-to-specific methodology (Hendry and 
Krolzig 2001) to simplify the VAR to parsimonious VAR and to examine not only the long-run 
relationship among the variables of interest, including that between order flow and exchange rate 
movements, but also the behavior of the Chinese exchange rate in terms of its short-run dynamics. See 
Juselius (2006) for more detailed applications. 
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where    is the log of spot exchange rate; 𝑋  is order flow;       
   is the short-term 
interest rate differential;       
   is the long-term interest rate differential;       
   
is country risk premium difference. B are the matrices of coefficients to be estimated 
(, K, M, O and L). Each VAR equation is estimated by OLS with heteroscedasticity 
robust standard errors. 
4.3.2.2 Variable Space in the VAR Specification 
Alternatively, our VAR specifications can also be expressed as follows: 
          𝜀  (4.10) 
Thus, 
   
  [  𝑋       
        
        
  ] (4.11) 
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As discussed, this work includes the country risk premium in the variable space when 
investigating the long-term relation and short-term dynamics in the system for the 
USD/CNY spot exchange rate. The variable    and the companion matrix Γ are 
allowed for a general number of lags and are constant across currencies.  [𝜀 𝜀 
 ]  
  is the covariance matrix, allowing residuals across the system equations for 
contemporaneous correlation.  
4.4 Empirical Results and Discussions 
Before estimating the VAR model outlined in section 4, this research first check the 
stationarity of data. The results of the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests show that 
the level data cannot reject the null hypothesis of having a unit root while the first 
difference data can, confirming that the variables are stationary as I (1) process.
26
  
4.4.1 Cointegration Analysis 
While the VAR has unique advantages as a modeling framework, a major challenge in 
deploying this framework is to determine the appropriate lag length for the variables 
in the system. Two methods for choosing the optimal VAR lag length have been 
suggested in the literature, one that is based on information criteria and another that is 
based on cross-equation restrictions. The cross-equation restriction method, however, 
requires the Block F-test, which would make it intractable in the VAR setting (Brooks 
2008). The number of lags included in our model is, therefore, determined on the 
basis of three criteria (likelihood ratio test (LR), Akaike information criterion (AIC) 
                                                 
26 The results relating to unit root tests are available from the authors on request.  
  80 
and Schwarz information criterion (SC)), starting the model with a high number of 
lags and proceeding until the optimal number is reached.
27
  
This chapter seeks to find the relationship between the exchange rate and order flow. 
The results of the ADF test have confirmed that the variables are following a random 
walk. Therefore, this chapter applies the Johansen cointegration test. Having 
identified the optimal lag length to be 4, this research estimate an unrestricted VAR 
(4) to investigate the relation between the variables of interest using the Johansen 
cointegration test. The trace statistics was used as it is shown to be more robust to 
non-normality of errors compared with the maximal eigenvalue. The cointegration 
test results are reported in Table 4.3.  
  
                                                 
27 This chapter considers 22 working days in a month, 10 working days in a half-month and 5 working 
days in a week. Thus, initially, this research set for the maximum lag length to be 22 and decrease the 
lag length with the unrestricted model. More specifically, by adopting the general-to-specific approach, 
this research omits one lag at a time (from maximum lags to 0 lag) and re-estimates the unrestricted 
VAR with the same sample. The results show that the optimal lag length is 4; thus, this chapter 
includes 4 lags of each variable in the unrestricted VAR estimation. Various diagnostic tests were also 
carried out and show no serious evidence of model misspecification. The results relating to the lag 
length selection are not presented but are available from the authors on request.  
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Table 4.3 Johansen Cointegration Tests 
Panel A Cointegration Rank Tests 
Rank                                               
Eigenvalue 0.2216 0.1618 0.0791 0.0325 0.0158 
Loglik 3635.184 3655.664 3665.224 3669.062 3670.911 
Trace test 129.58 71.454 30.494 11.373 3.6968 
Probability [0.0000]** [0.0090]** [0.4790] [0.8490] [0.7810] 
Panel B Restriction tests on cointegrating equations 
    𝑋        
         
        
  Trend 
Unrestricted: Strong Convergence 
   0.3437 -0.0006 1.0000 4.4495 0.1712 -0.3793 -0.0004 
 2 1.0000 -0.0002 -0.0601 -0.0131 -0.2225 -0.0594 0.0002 
          ,  
2           [      ] ; Strong Convergence 
   3.1028 -0.0018 1.0000 5.0113 -0.3867 -0.5055 0.00 
 2 1.0000 -0.0011 -2.5377 -0.0360 -0.4325 1.2700 0.00 
 2     𝑋 ,  
2           [      ]   ; Weak Convergence 
   -0.0006 0.0006 1.0000 5.0436 0.5569 0.0709 -0.0005 
 2 1.0000 -1.0000 202.46 -13.555 -442.92 -610.49 -0.0600 
 3       
          
  ,  2          [      ]   ; Strong Convergence 
   -35.755 0.0207 1.0000 -1.0000 7.5887 0.9392 -0.0056 
 2 1.0000 0.0117 -100.93 100.93 12.284 46.280 -0.0096 
 4       
          
  ,        ,  2          [      ]   ; Strong Convergence 
   1.8437 -0.0029 1.0000 -1.0000 -1.3576 -0.2210 0.00 
 2 1.0000 -0.0003 -1.6671 1.6671 0.0080 0.7502 0.00 
 5       
 ,  2          [      ] ; Strong Convergence 
   1.6581 -0.0011 4.8251 22.354 1.0000 -1.0000 -0.0021 
 2 1.0000 -0.0006 -0.0730 0.1618 -0.1804 0.1804 0.0001 
         
 ,        ,  2          [      ]  ; Strong Convergence 
   -1.0658 0.0021 5.6790 0.0823 1.0000 -1.0000 0.00 
 2 1.0000 -0.0006 0.1855 1.3832 -0.1016 0.1016 0.00 
Notes: This table summarizes the results of Johansen cointegration tests. If r denotes the number of 
significant cointegration vectors, then the Johansen trace statistics test the hypotheses of at most 
four, three, two, one and zero cointegrating vectors. *denotes significance at the 5% level; 
**denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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As shown in Panel A of Table 4.3, the full sample contains at least two cointegrating 
relationships. The null hypothesis of (       ) cannot be rejected at the 5% 
significance level. The full sample with dummy also confirms two cointegrating 
relationships. Given these results, this work set the cointegration rank =2 to restrict 
the system and form the cointegrated VAR (CVAR) to estimate the simultaneous 
equations within the setting of the I (0) VAR model.  
The long-run cointegration coefficients are given by β, while the feedback 
coefficients α give the short-term adjustment speed of the deviations from the long-
run equilibrium returning to the cointegrating relationship. This work test the unique 
cointegrating relationships in the cointegration space of the system,   
  
[  𝑋       
        
      
      ]. Panel B of Table 4.3 shows the 
test results. Hypothesis    tests whether a trend exists in the cointegrating 
relationships, and the trend excluded in the model is rejected with the p-value of 
0.0055. Hypotheses  2 to    test the long-run relations between     𝑋  exchange 
rate and order flow,       
          
   interest rate spread, and       
  
country risk difference in all cointegrating relationships and the joint test without 
trend. From the likelihood ratio (LR) test results, hypothesis  5 is accepted with the 
p-value of 0.1727. It also shows that the exchange rate relates not only to the risk 
premium but also to the country risk difference. Thus, this chapter test long-run 
homogeneity cointegrating relationships in   
 .  
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Table 4.4 Hypotheses Tests on the Cointegrated Relations 
Panel A Tests on the Stationarity of Single Relations 
    𝑋        
         
         
    2    Prob. 
   1 0 0 0 0 3.3176 [0.069] 
   0 1 0 0 0 2.7275 [0.099] 
   0 0 1 0 0 2.6407 [0.104] 
    0 0 0 1 0 3.6491 [0.056] 
    0 0 0 0 1 3.6090 [0.058] 
Panel B Granger Causality Test / Long-run Weak Exogeneity 
    𝑋        
         
         
   
 2    8.1825 36.547 25.859 9.3057 17.900 
Prob. [0.0851] [      ]   [      ]   [0.0539] [      ]   
Panel C The Identified Long-run Structures 
            
         
         
   LR test restrictions 
 : Cointegrating Vectors 
       
  4     
  5    
 23    
1.9129 -0.0009 1.0000 2.7807 -0.1133 
-1.0000 0.0023 8.7879 -1.0000 1.0000 
 : Feedback Coefficients with 2 Ranks 
-0.0183 
(0.0083) 
629.69 
(113.30) 
-0.0613 
(0.0239) 
0.0007 
(0.0009) 
0.0305 
(0.0741) 
0.0009 
(0.0012) 
-58.887 
(15.880) 
-0.0117 
(0.0033) 
0.0003 
(0.0001) 
-0.0067 
(0.0104) 
Notes: This table reports the results of hypotheses tests on the cointegrated relations among our key 
variables. One vector restriction is applied on β in testing the stationarity. *denotes significance at the 
5% level; **denotes significance at the 1% level. The trace test statistic indicates 1 cointegrating 
relationship at the 5 % level. The system then is restricted by cointegration rank 2. The cointegration 
coefficients   and adjustment coefficients   with their standard errors are all shown in ( ) in the table. 
The lag interval is 1 to 4. The LR test result is  2           [      ]. 
Panel A of Table 4.4 shows the test results on the stationarity of single relations. 
Hypothesis    states that the short-term interest rate is stationary with a p-value of 
0.104.    states that the order flow can be accepted as a stationary process at the 10% 
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significance level. This work next set the restrictions on   coefficient to test the long-
run weak exogeneity in the system. In Panel B of Table 4.4, this research set the   in 
a zero row to find the exclusively adjusting variables in the long-run equilibrium and 
to identify the Granger causality. The p-values for the LR test results are quite low, 
suggesting that there are no weak exogenous variables for the long-run beta 
parameters in this system. The Granger causality test shows that order flow Granger 
causes exchange rate movements and that lags of order flow are significant in 
explaining exchange rate movement. Overall, the result shows that unidirectional 
causality exists from order flow to exchange rate movements of the USD/CNY. 
Combining the results of all the hypotheses that this work tested, there are no fewer 
than two linear cointegration vectors. Taking into account the Johansen cointegration 
rank test and employing the Juselius (2006) modeling approach, the following 
cointegration vectors would be stationary cointegrating relationships: 
𝑋      , 
      
       , 
      
         
         
       . 
According to the above equations, this research test restrictions on cointegration 
vectors β and feedback coefficients α. There are several benefits from coefficient 
restrictions, such as identifying and restricting the cointegrating space. This research 
set the restrictions and tests them step-by-step. Thus, this work restrict the feedback 
coefficients to zero, the    coefficient to 1 in both vectors, the order flow 𝑋  
coefficients to 1 in the second vector and remove trend. The result of the LR test of 
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restrictions and the long-run structures are presented in Panel C of Table 4.4. The 
overall test statistic is x2           [      ] , indicating that it is not 
unreasonable to impose these restrictions in the cointegrating vectors.
28
 In addition, 
the results show that two cointegration equations (CIa and CIb) can be formulated for 
level data: 
 C a                        i  i 
   
 r  r 
         
  ; 
(4.12) 
 C                        i  i 
          
 r  r 
                
  . 
(4.13) 
From the above equations, this research find that the cointegration coefficient β on the 
interest differential is correctly signed and significant. The coefficient on the variable 
of order flow is significant and positive. Thus, the β coefficient on the order flow 
variable 𝑋  is positive, which implies a higher RMB price of dollars when the net 
buying imbalance is higher. Given a β coefficient of 0.0023 in the USD/CNY 
exchange rate equation, every 1 % increase in order flow will increase the RMB price 
of the dollar by 23 basis points within the day.  
Moreover, the variable that captures the influence of macro fundamentals—the 
interest differential—is signed positive. This result may reflect that the interest 
differential can be considered a risk-free return on currency investment if the interest 
rate of the dollar it is not changed while the interest rate of the RMB it
*
 is increased. 
                                                 
28 The estimation results for the long-run structures presented in this table also show that there are two 
small eigenvalues and two significant p-values. These values determine again that the cointegration 
rank is 2 and this research have two cointegration equations. 
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Under uncovered interest parity, USD/CNY may increase to allow for dollar 
depreciation.  
Hence, the long-run cointegration coefficient β on the interest differential is signed 
correctly. The long-run cointegration coefficient β on the country risk premium is also 
significant. 
4.4.2 VAR and Error Correction Modelling 
Using the long-run relationships given in equations (4.12) and (4.13) as the error 
correction terms, this work now turn to the formulation and the estimation of an error 
correction model (VECM) for the differenced variables which can be display as 
follows[     𝑋        
         
         
  ].  
The maximum likelihood (ML) method is used to estimate our model because the 
system is reduced to a partial VECM, as insignificant variables were dropped from the 
system to reach the most parsimonious model. This method ensures the efficient and 
consistent parameter estimates.
29
 The result from estimating the short-run VECM 
parameters for    ,  𝑋 , and        
   are reported in Table 4.5.  
  
                                                 
29
 Hendry and Doornik (1994) explain that the reason for modeling a parsimonious VAR (PVAR) is to 
reduce the dependence and increase the invariance to change. Here, this chapter follow the general-to-
specific method as applied by Hendry and Krolzig (2004). After this research simplifies the PVAR 
results, the equations show the major parts of the system. In other words, only significant lags of 
independent variables are kept, containing the majority of information in a much simpler model. 
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Table 4.5 Estimates of the Error Correlation Modelling 
      𝑋         
   
Constant 
0.0425 
(0.0241) 
-0.2577 
(0.2410) 
- 
α1 
-0.1970** 
(0.0648) 
-0.2048* 
(0.0896) 
-0.9915 
(0.5740) 
α2 - 
0.2237* 
(0.0881) - 
α3 - - 
-0.9044 
(0.4880) 
1 
-0.8765 
(0.5674) 
- - 
2 
-1.0055* 
(0.4521) 
- - 
 
-0.0115 
(0.0064) 
-0.8575** 
(0.0822) 
- 
φ3 - - 
0.6450** 
(0.1610) 
γ1 - - 
-11.6000* 
(5.5500) 
γ2 - - 
17.9300** 
(6.1400) 
γ3 - - 
-21.3000** 
(4.9800) 
1 - - 
-0.3038** 
(0.0608) 
2 - - 
-0.2982** 
(0.0701) 
3 - - 
-0.1355** 
(0.0517) 
R-square 0.13 0.21 0.27 
Notes: This table presents the results of estimating the following short-run VECM equations, for 
   ,  𝑋 , and        
  : 
                   𝑋        𝑋  2           𝜀 ,  
 𝑋                    2           𝜀 ,  
       
  
                 3          3     3
                 
           2     2
     
      3     3
                 
           2     2
           3     3
   𝜀 ,  
Standard errors are all shown in ( ) *denotes significance at the 5% level; **denotes significance at the 
1% level. 
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To focus first on the equation for exchange rate movement    , this work find that the 
second lag of the order flow  𝑋  2  is significant. The coefficient on the error 
correction term  is -0.0115, which shows that the short-term adjustment is negative 
and significant at the 10% level. The result is similar to that of unrestricted VAR, 
suggesting that order flow not only Granger causes exchange rate movements but also 
has explanatory power in capturing changes in the Chinese exchange rate in the short 
term. The long-run exchange rate movements influence the order flow and interest 
rate change in the short term.  
Comparing our specification with that of Evans and Lyons (2002a), although the 
coefficients are both significant, the R
2
 of our model is lower. Evans and Lyons 
(2002a) get 0.64 and 0.46, but our R
2
 is only 0.13. There are two possible 
explanations for the different results. First, as mentioned previously, in developing 
countries, there tends to be more government interventions in the foreign exchange 
market. For example, in an analysis of order flow in Brazil, De Medeiros (2004) 
obtained a R
2
 of 0.06. Second, for the long term, not only are order flow correctly 
signed and significant, but this research also including the correctly signed interest 
rate differential and significant country risk premium.  
Next, this research turn to the estimation of order flow equation. The speed of 
adjustment of order flow toward the long-run relationship, as given in equation (4.12), 
is negative and highly significant. The exchange rate movement appears to be an 
important factor influencing the order flow. Finally, consistent with previous findings, 
the country risk premium has a negative relationship with the exchange rate 
movement. The country risk premium also reacts significantly to the long-term 
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interest rate differential, as indicated by the γ coefficients and as shown before in 
equation (4.5). 
4.4.3 Impulse Response Functions 
More detailed insight on the casual relationship among the key variables can be 
obtained by analyzing their impulse response functions. First, this section reports the 
impacts of a shock to the system in different modeling configurations. Figure 4.5 
shows the impulse responses to one SE (standard error) shock of each system variable 
in the exchange rate equation. In the figure, from the first to the fourth columns, these 
variables are order flow   , short-term interest rate differential       
  , long-term 
interest rate differential       
  , and country risk premium difference       
    
From the first to the last rows, the impulse response functions plotted are the 
dynamics of unrestricted VAR, restricted form VAR, just identified VECM and 
parsimonious VAR (PVAR), discussed in the previous section. Comparing 
unrestricted VAR to PVAR, this research expects the estimated response of PVAR to 
be clearer and more concise to convey information about real economic phenomena.  
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Notes: This figure presents the impulse responses of the Chinese exchange rate to one standard error 
shock from the order flow (DXt), short-term interest rate differential (Dit), long-term interest rate 
differential (Drt) and country risk premium (DRt). This research tests for a time horizon of 30 days. 
Figure 4.5 Responses of USD/CNY to the Shocks in the Unrestricted VAR, 
Reduced Form VAR, Just Identified VECM and Parsimonious VAR 
 
The equilibrium order flow impulse response shows the shocks of all the other 
variables. In the first horizon, the exchange rate responds immediately when a 
negative jump to order flow shocks are slightly shorter than other variables, excluding 
the RMB exchange rate itself. The first graph shows that the exchange rate movement 
occurs immediately and steadily in response to various shocks to order flow. The 
shock appears as a negative signal at very short horizons (first two horizons) but leads 
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upward to 0.22% in the long run. It appears as a feedback effect in a short time period 
and then becomes steady over 10 periods.  
The graphs of the other three variables show that they have a different appearance 
when compared with the next term order flow. The results show that the proportion of 
the interest rate differential decreases with time. In the long horizon, the order flow 
has a negative influence on the interest rate differential. The interest rate, both long- 
and short term, has a negative sign at first and then becomes stable, declining to the 
origin. The interbank interest rate differential jumps in response to exchange rate 
shocks; at first, it has a negative sign. After 2 periods, the sign changes to a positive 
sign and decreases with time. If the government increases the interest rate, they 
should have the same sign. This will be consistent with the strict monetary policy, 
implying that the market may have attracted some speculators, while also being 
controlled by government intervention. The country risk premium shows a similar 
tendency but is much more flexible. In the short horizon (first five periods), the 
country risk difference responds immediately to exchange rate movements and more 
strongly and repeatedly than other variables.  
Having explored the exchange rate equation, this chapter now examines the responses 
and dynamic simulation results of each variable in Figure 4.6. 
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Panel A: Responses to order flow     Panel C: Responses to long-term interest rate differential 
   
Panel B: Responses to short-term interest rate differential  Panel D: Responses to country risk premium difference 
   
Notes: This figure presents the impulse responses of each variable to one standard error shock from the order flow (DXt), short-term interest rate differential (Dit), long-term 
interest rate differential (Drt) and country risk premium (DRt). PVAR denotes the Parsimonious VAR model. This research tests for a time horizon of 30 days. 
Figure 4.6 Responses to Shocks in the Parsimonious VAR
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The figure 4.6 shows the impulse responses of the system to one SE (standard error) 
shock to each variable equation, i.e., the order flow equation, short-term interest rate 
differential (it-it*) equation, long-term interest rate differential (rt - rt*) equation and 
country risk premium difference (Rt  - Rt*) equation, given there are two cointegrating 
relationships in the system. In the figures, the X-axis shows that the number of 30 
steps ahead has been selected; the Y-axis shows the impact on each variable.  
In the order flow equation, the exchange rate and short-term interest rate all has a 
positive impact on the order flow, but the effects of other variables are negative. 
These results are similar to the results shown in Table 4.5. For the short-term interest 
rate differential equation, the signs of responses are all positive except for that of the 
exchange rate.  
However, the country risk premium has a 1.5-period delay in affecting the short-term 
interest rate. For the long-term interest rate differential, only the order flow has a 
positive impact on the long-term interest rate. All the other impulse responses are 
negative. Panel D of figure 4.6 shows that the country risk premium difference has a 
one-period delay in responding to the interest rate shocks, both short term and long 
term. The exchange rate and order flow have opposite impacts on country risk 
premium; one is positive, and the other is negative. 
4.4.4 Forecast Error Variance Decomposition 
Finally, in this section, this work decomposes the forecast error variance of each 
variable into components to account for innovation in all the variables. In general, the 
more exogenous a variable is, the less its forecast error variance is explained by 
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innovations in other variables. The variance decomposition of exchange rate 
movements in relation to other key variables is reported in Table 4.6. 
 
Table 4.6 Decomposition of Exchange Rate Variance 
Horizon             
         
         
   S.E. 
5 90.6102 5.3382 0.1062 0.1564 3.7889 0.0027 
10 83.8929 11.9628 0.06370 0.1423 3.9383 0.0040 
20 78.5886 17.2970 0.1312 0.0714 3.9117 0.0059 
30 76.8319 19.0794 0.1406 0.0465 3.9017 0.0074 
Notes: This table presents the results of decomposing the forecast error variance of each variable into 
components to account for innovation in all the variables. S.E. denotes the standard error. This research 
tests for a time horizon of 30 days with Cholesky Decomposition. 
 
 
The most exogenous variable in the system for the exchange rate appears to be order 
flow. The result shows that 19% of changes in the exchange rate variance are due to 
order flow. Thus, order flow can explain 19% of exchange rate changes within a day. 
Country risk premium difference accounts for 3.9% of exchange rate changes, while 
less than 1% is due to interbank interest rate differential. The interest rate differential 
has a much weaker performance than other variables in China’s foreign exchange 
market. Hence, order flow and country risk are more influential determinants than the 
interest rate. Overall, changes in order flow explain more exchange rate movements 
than do other variables in the system.  
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4.5 Conclusions 
This research investigates the long-term determinants and short-term dynamics of the 
Chinese exchange rate, with particular emphasis on the relative role of cumulative 
order flow. This chapter construct a measure of daily order flow in the Chinese setting 
to reflect excess demand pressure in China’s foreign exchange market. An additional 
variable, the country risk premium, is included in our investigation, along with the 
exchange rate, order flow and interest rate differential.  
To investigate the behavior of the Chinese exchange rate in terms of its short-run 
dynamics and long-run equilibrium, this chapter apply a VAR framework to estimate 
both the long-run and short-run parameters and find that cumulative order flow is 
cointegrated with the USD/CNY exchange rate in China. The results also suggest that 
in the new Chinese exchange rate policy regime, order flow as a 'signed' measure of 
trading volume explains a significant part—approximately 19%—of the short-term 
fluctuations in the exchange rate of the RMB against the US dollar. 
In summary, this research uncovers the long term cointegrating relationship among 
variables under examination, including order flow, interest rates, and a proxy for 
macro influences. The short-run dynamics show that the fluctuations in the exchange 
rate of the RMB against the US dollar can be explained by a measure of excess 
demand pressure, i.e., the order flow. The results show that order flow has a strong 
and positive explanatory power in the Chinese foreign exchange market. The 
coefficient β on the order flow variable  𝑋  is positive, suggesting its positive 
association with the RMB price of the dollar. The coefficient is 0.0023 in the RMB 
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equation, which implies that on a day with a 1% increase in the net purchase of 
dollars, the RMB price of the dollar would increase by 23 basis points.  
The results of impulse responses analyses indicate that the Chinese exchange rate 
responds immediately and more strongly than other variables (excluding exchange 
rates themselves) to the changes in order flow over the short horizon. In the long term, 
the interest rate differential has a strong influence on exchange rate movements. 
Country risk premium shows a similar tendency, but to a lesser extent.  
Comparing our specification with that of Evans and Lyons (2002a), this research find 
an interesting detail. The coefficients on order flow in our research and in their 
research are both significant, but our R
2
 is low at 0.13, while Evans and Lyons 
(2002a) obtained R
2
 of 0.64 and 0.46. However, our result is consistent with the 
findings of similar research on emerging markets, such as that in Brazil. It seems that 
government intervention in the emerging foreign exchange market may be the reason 
for this difference. 
The fact that the domestic currencies of most emerging markets are not widely traded 
may be another reason for this difference. However, a more important reason is 
perhaps government over-involvement and intervention in the market. As a result, the 
level of the exchange rate does not move freely with market demand and supply, and 
the order flow consequently cannot aggregate sufficient information. In the next 
chapter, we will further examine the government intervention on order flow and hence 
its relation with the exchange rate. 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
Chapter 5 Chinese Intervention in the 
Foreign Exchange Market 
 
 
The chapter aims to detect the efficiency of 
China foreign exchange intervention with the 
multiple perspectives framework. This chapter 
also examine the action of exchange rate and 
order flow when intervention occurs. 
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Chapter 5  
Chinese Intervention in the Foreign Exchange 
Market 
5.1 Introduction 
Intervention is an essential and widely used tool for central banks to direct their 
domestic currencies to a desirable level or to stabilize the currencies’ movements. In 
recent years, researchers have increasingly turned their attention to study 
interventions in the emerging markets, where such interventions have become 
extensive. Menkhoff’s (2013) survey reveals that foreign exchange intervention by 
governments of emerging market economies takes various subtle forms and is an 
increasingly important force in international monetary relations. 
Among the emerging economies, China is particularly noted for its active intervention 
policy and so is the most watched internationally. The issue has become so charged 
that since 2005 there have been several bipartisan attempts in the US Congress to 
label China as a currency manipulator and to implement punitive actions 
accordingly.
30
  However, despite the grave international concern and the potential 
                                                 
30
 In 2005, Senators Charles Schumer (Dem, New York) and Lindsey Graham (Republican, South 
Carolina) co-sponsored the first Chinese currency bill. Bipartisan efforts pushed to pass a modified bill 
in September 2010 in the House of Representatives and in October 2011 in the Senate. However, these 
later failed to become law. 
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global impacts, studies of China’s foreign exchange intervention have been 
surprisingly absent. This chapter moves towards filling this critical void. 
This chapter aim to achieve a better understanding of China’s intervention by 
investigating how the Chinese monetary authority intervenes in the foreign exchange 
market, and the effectiveness thereof. This chapter seeks to establish how China 
intervenes in the marketplace, the consequences of Chinese monetary authority 
activity, and to what extent the interventions are effective. 
Studies of foreign exchange intervention are always and everywhere a challenging 
task. Governments tend to cover their activity in this field with great secrecy, and this 
is especially so in China. Governor Zhou Xiaochuan said that the government will not 
return to massive intervention, as this would make exchange rate pricing a matter of 
politics rather than a matter of market competition (PBOC, 2012). Later, at the G20 
meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors, the Chinese government 
further reiterated that reduced intervention will make the market play a bigger role 
(PBOC, 2013). In the terminology of the Chinese monetary authority, intervention is 
commonly referred to as ‘management’ of RMB exchange rates. Many covert foreign 
exchange activities would be concealed under the umbrella of ‘currency management’. 
In addition to covering the research gap with regard to the existence of Chinese 
monetary authority intervention, this chapter makes a further contribution to the 
literature by identifying the dates and forms of Chinese covert intervention using a 
wide range of news data sources.  
Based on the intervention information this research has amassed, this chapter 
conclude that the objective of China’s intervention is to maintain the stability of the 
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renminbi exchange rate at an appropriate level. This intervention is built on three 
pillars: intervention via setting the central parity rate (CPR), which we call CPR 
intervention; control of the fluctuation band within which market exchange rates are 
allowed to move around the central parity rate; and instructions to state-owned banks 
to act in a direction desired by the central bank (CB) in the Chinese foreign exchange 
market. In some cases, there are reports that the Chinese central bank may engage 
directly in foreign exchange trades to tame the market. This research broadly labels 
such activities as CB intervention. In this light, this research makes a further 
contribution to the literature by refining the typology of Chinese foreign exchange 
interventions and examining their efficiency.  
Due to issues of data availability, this chapter focuses on the CPR intervention and 
CB intervention. While the CPR intervention is derived from the information released 
by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange of China, CB intervention 
information is mainly detected from Reuters and Factiva. Having identified 
intervention dates and forms in China, this work then form a broad dataset that spans 
the eventful year of 2012.  
This target sample period is an eventful year, as it includes, for example, the Sino-
America currency dispute, a central issue in the current world economy; change of 
leadership in China; and general elections in the US and other countries important to 
China’s external monetary relations. These environmental changes offer a better 
opportunity window for us to observe a fuller development of China’s course of 
intervention and the consequences thereof. 
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This chapter adopt a multi-dimensional approach, based on high-frequency data, to 
explore China’s intervention. A reduced form regression analysis is first conducted to 
consider the behaviours of the RMB exchange rate and order flow under interventions. 
Then, a multivariate VAR model is applied to investigate how interventions may 
affect dynamics of the exchange rate directly, or via its effects on order flow. This 
research subsequently decomposes the market movements to find out whether or not 
the changes are intermediated by order flow. Following Marsh (2011), this chapter 
examine the effectiveness of the Chinese foreign exchange intervention. A GARCH 
analysis is then deployed to check the robustness of our empirical findings. In the 
process, the tests also shed additional light on the impacts of intervention on volatility. 
This thesis finds that Chinese intervention not only impacts directly on the exchange 
rate, but also on the buying–selling pressure. Intervention is more likely to occur 
when there are heavy selling orders and where the exchange rate deviates from the 
central bank’s tolerable level one day before or on the same day. In other words, it is 
more likely that the Chinese authority would move to arrest currency devaluation.  
Order flow is found to be positively and significantly correlated with the exchange 
rate when intervention occurs. Order flow carries additional information under CB 
intervention, while CPR intervention tends to cause a change of the impact sign when 
the government resorts to devaluation-targeting intervention. Decomposition analysis 
shows that the portion of intervention effects that is directly impounded into the 
exchange rate plays a more prominent role than that via the order flow. CB 
intervention can effectively influence both the exchange rate and order flow, while 
CPR intervention is effective in keeping the exchange rate within the fluctuation band. 
The robust test confirms the main findings of the chapter, and reveals additional 
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evidence that while CB intervention can influence the exchange rate and order flow, it 
tends to increase the volatility. Meanwhile, CPR intervention can play some role in a 
‘leaning against the wind’ policy, in that it may slow the net order flow out of the 
dollar, but it cannot reverse the trend. 
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. In section two, this research 
introduces the operation of China’s intervention and discusses sources of the datasets 
used in this study. A critical assignment in this section concerns the identification and 
calculation of the CPR and CB interventions. In section three, this chapter introduce 
the empirical model and test the direct impact of intervention on exchange rate return 
and order flow separately. In section four, this research explores the effectiveness of 
Chinese foreign exchange market intervention. Section five discusses the robustness 
of the findings. Finally, in section six it presents conclusions. 
5.2 Background and Data Descriptions 
5.2.1 Operation of Chinese Central Bank Intervention 
In an environment of growing pressure for appreciation of the Chinese currency on 
the ground that the RMB is claimed to be undervalued due to intervention, the 
Chinese government has been reluctant to admit that it has ever intervened, which 
may explain the secrecy around Chinese ‘management’ of exchange rate policy.  
From an operational standpoint, there are three major ways that China has deployed to 
effectuate the currency ‘management’: 
(1) Set the central parity rate and the band allowed for the fluctuation of the RMB 
exchange rate against the dollar; 
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(2) Intervention in the form of central bank instructions or guidance via the state-
owned banks;
31
 
(3) Direct sales or purchasing of foreign currencies by the central bank in the 
foreign exchange market. 
Here, it is necessary to note the central bank’s restrictions placed on Chinese banks 
with regard to foreign currency holdings. All banks must declare their positions in 
foreign currencies to the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE). The 
amount of foreign currency each bank may hold is calculated based on factors 
including its capital assets and transaction volume of foreign exchange settlements, 
etc. If a bank holds foreign currency position above the limit, it must sell the excess 
funds to another bank (PBOC, 2007). 
Owing to the issue of data availability, this chapter concentrates on two of the above 
three intervention channels: the intervention via CPR (central parity rate) and the CB 
intervention (the direct sale or purchase of foreign currencies by the central bank). 
Details of the data used in the intervention analysis are described in the next sub-
section. 
5.2.2 Data Descriptions and Statistics 
This chapter select a sample that covers the eventful year of 2012 and includes data 
on the exchange rate, order flow, CB intervention and CPR intervention. The sample 
period covers 14
th
 December 2011 to 13
th
 December 2012, with 243 trading days 
excluding official holidays. This research use 24-hour news information from Factiva 
                                                 
31 Where the central bank persuades the ‘big four’ joint-stock banks to execute the transaction in the 
foreign exchange market. The ‘big four’ are the Bank of China, China Construction Bank, the 
Industrial and Commercial Bank of China and the Agricultural Bank of China. At the end of 2009 these 
ex-state-owned commercial banks completed joint-stock reform one after another. For details, see inter 
alia http://www.pbc.gov.cn/, last accessed on 10 May 2013. 
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and Reuters China. The CPR data are released before the CFETS opening time. The 
business day of the CFETS runs from 9:30 to 15:30 Beijing time. This section has 
three main parts. 
Firstly, the year 2012 is chosen for the target sample period. This is because 2012 is 
an eventful period and provides a good fit for our studies, being the year of leadership 
changeover in China and in other countries.
32
 In particular, this year saw the US 
general election, in which the question of the Chinese currency was a highly charged 
issue. Americans wanted to ensure that China would keep her dollar assets in the US, 
and put pressure on the RMB to appreciate.
33
 Two Asian neighbours, Japan and South 
Korea, also had a power changeover, which would impact on international trade and 
on the Chinese economy. In addition, the on-going debt crisis in the euro zone and 
slowdown in the world economy continued throughout 2012. These conditions make 
it likely that the Chinese government would intervene in the foreign exchange market 
to ‘manage’ the RMB value in 2012 more actively than in other years.  
Secondly, the original data set was gleaned from three major sources. First, the tick-
by-tick transaction data are from the Reuters 3000 Xtra, obtained through the China 
Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS). This research use these data to calculate 
the daily order flow, and use the last transaction data of every business day as the 
daily exchange rate data. Second, the intervention information is gained from the 
                                                 
32 The Chinese power changeover process started in March 2012 and climaxed in November when the 
18th Party Congress closed in China. 
33 During an election campaign of at least six months in 2012, the Republican presidential nominee, 
Mitt Romney, declared that, if elected, the first thing he would do would be to deal with the Chinese 
currency, which he claimed was undervalued. President Obama took a similar hard line, with the 
advantage of knowledge of the under-the-table negotiations with the Chinese about China's currency. 
There is hearsay evidence that China had promised to do something to bid down the value of the 
Chinese currency. 
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newswire reports supplied by the online news databases, Factiva,
34
 and Reuters 
China.
35
 Third, the central parity rate is downloaded from the State Administration of 
Foreign Exchange (SAFE) official website.
36
 Figure 5.1A contains the level data of 
the exchange rate and the accumulated order flow, and Figure 5.1B plots the main 
variables, including the exchange rate (USD/CNY), accumulated order flow (𝑋 ), the 
CB intervention (CB INT) and the CPR intervention (CPR INT).  
Thirdly, analysis in this chapter covers two sub-periods. This is because, on 13
th
 
September 2012, the US Federal Reserve announced the launch of the third round of 
quantitative easing (QE3) to stimulate the US economy. This controversial plan also 
proved to be a great stimulus to the China foreign exchange market. As can be seen 
from Figure 5.1A, from 13
th
 September 2012 the RMB shows a long-lasting trend of 
appreciation, and order flow is quite different compared with its previous movements. 
Figure 5.1B also displays possible intervention movement by the Chinese monetary 
authority, suggesting that from 14
th
 September 2012 the Chinese central bank 
intervened to stem this appreciation.  
                                                 
34 Factiva belongs to the Dow Jones Reuters Business Interactive LLC. Formerly the Dow Jones 
interactive. Website: http://www.dowjones.com/factiva/, last accessed on 15 January 2013. 
35 Reuters China: http://cn.reuters.com/, last accessed on 15 January 2013. 
36 http://www.safe.gov.cn/, last accessed on 10 May 2013. 
  106 
 
Figure 5.1 a: The exchange rate and order flow. b: Chinese exchange rate, 
accumulated order flow, the CB intervention and the CPR intervention 
 
At the beginning of the period post-QE3 announcement, the CPR line shows that the 
monetary authority adjusted the CPR occasionally and tried to keep the RMB price 
stable, but this seems not to have worked. Starting from 30
th
 October 2012 to the end 
of the year, the CPR was adjusted in opposite directions every day. From the CB 
intervention line we see that from 18
th
 October 2012 the CB interventions were all 
reverse operations. In this study, this research work on the whole period and on two 
sub-periods. Sub-period A is from 15
th
 December 2011 to 13
th
 September 2012, and 
sub-period B is from 14
th
 September 2012 to 13
th
 December 2012. 
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5.2.2.1 The Reuters 3000 Xtra 
This chapter use the tick-by-tick data from the China foreign exchange interbank 
market; that is, the data recorded by anyone and everyone who clicks the transaction 
terminals that are linked to the central processing machine of the nation. Every second, 
many different traders click to the CFETS transaction platform; meanwhile, other 
traders will reply to these trading requests through the central machine of the CFETS; 
these transactions are bilateral (on both demand and supply sides), since the platform 
matches buyers with sellers. Reuters is one of the biggest licensed vendors of CFETS 
data. However, the Reuters 3000 Xtra can hold and maintain data of only 30,000 
transactions from the CFETS interbank foreign exchange spot market in their 
historical data pool. Therefore, this work download the 30,000 transaction data 
window first, and then collects them periodically.  
Order flow is the signed transaction, defined as buyer-initiated (seller-initiated) and 
signed as positive (negative).  Following Evans and Lyons (2002b), this research 
calculate order flow as daily data on the USD/CNY, the leading currency pair in the 
Chinese foreign exchange market.  The exchange rate data are also of daily frequency, 
obtained from the last transaction price of each working day.  
5.2.2.2 Intervention Data and the Central Parity Rate 
The Chinese monetary authority does not release their intervention data directly to the 
public. However, based on the Chinese ‘management’ policy of foreign exchange, 
termed ‘managed floating within horizontal bands for the exchange rate’, this research 
decompose the Chinese foreign exchange intervention into the CB intervention and 
CPR intervention, where the former contains both direct and indirect (via the state 
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banks) intervention by trading activity, and the latter denotes intervention with the 
central parity rate. 
This research detects the CB intervention information from the newswire reports 
supplied by Factiva and Reuters China. Following the method introduced by Beine et 
al. (2009) in their study of Japanese intervention, this thesis search the news reports 
for intervention activity. The basic rules of detecting intervention information are: 
First, when there is a report of direct central bank intervention this research sign this 
day as a CB intervention day. If the governing authority bought (sold) the USD this 
research sign it as +1 (-1), and otherwise as 0. Second, when it is reported that the 
central bank intervened via the state banks, this research also take this as a CB 
intervention day and the sign of intervention is marked the same as above. All degrees 
of certainty about the Chinese government intervention are counted into the CB 
intervention data: such as clearly, likely, suspected, covert, may have, think, and 
rumour.  
For example, on 25/07/2012, when traders expected that depreciation of the RMB 
exchange rate would strengthen, the sale of USD by all state banks acting together 
indicates that the central bank wished to keep the exchange rate stable. Therefore, this 
thesis signs this date as -1 of CB intervention. On 10/12/2012, according to two 
traders, after a long period during which the RMB exchange rate remained at the 
upper limit, at least one state bank purchased USD and raised the price near the 
closing time of the market. This is suspected to be intervention of the central bank. 
Therefore, this thesis signs this date as 1 of CB intervention. 
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The RMB exchange rate against the dollar is allowed to float within a narrow band of 
0.5% (1% after 16
th
 April 2012) around the central parity rate (CPR). This research 
obtains the CPR intervention data in two ways: First, this research follows the above 
described rules to gain the CPR information from news reports. If the news report 
states that CPR decreases (increases), in other words USD appreciates (depreciates) 
while the market believes that USD should depreciate (appreciate), we mark CPR 
intervention as +1 (-1), otherwise 0. Second, this research compares the CPR with the 
close-price of the previous day. If the CPR is contrary to the prediction of the market, 
and is 0.45% (0.9% after 16
th
 April 2012),
37
 in other words 90% of the horizontal 
band, above/below the close-price of the previous day, it is counted as CPR 
intervention and signed as +1/-1, otherwise 0.  
For example, on 23/03/2012, the CPR reached a new high, which is interpreted as an 
appreciation of the RMB exchange rate initiated by the government before a visit by 
Chinese leaders to the United States. Therefore, this date is signed as -1 of CPR 
intervention. On 23/08/2012, a trader pointed out that the increase of CPR was 
smaller than the overnight increase of the euro and the depreciation of USD, which 
could be an indication that the central bank intended to keep the exchange rate stable. 
Accordingly, this date is then signed as 1 of CPR intervention. 
5.2.2.3 Statistics of Dataset 
The statistics of the exchange rate, order flow, CB intervention and CPR intervention 
of the China foreign exchange market are summarized in Table 5.1.  
                                                 
37 Before April 4th 2012, the CPR bandwidth was no more than 0.5%. Starting from April 16th 2012, 
the People’s Bank of China extended the exchange rate fluctuation band of the RMB against the US 
dollar from 0.5% to 1%. Here this chapter choose 0.45% and 0.9% as our reference values. 
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Table 5.1 Summary Statistics of Intervention Data 
  Obs. Mean Std. dev. Skewness 
Excess 
kurtosis 
Summary statistics 
    242 -0.0090 0.1039 -0.6107 2.6527 
𝑋  242 -10.021 36.027 -2.2678 5.7498 
    
   37 -0.0289 0.3899 -0.2649 3.5011 
    
    90 0.0331 0.6089 -0.0166 -0.3093 
 
    𝑋      
       
    
Cross-correlation 
    1.0000 0.0658 0.2178 0.0839 
𝑋  0.0658 1.0000 0.2903 -0.4899 
    
   0.2178 -0.2903 1.0000 0.2824 
    
    0.0839 -0.4899 0.2824 1.0000 
 
First order Second order 
Serial correlation 
    -0.0764 -0.0321 
𝑋  0.6265*** 0.5431*** 
    
   0.3198*** 0.1567*** 
    
    0.6768*** 0.6207*** 
Note:     is 100 times log exchange rate return,    is order flow,   T 
   is the CB intervention, and 
  T 
    is the CPR intervention. * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
 
The whole data sample comprises 242 working days. One date observation would be 
lost if were to take log difference of the exchange rate. According to the method 
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outlined above, this researh can identify 37 days of CB intervention and 90 days of 
CPR intervention. Order flow and both types of intervention are positively correlated 
with log exchange rate change, while both types of intervention explain negative 
correlation with order flow. This implies that while intervention occurs to adjust 
exchange rate movements deemed undesirable by the authority, in general the Chinese 
central bank intervenes to stem currency appreciation.  Table 5.1 also shows that all 
the variables except exchange rate returns display significant autocorrelation at the 
1% level. 
5.3 Empirical Analysis of Intervention Effects 
This chapter now illustrate the intervention effects based on the empirical evidence 
unearthed.  First, this research tests the direct impacts of intervention on exchange 
rate returns and order flow. Second, this research empirically analyse the sensitivity of 
exchange rate returns to changes in order flow under different types of interventions. 
In the third step, this section adopts a multivariate VAR model to establish 
interactions between exchange rate returns and order flow. Then, the effect of 
intervention on this interactive relationship is analysed. For these purposes, this 
section estimate a restricted VAR model to examine distinct channels through which 
intervention influences the exchange rate returns.  
In this process, this research use the methodology introduced by Love and Payne 
(2008) and Frömmel, Kiss M and Pintér (2011); the data deployed in the analysis is at 
daily frequency. Then, as the fourth step, this section follow Marsh (2011) to test 
effectiveness of the interventions by adopting five main criteria for judging 
intervention success, with 20 subdivisions. Finally, this research estimate a GARCH 
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model, as introduced for example in Rincón and Toro (2010), to further explore 
intervention impacts, including those on volatility of exchange rate returns and order 
flow. Estimation of the GARCH model also provides a robust test to strengthen the 
empirical investigation in other parts of this chapter.  
5.3.1 Reduced Form Analysis of Intervention Effects on Exchange Rate Returns and 
Order Flow 
This section begins this research empirical investigation with two central questions, 
i.e. whether intervention has significant impact on exchange rate return and order flow 
separately, and how fast and for how long the intervention impacts occur. These 
questions are first investigated straightforwardly in a relatively simple model.   
To capture the direct impact of intervention on exchange rate returns, this section first 
set up and estimates an exchange rate returns model with both types of interventions 
as the regressors, but excluding order flow from the model formulation. Then this 
research formulate an order flow model which contains order flow as a dependent 
variable and both types of interventions as the independent variables, while the 
variable of exchange rate returns is excluded. The specifications of the models are 
shown below:  
       ∑     
 
    
      
   ∑     
 
    
      
    𝜀  (5.1) 
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 𝑋    ∑     
 
    
      
   ∑     
 
    
      
       
 
(5.2) 
where     is the log difference of the exchange rate between the Chinese RMB and 
the US dollar (USD/CNY) at time   (multiplied by 100), 𝑋  is order flow at time  , 
      
   is CB intervention at time    ,       
    is CPR intervention at time    .  
and n decide the number of lags (leads) considered in the model. This research use 
OLS estimation method and correct the autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity of 
coefficient variance/covariance matrix with the Newey-West method. The data 
frequency is daily. Considering that impacts of intervention may last a few days, this 
work take the lag lengths of both  and n as 1; i.e. this work study the effects of 
intervention with one day lag and one day lead. 
Table 5.2 presents the estimation results of our simple model. The first three columns 
show the results of the exchange rate returns model regressed with the whole sample 
and with two sub-periods. In the whole sample from 15
th
 Dec 2011 to 13
th
 Dec 2012, 
both CB intervention and CPR intervention have significant effects on exchange rate 
returns on intervention days. The coefficient on CPR intervention is negatively 
significant at one day lag, which means CPR intervention has its effect with a one day 
delay. In sub-period A, from 15
th
 Dec 2011 to 13
th
 Sep 2012, intervention shows 
almost the same effect on exchange rate returns but the rebound at one day delay is 
weaker. In sub-period B, from 14
th
 Sep 2012 to 13
th
 Dec 2012, CB intervention 
significantly impacts exchange rate returns but CPR intervention does not.  
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Table 5.2 Effects of Intervention on Exchange Returns and Order Flow 
     𝑋  
 
Whole 
period
 
Sub-period 
A
 
Sub-period 
B 
Whole period
 
Sub-
period A
 
Sub-period B 
  -0.0052       
(-0.90) 
0.0060 
(0.73) 
-0.0515*** 
(-2.69) 
-9.8841***   
(-3.52) 
0.9576 
(0.49) 
19.8749** 
(2.30) 
     -0.0300       
(-1.56) 
-0.0410       
(-1.44) 
-0.0025       
(-0.10) 
-3.0614         
(-0.75) 
-2.0955   
(-0.61) 
2.2303    
(0.20) 
   0.0844*** 
(3.61) 
0.1146*** 
(3.12) 
0.0572*** 
(3.02) 
-9.5954         
(-1.19) 
6.2388* 
(1.66) 
-31.2934*     
(-1.72) 
     0.0106 
(0.70) 
-0.0049       
(-0.24) 
0.0380* 
(1.88) 
-14.0619**   
(-2.09) 
-3.3879   
(-1.04) 
-31.2934**   
(-2.11) 
     -0.0371**   
(-2.27) 
-0.0353*     
(-1.86) 
0.0073 
(0.32) 
-2.7990         
(-0.60) 
-3.3879   
(-1.04) 
2.2040    
(0.19) 
   0.0420*** 
(2.88) 
0.0538*** 
(3.04) 
0.0500 
(1.52) 
-13.7548*** 
(-2.93) 
-2.9150   
(-0.94) 
-36.8514*** 
(-3.35) 
     -0.0234       
(-1.25) 
-0.0093 
(0.67) 
-0.0456       
(-1.52) 
-11.7818*** 
(-2.72) 
-0.9593   
(-0.34) 
-36.2443*** 
(-3.28) 
 ̅  0.1076 0.1206 0.1477 0.2986 -0.0079 0.3220 
Note: The whole period contains a dataset from 15/12/2011 to 13/12/2012.  Sub-period A is from 
15/12/2011 to 13/09/2012, while sub-period B is from 14/09/2012 to 13/12/2012.  ,     ,      are the 
constant and coefficients of intervention in equation (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. Numbers in brackets 
below each estimate are t-HASCE statistics; * denotes significant at the 10% level, ** at 5% level and 
*** at 1% level. 
 
The last three columns of Table 5.2 present the estimation results of the order flow 
model. The performance of the model with the whole period is mainly determined by 
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sub-period B, while most coefficients in sub-period A are not significant; the 
exception is CB intervention. Although both CB and CPR interventions show almost 
the same effects on exchange rate returns, their impacts on order flow are different in 
the two sub-periods. The coefficient on CB intervention in sub-period A is positive 
though weakly significant, which means that government purchases or sales of foreign 
exchange may influence order flow, which in turn pushes exchange rate movements. 
In contrast, the coefficients on CB intervention and CPR intervention in sub-period B 
are negatively significant and exhibit one day lead effect on order flow.  
As can be seen from Figure 5.2, in sub-period B the market expects the US dollar to 
depreciate against the RMB and in response there is a large number of selling orders. 
After October 2012, the exchange rate frequently hits the limits of the CPR 
fluctuation band. Intervention is then expected to occur, and this is also associated 
with deviations from the central bank’s tolerable level one day before or on the same 
day. CB intervention plays a role of liquidity provider and passively attenuates order 
flow, while CPR intervention is a tool to enforce exchange rate movements no matter 
how large the selling orders are. In the empirical examination of this research, this 
section also find that CB intervention is only effective on the day it occurs, while 
CPR intervention has a one day delay but shows a weak trend of rebound. The 
delayed effect appears in the exchange rate return equation but not the order flow 
equation. 
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Figure 5.2 Evolution of Exchange Rate Movements and CPR Fluctuation Band 
 
5.3.2 Sensitivity Analysis 
As has been reported above, intervention not only impacts directly on exchange rate 
returns, but also affects the buying – selling pressure, or order flow. Our findings for 
sub-period A are consistent with the news effects studied by Love and Payne (2008) 
and Frömmel, Kiss M and Pintér (2011). However, the sign of intervention effect on 
order flow is opposite in sub-period B. In this sub-section this research explore further 
the market behaviour in China under the influence of intervention. Following 
Frömmel, Kiss M and Pintér (2011) this research formulate the following model for 
our investigation: 
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         𝑋    𝑋       
      𝑋       
     𝜀  (5.3) 
where,       
    and       
     are dummy variables when CB intervention and 
CPR intervention respectively occur. Equation (5.3) distinguishes the influence of 
order flow on exchange rate when intervention occurs from that where there is no 
intervention. This work introduces a benchmark model which contains order flow 
only in the exchange rate return equation. The comparison will allow us to acquire 
insights into the behaviour of order flow when intervention occurs. This section’s 
estimated results are shown in Table 5.3. 
Table 5.3 Sensitivity Analysis of Order Flow to Intervention 
 
Whole Period 
(15/12/2011-13/12/2012) 
Sub-period A 
(15/12/2011-13/09/2012) 
Sub-period B 
(14/09/2012-13/12/2012) 
 Benchmark 
Equation 
(5.3) 
Benchmark 
Equation 
(5.3) 
Benchmark 
Equation 
(5.3) 
  -0.0071          
(-1.13) 
-0.0101      
(-1.57) 
-0.0054          
(-0.76) 
-0.0028      
(-0.40) 
-0.0426***    
(-3.30) 
-0.0416*** 
(-3.07) 
   0.0002     
(1.26) 
0.0020*** 
(3.92) 
0.0017*** 
(3.21) 
0.0014** 
(2.19) 
-0.0004***    
(-3.26) 
0.0016* 
(1.80) 
   
 
-0.0001      
(-0.47) 
 
0.0043* 
(1.67) 
 
-0.0003      
(-1.09) 
   
 
-0.0020*** 
(-3.82) 
 
-0.0008      
(-0.73) 
 
-0.0019**  
(-2.06) 
 ̅  0.0002 0.0544 0.0637 0.1004 0.0316 0.069 
Notes:  ,   ,   ,    are the constant and coefficients to be estimated in equation (5.3). The first row in 
every equation is the estimated value of constant and coefficients; numbers in brackets below each 
estimate are t-HASCE statistics; * denotes significant at 10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
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It can be seen that in the regression results for the whole sample period, order flow is 
not significant in the benchmark model. However, when this research introduces the 
sensitivity parameter of order flow to the CPR intervention model, order flow 
becomes significant and positively correlated with exchange rate returns. Similarly, 
while the coefficient on order flow looks wrong-signed (negative) and significant in 
the benchmark model, it becomes positive though weakly significant in the estimation 
results of equation (5.3). The sum of coefficient    and    is quite close to the 
coefficient on order flow in the benchmark model, which suggests that the wrong sign 
of order flow is due to the existence of CPR intervention. Without CPR intervention, 
every 1% increase of order flow is associated with an increase in the exchange value 
of the RMB against the dollar by 20 basis points (16 basis points in sub-period B). 
When CPR intervention occurs, order flow changes its impact direction to decrease 
the exchange value of USD/CNY. The final effect of order flow therefore disappears 
and is even dominated by wrong-signed order flow. The adjusted R-sq for the whole 
period is relatively low. It is plausible that the sub-period B influences the 
performance of the whole period. In addition, the effect of order flow only changes 
under CPR intervention when the exchange rate is close to the limits of the CPR 
fluctuating band, while    is not significant in sub-period A. 
In sub-period A, order flow is positive and significant in the exchange rate 
determination. This is consistent with the previous literature, for example the findings 
of Evans and Lyons (2002b) with regard to USD/JPY and USD/DEM. When CB 
intervention occurs, the effect of order flow on exchange rate significantly changes. 
Every 1% increase of net buying of the US dollar will lead to an additional 29 basis 
points increase of the exchange rate compared to the case without CB intervention. 
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This indicates that order flow carries additional information when CB intervention is 
discovered. 
5.3.3 Intervention Impacts on Exchange Rate Returns and Order Flow in a VAR 
Setting  
Having analysed impacts of CB intervention and CPR intervention on exchange rate 
movements and order flow in different sample periods, this chapter now move to 
explore whether the exchange rate reacts to these two different interventions directly 
or indirectly, that is, intermediated by order flow. For this purpose, this section needs 
to investigate the interactions between the exchange rate and order flow when 
intervention occurs.  
5.3.3.1 The VAR Model 
This research set up a VAR model that includes CB and CPR interventions, the 
exchange rate and order flow in its variable space.  The model specification is as 
follows: 
                      (5.4) 
and, 
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(5.5) 
 
where,    is the log difference of the exchange rate; 𝑋 is order flow;     
  is CB 
intervention and     
  is CPR intervention.   and   are the coefficients matrices of 
lagged variables to be estimated;   is the structural effects of interventions;   is the 
covariance matrix; C is constant. 
The reduced form uses the     to multiply the structural VAR model, both sides of 
equation (5.4). Here the reduced form VAR can be displayed as: 
                     (5.6) 
where,       ;       ;              
    . 
The coefficients on interventions are       . The matrix  , or the off-diagonal 
elements, can be retrieved from the estimation of the structural parameters. Thus, the 
structural form intervention impact,  , is from the conditional covariance matrix of 
reduced form  , such that     . The coefficient on the structural form intervention 
impact could tell us the effect of intervention on the exchange rate intermediated by 
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order flow. Here, this research follow Frömmel, Kiss M and Pintér (2011), and do not 
consider the simultaneous feedback trading in this chapter’s sample.  
There are two assumptions essential to our empirical modelling: first, the error term of 
the structural form is zero covariance; second, set  2,  of matrix A in equation (5.5) is 
equal to zero. The final multivariate VAR model is as follows: 
 (
   
𝑋 
)    (
   ,2
 
)𝑋   2×2 (
     
𝑋   
)   2×2 (
    
  
    
   )     (5.7) 
where,    is log difference of the exchange rate; 𝑋 is order flow;     
  
 is CB 
intervention;     
   
 is CPR intervention. In this formulation, the contemporaneous 
order flow is on the left hand side of the reduced form exchange rate equation. 
All the equations in the system are estimated with OLS; the residuals are estimated by 
the ML (maximum likelihood). For every sample, the optimal lag is set to be one. The 
lag length choice method is guided by the SC (Schwarz information criterion) and HQ 
(Hannan-Quinn information criterion). 
5.3.3.2 Estimation Results of the VAR model 
Table 5.4 reports the estimates of order flow and exchange rate returns in the VAR 
analysis. The results of the coefficients on the intervention variables can be 
summarized as follows: First, the coefficients on the CB intervention in the exchange 
rate equation are positive and significant in every sample set. In the whole sample 
period, one unit of central bank intervention directly causes USD/CNY appreciation 
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of 6.10 basis points. In sub-period A this increases to 9.83 basis points, while sub-
period B has appreciation of 4.77 basis points (significant at 10% level). Second, the 
reduced form coefficients on both CB and CPR interventions in the order flow 
equation have wrong signs in sub-period B. This seems to be caused by poor liquidity 
of the Chinese foreign exchange market during sub-period B. Third, the coefficients 
on CPR intervention are significant only in the equation where order flow is excluded 
in sub-period A. The aim of CPR intervention in general is to prevent a too rapid 
increase in the RMB price. This seems to work with regard to order flow, but still 
cannot influence the RMB appreciation trend. This could be because the performance 
of the whole period is mainly determined by the performance in sub-period B, during 
which, as previous reports show, the Chinese foreign exchange market has poor 
liquidity. In contrast, in sub-period A the CPR intervention directly causes 3.38 basis 
points of USD/CNY rate appreciation.  
The reduced form adjusted  2 shows that the regression results of the exchange rate 
equation have less explanatory power than the results of the order flow equation. The 
adjusted  2  in the order flow equation is nearly 28% on average while the 
explanatory power of the exchange rate equation is 25%. Compared to the results in 
Table 5.2, the reduced form of the VAR model has a better performance and greater 
explanatory power. 
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Table 5.4 VAR Analysis of Order Flow and Exchange Rate Returns 
 
Whole Period 
(15/12/2011-13/12/2012) 
Sub-period A 
(15/12/2011-
13/09/2012) 
Sub-period B 
(14/09/2012-
13/12/2012) 
                      
Constant -0.0076          
(-1.10) 
-4.7947*** 
(-2.60) 
0.0138    
(1.62) 
1.0966 
(0.80) 
-0.0783*** 
(-3.41) 
4.5156 
(0.42) 
    
   0.0610*** 
(3.34) 
-4.4663       
(-0.92) 
0.0983*** 
(4.17) 
5.9715 
(1.56) 
0.0477* 
(1.74) 
-17.4793   
(-1.36) 
    
    0.0046    
(0.37) 
-14.6100*** 
(-4.46) 
0.0338** 
(2.12) 
-2.4241 
(-0.94) 
0.0315 
(1.08) 
-32.7807** 
(-2.39) 
 ̅  0.0419 0.4365 0.1030 0.0102 0.1067 0.3830 
    -0.000678*** 
(-2.85) 
___ 
-0.001616*** 
(-3.66) 
___ 
-0.0000737 
(-0.27) 
___ 
     ___ 0 ___ 0 ___ 0 
    
          0.0641 ___ 0.0886 ___ 0.0490 ___ 
    
           0.0145 ___ 0.0377 ___ 0.0339 ___ 
Notes:     is log difference of the exchange rate;    is order flow;   T 
   is CB intervention;   T 
    is 
CPR intervention;   F  is the effect of order flow on exchange rate returns in the exchange rate 
equation, retrieved from the conditional variance estimation;  E   is the effect of exchange rate returns 
on order flow in the order flow equation. Given that no feedback trading is allowed in China, here we 
restrict it to zero.   T 
   Str c  and   T 
    Str c  are coefficients on the structural CB and CPR 
interventions, indicating their impacts in the exchange rate return equation. * Denotes significant at 
10% level, ** at 5% level and *** at 1% level. 
 
The last four rows of Table 5.4 show the coefficients of the structural form retrieved 
from the estimations of the multivariate VAR model. The row 𝑂   shows matrix  , 
the off-diagonal elements, as the coefficients on the order flow (equation (5.7)   ,2) 
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in the exchange rate equation. The coefficients are all significant and negative except 
for those in sub-period B. This indicates that order flow has a highly positive effect on 
exchange rate returns. In particular, in sub-period B, the effect of order flow is 
significant at the 1% level in the exchange rate equation. However, in sub-period B 
this effect seems not to be present, probably due to poor liquidity in the market. The 
row     shows the effects of exchange rate returns in the order flow equation and is 
restricted to zero, because this work does not count on simultaneous feedback trading. 
The coefficients on structural impacts of the CB and CPR interventions are shown in 
the final two rows respectively. Comparison of the corresponding values of the 
reduced form (the second row     
  
 
and the third row     
   ) and the structural 
form (the last two rows     
          and     
          ) reveals interesting 
insights. First, both the reduced and the structural forms of intervention effects have 
the same direction. Second, the structural form exchange rate impact of the CB 
intervention is slightly greater than the reduced form impact, except for sub-period A. 
Similarly, the structural form exchange rate impacts of the CPR interventions are 
greater than the reduced form impacts across all sub-periods. Third, since this 
research proposes no simultaneous feedback trading in our sample, there is no channel 
for intervention to transmit contemporaneous impact from the exchange rate to order 
flow. The structural coefficient in the order flow equation does not differ from that of 
the reduced form model. Hence, this research does not show it again in Table 5.4.  
5.3.3.3 Decomposition of Intervention Impacts  
In the previous section, this research show that order flow is more sensitive during 
intervention periods. Given that order flow presents the market reactions to CB and 
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CPR interventions, and has the potential to move the exchange rate, this research use 
a simple VAR model to estimate the intermediation effect of order flow on the 
exchange rate when intervention occurs. In order to evaluate to find the size of such 
intermediation reaction this research further explores equation (5.7) by applying 
restrictions on the structural coefficients on CB and CPR interventions such that 
impact of order flow is restricted to be zero. Consequently, all responses of the 
exchange rate movements can be explained as the direct impact of the intervention 
through the structural exchange rate equation.  
Results of the impulse response function (IRF) are shown in Figure 5.3. The solid line 
represents the responses of the exchange rate to different interventions. The dotted 
line is the standard error band of the impulse response function (IRF) within the 95% 
confidence interval. The dashed line denotes exchange rate responses to interventions 
when structural coefficients on all interventions in the order flow equation are 
restricted to be zero. The hypothesis of exchange rate responses to interventions is 
that order flow has greater direct impact on the exchange rate than do the 
interventions themselves. The responses of the exchange rate are plotted in the 
following graphs:  
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Notes: Graphs a and b show the responses of the exchange rate to interventions in the whole sample 
period; graphs c and d show the responses of exchange rate to interventions in sub-period A; graphs e 
and f present impulse responses in sub-period B; the solid line shows impulse responses of the 
exchange rate to the Cholesky one S.D. intervention shocks and with the standard error bands (the 
dotted line); the dashed line shows the responses of the structural coefficients, to be set as zero on CB 
and CPR interventions in the order flow equation. 
Figure 5.3 Accumulated Responses of USD/CNY Exchange Rate to Intervention 
 
First, the influence of CB intervention on exchange rate is greater than that of CPR 
intervention. Second, in each graph, all the dashed lines are above the solid lines 
except for the CB intervention impact in sub-period A. This result indicates that the 
direct impact (i.e. impact not via order flow) of interventions on the exchange rate is 
greater than the indirect impact via order flow.  
  127 
As shown before, the reduced form coefficient on CPR intervention has the wrong 
sign in the order flow equation, especially in sub-period B (see Table 5.4). This means 
that the structural form impulse responses of the exchange rate to CPR intervention 
through the order flow channel also have the wrong direction. Meanwhile, the impulse 
response of the exchange rate to CB intervention in sub-period A (Figure 5.3c) is the 
only normal case in our sample. In sub-period B, liquidity is poor and this also 
influences the whole period performance. 
Table 5.5 quantifies the percentage of responses of the exchange rate to different 
interventions via direct impact and order flow effect. As discussed, when the 
coefficient on intervention in the order flow equation is wrong signed, the responses 
of no order flow IRF will be greater than those of reduced form IRF. The portion of 
the effects of intervention directly impounding into the exchange rate will be over 
100% and thus the order flow ratio will be negative. This can be found in all cases 
except that of CB intervention in sub-period A. In these cases, order flow is wrong 
signed and the correct sign of reduced form coefficient is due only to the direct impact 
of intervention.  
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Table 5.5 Multivariate VAR Results of Direct and Order Flow Effects 
 Whole Period 
(15/12/2011-13/12/2012) 
Sub-period A 
(15/12/2011-13/09/2012) 
Sub-period B 
(14/09/2012-13/12/2012) 
Time 
Period 
of Shock 
Direct 
(% Share) 
OrderFlow 
(% Share) 
Direct 
(% Share) 
OrderFlow 
(% Share) 
Direct 
(% Share) 
OrderFlow 
(% Share) 
The CB Intervention 
0 105.0820 -5.0820 90.1322 9.8678 102.7254 -2.7254 
1 105.0810 -5.0810 90.1326 9.8674 102.7235 -2.7235 
3 105.0820 -5.0820 90.1325 9.8675 102.7253 -2.7253 
5 105.0818 -5.0818 90.1327 9.8673 102.7242 -2.7242 
The CPR Intervention 
0 315.2174 -215.2174 111.5385 -11.5385 107.6190 -7.6190 
1 315.2321 -215.2321 111.5390 -11.5390 107.6194 -7.6194 
3 315.2262 -215.2262 111.5385 -11.5385 107.6186 -7.6186 
5 315.2262 -215.2262 111.5370 -11.5370 107.6217 -7.6217 
Notes: The column headed ‘Direct’ indicates the percentage of exchange rate responses to the direct 
intervention upon impact; Order Flow represents the share of exchange rate responses to                                                                                                           
intervention through the order flow channel. 
 
The share of impact of CB intervention impounded into the exchange rate via the 
order flow channel is relatively small. In sub-period A, it accounts for 9.8678% of the 
total effect contemporaneously, 9.8674% after one day, 9.8675% after three days and 
9.8673% after one week (5 working days). The CB intervention impact is absorbed by 
the market on the day of intervention and becomes stable afterwards. Compared to the 
effect channelled via order flow, the share of direct impact of CB intervention is much 
more prominent. Turning to CPR intervention, by implication it is not meant to be 
used as a policy tool in actual trading activity, so its main effects are reflected in the 
direct impact. 
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5.4 Effectiveness of Chinese Intervention 
Given the extensive interventions in the foreign exchange market by the Chinese 
authority, it is natural to ask whether these interventions are successful. In what 
follows, this research apply the success criteria established by Chaboud and Humpage 
(2005), Fatum and Hutchison (2006) and Marsh (2011) to evaluate the effectiveness 
of China’s interventions, with necessary adaptations according to China’s special 
institutional features.  
5.4.1 Criteria of Success 
I. The ‘Direction’ Criterion 
The first criterion tested is whether the direction of the price movements is in 
agreement with that of the central bank intervention. For an intervention to be 
successful, the directional agreement is essential. This criterion can be further 
classified as follows: 
i. The order flow movement 
According to the first criterion, based on the movement of order flow in situation A, 
    
 , in the case that the Chinese monetary authority intervenes by purchasing the US 
dollar and order flow on the market also moves in the direction of dollar buying, this 
can be viewed as a successful intervention: 
 
    
  {
           ,     𝑋   
           
,      {
    
  
    
   
 
(5.8) 
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By the same criterion, based on the movement of order flow in situation B,     
 , in 
the case that the Chinese monetary authority intervenes to sell off the US dollar and 
the order flow is also out of the US dollar, this too can be viewed as an indicator of a 
successful intervention. 
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,      {
    
  
    
    (5.9) 
ii. The exchange rate movement 
Again according to the first success criterion, based on the movement of exchange 
rate, when the monetary authority buys the dollar,     , if the value of the US dollar 
appreciates then the intervention can be deemed successful. 
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    (5.10) 
By the same criterion, based on the movement of exchange rate, when the monetary 
authority sells the dollar,     , if the value of the US dollar depreciates then the 
intervention can be said to be successful. 
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    (5.11) 
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The intervention      includes the CB intervention (     
  ) and the CPR 
intervention (    
   
 
).     is today’s closing exchange rate minus last day’s closing 
price. 
II. The ‘Reversing’ Criterion 
The second success criterion refers to a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy, whereby the 
Chinese central bank intervenes to reverse the current exchange rate trend.  
i. The order flow movement 
According to the second success criterion, based on the movement of order flow in 
the situation A,      
 , in the case that the central bank’s intervention changes the 
direction of order flow from out of the US dollar to into the US dollar, this can be 
deemed a successful intervention. 
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(5.12) 
Similarly, based on the movement of order flow in the situation B,      
 , if the 
intervention changes the direction of order flow from into the dollar to out of the 
dollar, this can be deemed a successful intervention. 
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(5.13) 
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ii. The exchange rate movement 
Also according to the second success criterion, based on the movement of exchange 
rate, when the monetary authority buys or sells the dollar,       and      , if the 
intervention reverses the direction of change in the dollar value, it can be deemed 
successful. 
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(5.14) 
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(5.15) 
III. The ‘Moderating’ Criterion 
This success criterion is similar to a ‘leaning against the wind’ policy, but rather than 
reverse the trend, the central bank aims to smooth and slow down the movement. 
i. The order flow movement 
According to the third success criterion, based on the movement of order flow in the 
situations A and B,       
  and       
 , if by buying (selling) the US dollar the 
Chinese monetary authority slows the net order flow out of (into) the dollar, this can 
be deemed a successful intervention. 
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(5.17) 
ii. The exchange rate movement 
Also according to this third criterion, based on the movement of exchange rate, 
whenever the monetary authority buys or sells the dollar,        and       , if the 
intervention declines the trend of US dollar appreciation or depreciation, it is 
considered to be successful. 
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(5.18) 
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IV. The ‘Accentuating’ Criterion 
The fourth success criterion, in contrast to the second and third, follows the ‘leaning 
with the wind’ policy.  
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i. The order flow movement 
According to the fourth success criterion, based on the movement of order flow in the 
situation A and B,      
  and      
 , if the intervention accentuates movement of the 
net order flow into (out of) the US dollar, it is deemed to be successful. 
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ii. The exchange rate movement 
Again according to the fourth success criterion, based on the movement of exchange 
rate, when the monetary authority buys or sells the dollar,       and      , the 
intervention can be judged to be successful if it accelerates the speed of the exchange 
rate depreciation or appreciation. 
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V. General Criterion of Success 
The final success criterion unites all the above criteria. The Chinese monetary 
authority intervention to purchase (sell) the USD is regarded as successful if it meets 
the following criteria: 
i. The intervention to purchase (sell) the US dollar is successful if it changes the 
order flow to into (out of) the US dollar, or at least decreases (increases) the net 
order flow out of (into) the US dollar. 
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(5.25) 
ii. Intervention to purchase (sell) the USD by the central bank of China is 
successful if it appreciates (depreciates) the value of the exchange rate, or at 
least smoothes the exchange rate movements. 
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5.4.2 Test Results for China 
Based on the criteria given above, this research evaluate to what extent interventions 
by the Chinese monetary authority are successful. Table 5.6 displays the full range of 
Chinese foreign exchange market interventions. Tables 5.7 and 5.8 present the results 
of the successful CB intervention and CPR intervention respectively in the whole 
sample period. In each table, the columns from left to right display the total number of 
interventions, the number of successful interventions (as a percentage), the number of 
unconditional successful interventions (percentage), the number of expected 
successful interventions, the standard deviations (S.D.) and the probability value. To 
evaluate the probable number of successful interventions, this research assumes that 
all variables follow hypergeometric distribution. This distribution does not hinge on 
the presumed probability of an individual intervention being successful, and allows 
the individual events to be dependent. The null hypothesis is that the actual number of 
successful interventions is equal to the number of expected successful interventions. 
Table 5.6 Summary of the Number of Chinese Interventions 
Total Intervention Num. 
    
         
          
          
       
37 90 
Whole Period 
(15/12/2011-13/12/2012, 243 obs.) 
15 22 49 41 
Sub-period A  
(15/12/2011-13/09/2012, 143 obs.) 
0 21 6 41 
Sub-period B  
(14/09/2012-13/12/2012, 60 obs.) 
15 1 43 0 
Notes: The table reports the number of CB and CPR interventions in each period.  
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In Table 5.6, there are 37 days of CB intervention and 90 days of CPR intervention. In 
sub-period A, the majority of CB interventions are negative, with only one exception 
in which the central bank of China intervenes to sell the US dollar to accelerate the 
appreciation of the RMB. The fact that over 87% of the CPR interventions are 
negative means that the central bank of China does not want the RMB price to 
depreciate too much; in other words, it wishes to appreciate the RMB price against the 
market.  
However, on 13
th
 September 2012, the US Federal Reserve launched the third round 
of quantitative easing (QE3) and this, combined with a series of international events, 
led to massive appreciation of the RMB in the Chinese foreign exchange market, 
forcing the monetary authority to use the CPR intervention frequently in sub-period B 
to limit the RMB price within a stable range.  Most of the CB interventions in sub-
period B are positive.  
The results of the effectiveness estimation of the Chinese intervention are 
demonstrated in Tables 5.7 and 5.8. While the majority of        are in sub-period 
B and the majority of         are in sub-period A, the results of     
  for the 
whole period could represent the performance of intervention in sub-period B, and 
those for     
  could represent the performance of intervention in sub-period A; the 
results of other success criteria are similar to those for     
  and     
 . Therefore, this 
work does not present the results for the separate sub-periods in this section. 
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Table 5.7 Number of Successful CB Interventions for Whole Sample 
The CB Intervention Whole Period                                                              
(15/12/2011-13/12/2012, 243 observations) 
 
Intervention Unconditional Expected Standard 
P-
Value 
 Total Success Success Success Deviation 1-CDF 
 Num. Num. % Num. % Num. Num.  
    
 
 15 2 13.33 111 45.68 6.85 1.87 0.9923 
    
 
 22 11 50.00 124 51.03 11.23 2.24 0.4520 
     15 8 53.33 118 48.56 7.28 1.88 0.2586 
     22 15 68.18 120 49.38 10.86 2.24 0.0182 
     
 
 15 1 6.67 46 18.93 2.84 1.47 0.8157 
     
 
 22 7 31.82 47 19.34 4.26 1.77 0.0393 
      15 3 20.00 59 24.28 3.64 1.61 0.5156 
      22 4 18.18 60 24.69 5.43 1.93 0.6746 
      
 
 15 7 46.67 38 15.64 2.35 1.37 0.0005 
      
 
 22 2 9.09 33 13.58 2.99 1.54 0.6001 
       15 3 20.00 27 11.11 1.67 1.18 0.0701 
       22 2 9.09 28 11.52 2.54 1.43 0.4788 
     
 
 15 0 0.00 29 11.93 1.79 1.22 0.8601 
     
 
 22 3 13.64 35 14.40 3.17 1.57 0.3933 
      15 2 13.33 31 12.76 1.91 1.25 0.2958 
      22 7 31.82 33 13.58 2.99 1.54 0.0040 
    
 
 15 9 60.00 149 61.32 9.20 1.83 0.4418 
    
 
 22 13 59.09 157 64.61 14.21 2.14 0.6367 
     15 11 73.33 145 59.67 8.95 1.84 0.0797 
     22 17 77.27 148 60.91 13.40 2.19 0.0265 
Notes: This table shows the successful CB interventions for the whole period. If the intervention meets 
any of the success criteria conditions it can be counted into the number of successful interventions. The 
percentage of the unconditional success is the number of days which meet the success criteria in the 
whole population, including intervention days and no intervention days. The probability value is 
observed by the hypergeometric function based on the number of conditional (unconditional) success 
and the whole sample size. Significant P-values and larger total success rate (compared with the 
unconditional success rate) are in bold type. 
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Table 5.7 presents the results against the success criteria for the whole sample of CB 
intervention. The population of the whole sample is 243, and includes 37 CB 
interventions. The third column gives the percentage of successful interventions under 
each success criterion, and the fifth shows the proportion of unconditional success 
based on all observations. Where the proportion of successful intervention is above 
that for unconditional success, this work present the result in bold.  
In Table 5.7, out of 20 tests, 9 are greater than the unconditional success rates and 5 
have significant probability value under 0.05, which are also marked in bold. Taking 
     as an example, the intervention is successful 15 times out of 22 cases and the 
proportion is 68.18%. This is significantly greater than the unconditional success and 
the probability value is 0.0182. In terms of the     ,       and      success criteria, 
    
      indicates that the central bank intervened successfully to appreciate the 
RMB price by selling the US dollar during sub-period A. Similarly,      
  is strongly 
significant.  This presents the case in which the monetary authority of China directly 
sells the US dollar and successfully changes the direction of order flow.  
With the       
  success criterion,     
     implies that the Chinese monetary 
authority purchases the US dollar and successfully slows the net order flow out of the 
US dollar in sub-period B. These successful CB interventions imply that, for market 
participants wanting to tap the Chinese foreign exchange market, they should take the 
general tendency of the Chinese authority’s intervention into consideration when 
making investment decisions. 
Table 5.8 provides the results of successful CPR intervention based on each success 
criterion for the whole sample. This includes 90 days CPR intervention and 243 
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observations. The percentage of successful interventions greater than the 
unconditional case is over 50%. However, in sub-period B only 3 tests are significant 
at 5% level. For the first criterion,       
 , where     
      the CPR intervention 
has similar effects with the CB intervention in sub-period B. However, the process 
here is different.  
As discussed above, in CB intervention the Chinese monetary authority purchases the 
US dollar to slow the net outflow of the US dollar. In contrast, CPR intervention will 
make the exchange rate deviate from the market expected value. More specifically, it 
will make the US dollar overvalued. In this case, market participants wishing to sell 
the US dollar would be faced with fewer buying orders as well as weaker motivations 
for market makers to provide liquidity. This leads to a lack of market liquidity and 
decreases order flow. The other two significant results in sub-period B,         
and     , both show that the CPR intervention successfully declined the trend of the 
US dollar appreciation and smoothed the exchange rate movements. 
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Table 5.8 Number of Successful CPR Interventions for the Whole Sample 
The CPR Intervention Whole Period                                                           
(15/12/2011-13/12/2012, 243 observations) 
 Intervention Unconditional Expected Standard P-Value 
 Total Success Success Success Deviation 1-CDF 
 Num. Num. % Num. % Num. Num.  
    
  49 10 20.41 111 45.68 22.38 3.12 0.9999 
    
  41 17 41.46 124 51.03 20.92 2.92 0.8796 
     49 24 48.98 118 48.56 23.79 3.13 0.4104 
     41 22 53.66 120 49.38 20.25 2.92 0.2202 
     
  49 7 14.29 46 18.93 9.28 2.46 0.7616 
     
  41 9 21.95 47 19.34 7.93 2.31 0.2431 
      49 14 28.57 59 24.28 11.90 2.69 0.1655 
      41 9 21.95 60 24.69 10.12 2.52 0.5893 
      
  49 16 32.65 38 15.64 7.66 2.28 0.0001 
      
  41 8 19.51 33 13.58 5.57 2.00 0.0761 
       49 10 20.41 27 11.11 5.44 1.97 0.0077 
       41 3 7.32 28 11.52 4.72 1.87 0.7348 
     
  49 2 4.08 29 11.93 5.85 2.03 0.9596 
     
  41 3 7.32 35 14.40 5.91 2.05 0.8836 
      49 3 6.12 31 12.76 6.25 2.09 0.9122 
      41 7 17.07 33 13.58 5.57 2.00 0.1658 
    
  49 29 59.18 149 61.32 30.05 3.05 0.5738 
    
  41 25 60.98 157 64.61 26.49 2.80 0.6422 
     49 34 69.39 145 59.67 29.24 3.07 0.0417 
     41 25 60.98 148 60.91 24.97 2.85 0.4297 
Notes: This table shows the performance of CPR intervention for the whole period in terms of the 
success criteria. If the intervention meets any of the success criteria, it can be counted into the number 
of successful interventions. The percentage of the unconditional success is the number of days which 
meet the success criteria in the whole population, including intervention days and no intervention days. 
The probability value observed by the hypergeometric function is based on the number of conditional 
(unconditional) success and the whole sample size. The significant P-values and the larger total success 
rate (compared with the unconditional success rate) are presented in bold. 
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5.5 Robustness of the Findings 
5.5.1 The GARCH Model 
In order to explore intervention effects further, including those on both the level and 
the volatility of exchange rate, this section apply a GARCH (1, 1) model which 
contains CB intervention and CPR intervention in both the mean equation and the 
variance equation. The specification of the models for changes in the exchange rate 
and order flow are formulated as follows: 
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(5.28) 
and, 
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(5.29) 
where, 𝜀  is the residual,   
2 is the conditional variance, and variables are defined as 
before.  
As discussed elsewhere in this chapter, the majority of CB and CPR interventions in 
sub-period A are negatively associated with the exchange rate returns and order flow, 
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while in sub-period B the majority of CB and CPR interventions are positive. The 
estimated coefficients on CB intervention and CPR intervention in sub-period A could 
represent the outcome of appreciation-targeting intervention that aims to prop up the 
value of domestic currency or slow the depreciation in the marketplace. CB 
intervention is conducted through selling the US dollar and so can be named sale 
intervention. For CPR intervention, the government sets a higher value of domestic 
currency than market expectation and limits the depreciation. The estimation results in 
sub-period B could represent the outcome of depreciation-targeting intervention.  
5.5.2 Estimation Results of the GARCH model 
Table 5.9 shows the estimation results of intervention effects on changes in the 
exchange rate (equation 5.28). The coefficients on interventions in the mean equation 
are consistent with the contemporaneous coefficients in Table 5.2. CB intervention is 
positively significant in both sub-periods. This is indirect evidence supporting the 
notion that CB intervention has the ability to appreciate RMB price by selling the US 
dollar in sub-period A, and reduce the appreciation of RMB price by purchase of the 
dollar in sub-period B. This is consistent with our finding that       is significant and 
       is weak significant for CB intervention. The coefficient on CPR intervention in 
sub-period A is weakly significant. However, no criterion of success is significant. 
In the variance equation, the estimated coefficient on CB intervention is negative and 
weakly significant in sub-period A and positively significant in sub-period B. This 
implies that CB intervention tends to reduce volatility of exchange rate growth in sub-
period A and increases the volatility in sub-period B. Given the illusive nature of CB 
intervention on exchange rate volatility and the fact that CB intervention in China is 
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usually conducted by unannounced transactions, it tends to increase uncertainty, 
hence intensify volatility in China’s foreign exchange market. In contrast, as we will 
see later, CPR intervention has no impact on the volatility of changes in the exchange 
rate.  
 
Table 5.9 GARCH Analysis of Intervention Effects on Exchange Rate Returns 
Mean Equation 
       
Sub-period A 
(15/12/2011-
13/09/2012) 
0.0123 
(0.0076) 
0.0985*** 
(0.0331) 
0.0216* 
(0.0130) 
Sub-period B 
(14/09/2012-
13/12/2012) 
-0.0733** 
(0.0335) 
0.0662*** 
(0.0060) 
0.0522 
(0.0349) 
Variance Equation 
           
Sub-period A 
(15/12/2011-
13/09/2012) 
0.0053 
(0.0037) 
-0.0136* 
(0.0070) 
0.0030 
(0.0019) 
0.0989 
(0.1143) 
0.2849 
(0.3284) 
Sub-period B 
(14/09/2012-
13/12/2012) 
0.0065** 
(0.0026) 
0.0036*** 
(0.0000) 
-0.0040 
(0.0026) 
0.0000 
(0.0015) 
0.3276*** 
(0.0064) 
Notes: The estimated coefficients of equation (5.28) are shown in the first row of each model. Standard 
errors are in the parentheses below the estimates. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, 
** for 5%, and *for 10%.  
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Table 5.10 presents the estimation results of intervention effects on order flow 
(equation 5.29). Again, coefficients on interventions in the mean equation are 
consistent with contemporaneous coefficients in Table 5.2. The coefficient on CB 
intervention in sub-period A is positively significant while the coefficient on CPR 
intervention is insignificant. This provides indirect evidence that CB intervention is 
able to move order flow while CPR intervention is not. This is consistent with our 
previous finding that      
  is significant. In sub-period B, both CB and CPR 
intervention are negatively significant in explaining changes in order flow. This 
provides some support for the finding that       
  for both CB and CPR interventions 
is significant. However, both CB and CPR interventions have no impact on the 
volatility of order flow. 
  
  146 
Table 5.10 GARCH Analysis of Intervention Effects on Order Flow 
Mean Equation 
       
Sub-period A 
(15/12/2011-
13/09/2012) 
3.3687*** 
(1.2783) 
7.2661** 
(3.2431) 
-3.3205 
(2.4994) 
Sub-period B 
(14/09/2012-
13/12/2012) 
4.9026 
(8.3537) 
-16.3184** 
(7.9648) 
-33.6997*** 
(8.6051) 
Variance Equation 
           
Sub-period A 
(15/12/2011-
13/09/2012) 
23.7900* 
(13.5900) 
-19.9958 
(29.7300) 
19.1166 
(19.4100) 
0.1141* 
(0.0625) 
0.8017*** 
(0.0801) 
Sub-period B 
(14/09/2012-
13/12/2012) 
100.0000 
(72.7430) 
-79.8941 
(85.5470) 
100.0000 
(308.00) 
1.0000*** 
(0.3377) 
0.0960 
(0.1830) 
Notes: The estimated coefficients in equation (5.29) are shown in the first row of each model. Standard 
errors are in the parentheses below the estimates. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, 
** for 5%, and *for 10%.  
 
5.6 Conclusions 
Despite the attention paid to China’s exchange rate policy, and the growing awareness 
in international policy circles and academia that intervention is a central feature of 
that policy, little is known about China’s monetary governance in relation to foreign 
exchange intervention and the consequences thereof.  Given the intensity of the 
intervention, the lack of research of the issue is striking. This chapter extends the 
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literature on foreign exchange intervention to consider the case of China, which is 
perhaps the most watched emerging market in terms of its foreign exchange rate 
policy. This chapter concentrate on considering CB intervention and CPR intervention 
in China. This research first identifies the intervention days, and then moves on to 
empirically investigate effects of interventions on the exchange rate and order flow 
using a market microstructural approach. The effectiveness of Chinese intervention is 
assessed according to 5 sets of success criteria. To test the robustness of our empirical 
study, a GARCH model is applied, which also provides further examination of 
intervention effects on volatility.  
In a reduced form of empirical model formulation, this chapter test for the effects of 
interventions on exchange rate movements and order flow. This research find that 
intervention not only impacts directly on changes in the exchange rate, but also affects 
the buying – selling pressure, or order flow. Intervention is more likely to occur when 
there are heavy selling orders with little liquidity, and where the exchange rate 
deviates from the central bank’s tolerable level one day before or on the same day in 
sub-period B of our sample data. 
Sensitivity analysis sheds further light on the effects of intervention on the exchange 
rate returns and order flow.  In sub-period A, there is positive and significant 
correlation between order flow and exchange rate when intervention occurs. For 
example, every 1% increase of net buying of the US dollar will lead to an additional 
29 basis points increase of the exchange rate. This indicates that order flow carries 
additional information under CB intervention. This chapter also find that CPR 
intervention will induce order flow to show wrong signs in sub-period B. 
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Using a multivariate VAR model this research examine the effects of intervention on 
the inter-reaction between order flow and exchange rate returns. By decomposing the 
shocks to the intervention effects, this chapter find that the intervention directly 
impounded into the exchange rate plays a more prominent role than that via the order 
flow.  
The effectiveness of Chinese intervention is assessed against 5 sets of success criteria. 
The results show that CB intervention can effectively influence both the exchange rate 
and order flow via transaction activity in sub-period A. However, due to the poor 
market liquidity in sub-period B, the effects of CB intervention are to provide 
liquidity and reduce the market transaction pressure. The CPR interventions are 
effective to keep the exchange rate within a stable band.  
This chapter conduct a robust analysis of intervention effects in an alternative 
GARCH modelling framework. The results confirm the main findings of the chapter. 
CB intervention proves successful in moving the exchange rate and influencing order 
flow, but it tends to increase the volatility. With regard to CPR intervention, the 
Chinese central bank has been successful in using it for a ‘leaning against the wind’ 
policy. This type of intervention proves able to slow the net order flow out of the 
dollar, hence can smooth and slow down the order flow movement. However, it 
cannot reverse the trend, and it has no impact on the volatility of order flow.  
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Chapter 6 Exchange Rate Regime Shifts in 
China 
 
 
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the de 
facto exchange rate regime of the China FX 
market. First, this chapter detect the exact timing 
of the China exchange rate regime shifts. Then, 
this research adopt the multiple GARCH model 
to find the different impacts of exchange rate 
regime shift in the financial crisis and post-crisis 
periods. 
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Chapter 6  
Exchange Rate Regime Shifts in China 
6.1 Introduction 
In recent decades, there have been dramatic changes to the world economy. These 
include rapid growth of the emerging economies and wide fluctuations of the world’s 
major exchange rates. In response, many governments around the world have changed 
their policy regimes to deal with the changing economic conditions within and across 
countries.  For example, on 21
st
 July 2005 China announced an important change to 
its exchange rate policy, whereby it would adopt a managed floating rate system. This 
change, reiterated on 19
th
 June 2010, represents a critical departure from China’s 
long-held policy of pegging its currency to the US dollar.  Under the new regime, the 
Chinese exchange rate is administered by the government but allowed to move within 
a fluctuation band specified by the authority (PBOC 2005, 2010).   
Policy changes announced by governments are often only notional. There are frequent 
cases where the de jure policy changes do not necessarily mean de facto changes in 
the policy regime and its actual working. Furthermore, in a time of global financial 
crisis, shifts in government policy regimes could be further complicated by turmoil 
and economic chaos. All these present challenges to a sound understanding of China’s 
new exchange rate regime. 
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In order to better understand the property of exchange rate regime shifts of the China 
FX market, this chapter adopts two different but complementary approaches, as 
introduced by Engel and Hamilton (1990) and by Zeileis et al. (2010), to identify and 
analyse China’s exchange rate regime switch. In this task, the first step is to identify 
the timing of the regime shifts.  
This chapter also attempts to acquire a better understanding of the Chinese regime-
volatility puzzle from the perspective of market microstructure. Killeen et al. (2006) 
employ the microstructural approach to explain the different performance of the 
regime dependent exchange rate volatility during Europe’s shift from flexible rates to 
fixed rates. From the microstructural perspective, the order flow plays an important 
role in conveying dispersed information.  Following Killeen et al.’s (2006) approach, 
this chapter extends the literature by investigating whether adding order flow in the 
analysis may help solve the regime volatility puzzle in the China foreign exchange 
market. This thesis examines the foreign exchange pricing model, which attributes a 
key role to order flow.  
Effects of the shifts in the Chinese exchange rate regime are intertwined with the 
fallout from the recent global financial crisis. In a recent empirical research, 
Tsangarides (2012) studies the behaviour of the emerging market governments with 
regard to switching their exchange rate regimes during the financial crisis and 
recovery periods. He finds that in the recovery periods the peg rate regimes slow the 
growth performance, but in the crisis periods those regimes have no differences from 
floating rate regimes. For the Chinese case, this chapter employ the DCC AR (1)-GJR 
(1, 1) model to analyse the dynamic regime performance across the financial crisis in 
terms of the bid-ask exchange rate spread. Moreover, this chapter also investigate to 
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what extent FX intervention by the Chinese government changes, or becomes more 
likely to occur, during the periods under examination.   
This chapter further explore the economic significance of the RMB exchange rate 
exposure introduced by the freedom, though moderate, of rate changes afforded by the 
new exchange rate regime. This chapter apply the AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model to 
investigate the economic significance of the exchange rate fluctuations across the 
financial crisis periods.  
This chapter find that both regime detecting methods identify 21
st
 June 2010 as the 
date of regime shift of the China FX market. The period before this date is 
characterised by the significant influence of the global financial crisis, during which 
volatility of the RMB exchange rate has low variance. After this date, the world 
begins to see some easing of the crisis. The Chinese monetary authority then starts to 
allow greater RMB exchange rate flexibility, and consequently volatility of the trade-
weighted RMB real exchange rate increases. In the periods under examination, the 
U.S. dollar maintains its dominant weight in the reference currency basket, but there 
is significant evidence that the Chinese exchange rate no longer pegs only to the 
dollar.  
For the regime volatility puzzle and the role of order flow in the process, this chapter 
find evidence that appreciation of the RMB exchange rate is order flow driven during 
the post-crisis period. During the crisis period, deviations from the central parity rate 
(CPR) increase the possibility of government intervention, and the intervention 
correlates with bid-ask exchange rate spread. The Chinese monetary authority is 
found to act to keep the exchange rate stable. In the post-crisis period, the correlation 
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becomes time-varying and the government prefers the RMB exchange rate to 
gradually appreciate.  
There is a significant negative currency exposure during the financial crisis, caused by 
changes in the RMB exchange rate, indicating that the Chinese stock market exhibits 
a negative reaction in the period. However, no significant impact is found in the post-
crisis period. In order to modify the exchange rate exposure to fluctuations of the U.S. 
dollar, the Chinese government seems to have adopted the relatively more efficient 
exchange rate regime to handle the effects of the global financial crisis (Zhang et al., 
2011).  
The research presented in this chapter makes three main contributions to the literature. 
First, this chapter have amassed a large data set that covers the period from 22
nd
 July 
2005, when the Chinese government adopted a managed floating exchange rate 
regime, until 9
th
 October 2012. This sample size can help us detect the de facto 
exchange rate regime of China after the monetary authority adopted the managed 
floating rate arrangement. Second, the study uses the market microstructural approach 
to analyse the tick-by-tick transaction price in order to examine China’s government 
intervention across the global financial crisis. Third, this research employs the 
multiple GARCH model to analyse the impact of China’s exchange rate regime shift 
during the period under examination. 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. The following Section contains the 
data description. Section three presents the adopted models and discusses the findings. 
Section four concludes. 
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6.2 Data  
This chapter examines the different performance of Chinese foreign exchange regimes. 
The data deployed are in four main parts. The first part comprises the daily central 
parity rate (CPR) and the daily market exchange rate. The second sector includes the 
daily closing price of the USD/CNY exchange rate, the daily order flow, and the daily 
overnight interest rate differential. The third part contains the midday bid-ask spreads, 
the midday positive deviations from the CPR (PDC), the midday negative deviations 
from the CPR (NDC), and the midday order flow. The final part embraces the daily 
MSCI (Morgan Stanley Capital International) China index, the daily MSCI world 
index and the daily one-month Eurodollar rate. Only the first sample of the data, the 
CPR and the market exchange rate, spans the period from 22
nd
 June 2005 to 9
th
 
October 2012.
38
 Due to data availability, all other data samples run from 9
th
 Dec 2009 
to 9
th
 Oct 2012 exclusive of holidays.
39
  
The period overlaps with the U.S. subprime crisis. Celik (2012) finds that during that 
crisis financial markets suffered from the financial contagion effect, with the 
emerging markets experiencing the most severe impacts. Figure 6.1 shows the 
movements of three major currencies and the renminbi against the U.S. dollar during 
the financial crisis. This research finds that values of the three major currencies 
appreciated, because the dollar depreciated during the subprime crisis period. It is 
noteworthy that movements of the RMB exchange rate (Fig.6-1d: USD/CNY) 
diminish, and become almost a straight line from mid-2008 to mid-2010, suggesting 
                                                 
38 On 21st June 2005, at 19:00 (non-trading hours), the transaction price of the USD/CNY exchange 
rate was adjusted to 8.1100 Yuan, as the CPR price of the next day’s interbank market transaction price. 
Since then, the Chinese central bank has published the CPR price every working day. 
39 Excluding public holidays of China and the United States. 
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that during the crisis the Chinese currency changed to an almost fixed exchange rate 
regime.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Daily exchange rate movements, a: Euro, b: Great Britain, c: Japan, d: 
China 
 
As a first step, in order to identify regime shifts in China’s exchange rate 
arrangements, this research deploy the CPR and the market exchange rate price. The 
daily central parity rate, used in this study as the benchmark for transaction price of 
USD/CNY, is published by the China Foreign Exchange Trade System (CFETS) on 
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every working day before the market opens.
40
 Every morning, the CFETS collects 
every market maker’s preferred price and calculates the weighted average price, 
excluding the highest and lowest price, as the intraday CPR of USD/CNY. The weight 
used for averaging is based on every member’s previous transaction records in terms 
of transaction volumes and the bid/ask price. The CPR prices of other currencies are 
obtained from the cross rates between the renminbi against the USD and other major 
currencies as quoted in the international foreign exchange markets at 9 a.m.
41
  
In setting the CPR, the People’s Bank of China is guided by the aim to keep the RMB 
exchange rate stable by keeping it in a stable horizontal band. In the IMF annual 
report (IMF 2012), the de facto exchange rate regime of China is described as a 
‘crawl-like arrangement’. Prior to 21st May 2007, fluctuation of the USD/CNY 
transaction price in the interbank market was controlled by the government, so that 
the price remained within a narrow band around ±0.3% of the daily CPR. After that 
date, the monetary authority extended the band to ±0.5%. On 16
th
 April 2012, the 
State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE) announced the widening of the 
maximum fluctuation of USD/CNY bid and ask price from 1% to 2% around the CPR. 
The CPR data are from the CFETS official website and Wind Info.
42
  
In order to better understand China’s regime changes this research explore the 
differences between the policy driven exchange rate (CPR) and the actual exchange 
rate on the exchange market in China.  Historical data of the daily market exchange 
                                                 
40  Details of the central parity rate are from the CFETS official website: 
http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/fe/Channel/2781516, last accessed on 10 May 2013. 
41 Currently, the PBOC as the central bank authorises the CFETS to release information only about the 
direct trading data of 100JPY/CNY, CNY/MYR and CNY/RUB. The exchange rates of the RMB 
against other currencies are obtained on the basis of the USD/CNY rate. 
42 Shanghai Wind Information Co., Ltd. http://www.wind.com.cn, last accessed on February 2013. 
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rate are obtained from the Pacific Exchange Rate Service at the UBC.
43
 This chapter 
obtain the RMB exchange rates against six major currencies: CAD, CNY, USD, EUR, 
GBP, and JPY. The time periods for our sample are all from 22
nd
 Jul 2005 to 9
th
 Oct 
2012. 
In order to calculate the daily order flow, this research use the intraday tick-by-tick 
USD/CNY transaction price from China’s interbank spot foreign exchange market. 
All intraday tick-by-tick USD/CNY transaction prices, and the daily closing prices of 
USD/CNY, are obtained from the Reuters 3000 Xtra, one of the largest licensed data 
vendors of the CFETS.  
In the microstructural approach, order flow plays an important role in conveying 
dispersed information. As explained previously, order flow is calculated as the 
difference between the buyer initiated and seller initiated trades.  Following Evans 
(2011), this thesis apply the ‘Lee and Ready’ trade identification method to estimate 
the daily order flow of the USD/CNY transaction from every tick transaction price. 
The daily overnight interest rate differential is the difference between the Shibor 
(domestic) overnight interest rate and the U.S. (foreign) overnight interest rate, 
collected from DataStream. The time period is from 9
th
 Dec 2009 to 9
th
 Oct 2012.  
To examine the relation between exchange rate spreads and market possibility 
intervention across the global financial crisis, this chapter employ the data of midday 
bid-ask spreads, midday Positive Deviations from the CPR (PDC), midday Negative 
Deviations from the CPR (NDC), and the midday order flow. The midday bid-ask 
                                                 
43 The Pacific Exchange Rate Service is managed by Professor Werner Antweiler of the University of 
British Columbia Sauder School of Business, http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca, last accessed on 16 April 2013. 
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spread is defined as the ask price minus the bid price at the end of the midday interval. 
If the transaction price at the end of midday minus the CPR is positive this research 
defines it as PDC, otherwise it is defined as NDC. The method of calculating the 
midday order flow is similar to that   for calculating the daily order flow, in that it is 
accumulated at the end of every midday interval.  
To estimate whether the currency exposure in China is economically significant 
during the exchange rate regime shift, this chapter collates the data of the daily MSCI 
China index, the daily MSCI emerging market index and the daily one-month 
Eurodollar from 9
th
 Dec 2009 to 9
th
 Oct 2012, all obtained from DataStream as 
provided by Morgan Stanley Capital International. Table 6.1 shows the descriptive 
statistics of the data. The higher kurtosis of Panel C shows that the level data might 
not follow the normal distribution. This chapter adopts the DCC-GARCH model to 
account for possible effects of outliers. 
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Table 6.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean SD Skewness Kurtosis J-B Obs. 
Panel A: 2005/07/22 – 2012/10/09  
CPR 6.5495 0.4417 1.2946 3.0357 1121*** 1690 
 Market Exchange Rate  
CAD 0.9946 0.0881 0.3892 -0.1020 43.40*** 1690 
CNY 6.5506 0.4416 1.2810 2.9682 1083*** 1960 
USD 0.9344 0.1220 0.5913 -0.2674 103.5*** 1960 
EUR 0.6932 0.0827 0.8049 -0.7587 223.0*** 1960 
GBP 0.5523 0.1091 0.1415 -1.3343 131.0*** 1960 
JPY 90.423 6.5326 0.1621 -0.9345 68.90*** 1960 
Panel B: 2009/12/09 – 2012/10/09 
Closing Price 
of USD/CNY 6.5458 0.1978 0.2670 -1.5092 68.98*** 646 
Daily Order 
Flow -16.77 24.863 -0.6201 0.2911 43.69*** 646 
Interest Rate 
Differential 
3.0808 0.4287 0.2673 19.114 9826*** 645 
Panel C: 2009/12/09 T12: 30 – 2012/10/09 T15: 30 
Bid-ask 
Spreads 
0.0759 0.1049 8.4162 115.23 775190*** 1372 
PDC 0.7065 1.3193 2.1977 4.1947 2110.3*** 1372 
NDC -0.2724 0.6249 -4.8683 30.534 58717*** 1372 
Midday Order 
Flow 
-8.5545 15.387 -0.7364 0.7631 157.29 1372 
Panel D: 2009/12/09 – 2012/10/09, Source: DataStream. 
MSCI China 
Index 
92.054 7.5117 -0.0135 -0.5807 10.419*** 740 
Emerging 
Market Index 
1849.4 153.96 0.1939 -1.0175 36.558*** 740 
Eurodollar 
Rate 
0.3196 0.0486 0.4736 1.0559 62.042*** 740 
Note: The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and *for 10%. In Panel A, all the 
currencies are level data, with the CHF (the Swiss franc) used as the numeraire. Source: CFETS, Wind 
Info and Pacific Exchange Rate Services, unless otherwise specified. 
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6.3 Empirical Findings and Analysis 
To facilitate investigation of the behaviour of the renminbi exchange rates across the 
global financial crisis, this research divide this section into two parts. In the first part, 
this research apply the Markov switching model and also follow the approach of 
Zeileis et al. (2010) to identify the dates of the de facto exchange rate regime shifts in 
China. In the second part, this research adopts the multiple GARCH model to 
examine the impacts of China’s regime shifts in different periods across the global 
financial crisis.  
6.3.1 Identifying Regime Shifts in China’s Exchange Rates 
This section applies two complementary methods to analyse exchange rate regime 
shifts in China. The approaches introduced by Engel and Hamilton (1990) and by 
Zeileis et al. (2010) are deployed to analyse the patterns of renminbi exchange rate 
changes in order to determine the dates of the Chinese regime shifts. 
6.3.1.1 The Markov Switching Model 
Following Engel and Hamilton (1990), a regime switching regression can be 
described as follows: 
 
   {
          𝜀 ,        
    2     𝜀 ,        
 (6.1) 
where, 𝜀   [ ,  
2] is the residual which follows normal distribution;    denotes 
the change data of the exchange rate time series;    is an unobserved random variable 
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and denotes the exchange rate regime. The mean can be written as a function in the 
form:        {
          
          
;    is a vector of parameters; 𝜀  follows the Gaussian 
white noise. In this Markov switching model, the unobserved random variable    is 
assumed to follow the first-order Markov chain, defined by the ergodic transition 
probabilities between the states   and  : 
      [      |    ] (6.2) 
where the ergodic transition probabilities     can be characterised by the following 
matrix, if there are two regimes: 
 
 
(6.3) 
6.3.1.1.1 Regime Shifts in the Policy Driven Exchange Rate – the CPR 
Detection of the exact timing of exchange rate regime switching in China has a unique 
dimension, since the CPR is a policy driven price.
44
 Here this work use Engel and 
Hamilton’s (1990) approach to analyse possible regime shifts according to the CPR 
data. Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2 show the empirical results from the two-regime MS 
model.   
                                                 
44The reason for this is explained in the data section. 
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Table 6.2 Estimation results with Markov Switching Model for CPR 2005/07/22-
2012/10/09 
Markov Model Parameters 
                  22 
     
-0.0221*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0021** 
(0.0009) 
0.1187*** 
(0.0025) 
0.0211*** 
(0.0008) 
0.9913*** 
(0.0034) 
0.9825*** 
(0.0065) 
Regime Classification 
     Regime 0          Days     Avg. Prob.          Regime 1          Days     Avg. Prob. 
2005-07-22 - 2005-07-22        1          1.000 
2006-03-14 - 2006-06-27       71         0.965 
2006-07-18 - 2007-06-13      219        0.974 
2007-07-02 - 2008-10-07      310        0.998 
2008-11-28 - 2008-12-02        3          0.854 
2008-12-17 - 2008-12-19        3          0.896 
2010-06-22 - 2011-01-14      139        0.996 
2011-01-28 - 2012-10-09      410        0.986 
2005-07-25 - 2006-03-13      152        0.983 
2006-06-28 - 2006-07-17       14         0.936 
2007-06-14 - 2007-06-29       12         0.872 
2008-10-08 - 2008-11-27       37         0.913 
2008-12-03 - 2008-12-16       10         0.880 
2008-12-22 - 2010-06-21      363        0.997 
2011-01-17 - 2011-01-27        9          0.951 
Notes: The dependent variable      is the change in the 100-log difference of the CPR price. The 
standard errors are shown below the estimates. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, 
** for 5%, and *for 10%.  
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Figure 6.2 Smoothed probabilities of two regimes for CPR 
 July 2005 – December 2012 
 
From Table 6.2, this section finds that the variances of the two regimes are 
asymmetric. Regime 0 has high variance, while regime 1 has low variance. 
Meanwhile, both regimes’   are significantly negative and different from zero. This 
means that the Chinese renminbi (RMB) has a long-term appreciation trend during the 
period under examination, i.e. from 22
nd
 July 2005 to 9
th
 October 2012. The transition 
probabilities are also highly significant. For regime 1 the CPR is relatively stable, 
especially from 22
nd
 December 2008 to 21
st
 June 2010, when the Chinese economy 
was facing the high impact of the global financial crisis.  
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The estimation result for this crisis period indicates that changes in the CPR price 
have very low variance and relatively slow appreciation, reflecting part of China’s 
handling of the fallout of the global financial crisis.  
From the results, it can be seen that after 21
st
 June 2010, the Chinese government 
seems to have decided to further reform the RMB exchange rate formation 
mechanism. Consequently, the RMB exchange rate flexibility is enhanced. The 
reform focuses on allowing for a greater role of market supply and demand in 
determining the RMB exchange rate. In our sample estimation, the identified regime 1 
covers the period from 22
nd
 June 2010 to 2011, which is the immediate post-crisis 
period. As indicated in Table 6.2, in regime 0 the variances (appreciation speed) of 
the CPR price are nearly 5 times (9 times) higher than for regime 1.  
Meanwhile, in Figure 6.2, the MS model identifies 6 periods of low variance and slow 
appreciation process for regime 1, presented as grey areas in the figure. The longest 
period begins around the end of 2008 and continues until 21
st
 June 2010, which 
corresponds to the period when the global financial crisis was hitting China with 
greatest force. This indicates that while movements of the policy driven CPR price 
were kept stable as part of the Chinese strategy to deal with the consequences of the 
global financial crisis, once the crisis had passed its height (at least in China), China 
resumed the momentum of the exchange reform by allowing more room for the CPR 
price to have greater flexibility.  
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6.3.1.1.2 Regime Shifts in the Market Exchange Rate  
This section now deploy the historical data of market exchange rate to estimate the 
two-regime MS model as a further exercise for dating and analysing China’s regime 
switching. This will allow for comparison analysis of regime shifts in the two 
different types of data, i.e. the policy driven CPR price and the market driven 
exchange rate. Table 6.3 and Figure 6.3 display the results of the two-regime MS 
model with the daily USD/CNY historical data. 
From Table 6.3, both regimes’   are significant and negative. In common with the 
performance of CPR, the market traded USD/CNY exchange rates also have a long-
term appreciation trend from 22
nd
 June 2005 to 9
th
 October 2012. The variances of the 
actual market USD/CNY exchange rate price are higher than those of the CPR in both 
regimes. This indicates that the actual market USD/CNY exchange rate prices are 
more fluctuating. The high variance is still found in regime 0, while the low variance 
is a feature of regime 1. The results for regime 0 indicate that the appreciation speed 
(variance) of the market USD/CNY exchange rate price is over 8 times (3 times) 
higher than that for regime 1.  
Meanwhile, in Figure 6.3, the MS model identifies some periods of low variance and 
slow appreciation process for regime 1, presented as grey areas. The longest period 
begins around 24
th
 March 2009 and lasts until 17
th
 June 2010, which corresponds to 
the financial crisis period. Similarly, during the crisis period the market USD/CNY 
exchange rate under regime 0 is more stable, but in the post-crisis period it becomes 
more flexible.  
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Table 6.3 Estimation results with Markov Switching Model for USD/CNY, 
2005/07/22-2012/10/09 
Markov Model Parameters 
                  22 
USD/CNY 
-0.0231*** 
(0.0043) 
-0.0030** 
(0.0015) 
0.1342*** 
(0.0037) 
0.0391*** 
(0.0018) 
0.9408*** 
(0.0135) 
0.9287*** 
(0.0145) 
Regime Classification 
        Regime 0          Days     Avg. Prob.          Regime 1          Days     Avg. Prob. 
2005-09-06 - 2005-09-06       1         1.000 
2005-10-12 - 2005-10-17       4         0.742 
2005-11-01 - 2005-11-22      15        0.841 
2006-03-15 - 2006-03-15       1         0.514 
2006-04-13 - 2006-04-19       4         0.592 
2006-05-30 - 2006-06-20      16        0.891 
2006-07-07 - 2006-07-07       1         0.522 
2006-07-20 - 2006-09-13      38        0.859 
2006-09-18 - 2006-09-27       8         0.891 
2006-10-11 - 2006-10-17       5         0.898 
2006-10-25 - 2006-10-30       4         0.884 
2006-11-24 - 2006-12-08      11        0.729 
2006-12-28 - 2007-02-12      32        0.917 
2007-02-27 - 2007-02-27       1         0.607 
2007-03-02 - 2007-03-09       6         0.613 
2007-03-15 - 2007-03-19       3         0.684 
2007-04-05 - 2007-04-11       4         0.938 
2007-04-20 - 2007-04-30       7         0.880 
2007-05-08 - 2007-09-25      97        0.898 
2007-10-09 - 2008-02-06      83        0.948 
2008-02-11 - 2008-04-29      56        0.951 
2008-05-08 - 2008-09-29      99        0.963 
2008-10-06 - 2008-10-10       5         0.902 
2008-10-24 - 2008-10-29       4         0.916 
2008-11-26 - 2009-01-08      29        0.937 
2009-02-02 - 2009-02-17      12        0.964 
2009-03-19 - 2009-03-23       3         0.895 
2010-06-18 - 2010-07-06      12        0.940 
2010-08-10 - 2010-08-24      11        0.872 
2010-08-31 - 2010-09-27      19        0.929 
2010-10-08 - 2011-01-18      68        0.976 
2011-01-31 - 2011-02-23      18        0.972 
2011-03-04 - 2011-04-11      27        0.917 
2011-04-21 - 2011-04-29       6         0.996 
2011-05-12 - 2011-06-29      34        0.932 
2011-07-12 - 2011-12-05     101       0.939 
2011-12-14 - 2012-01-20      25        0.965 
2012-01-31 - 2012-02-08       7         0.971 
2012-02-27 - 2012-03-16      15        0.839 
2012-03-21 - 2012-04-17      19        0.853 
2012-05-10 - 2012-06-08      21        0.929 
2012-06-15 - 2012-08-20      45        0.893 
2012-09-11 - 2012-09-28      14        0.936 
2005-07-22 - 2005-09-02      30          0.953 
2005-09-07 - 2005-10-11      24          0.945 
2005-10-18 - 2005-10-31      10          0.773 
2005-11-23 - 2006-03-14      77          0.905 
2006-03-16 - 2006-04-12      20          0.756 
2006-04-20 - 2006-05-29      27          0.932 
2006-06-21 - 2006-07-06      11          0.916 
2006-07-10 - 2006-07-19       8           0.790 
2006-09-14 - 2006-09-15       2           0.569 
2006-09-28 - 2006-10-10       8           0.773 
2006-10-18 - 2006-10-24       5           0.617 
2006-10-31 - 2006-11-23      17          0.898 
2006-12-11 - 2006-12-27      11          0.787 
2007-02-13 - 2007-02-26      10          0.885 
2007-02-28 - 2007-03-01       2           0.505 
2007-03-12 - 2007-03-14       3           0.576 
2007-03-20 - 2007-04-04      12          0.767 
2007-04-12 - 2007-04-19       6           0.706 
2007-05-01 - 2007-05-07       5           0.699 
2007-09-26 - 2007-10-05       8           0.869 
2008-02-07 - 2008-02-08       2           0.532 
2008-04-30 - 2008-05-07       6           0.776 
2008-09-30 - 2008-10-03       4           0.689 
2008-10-14 - 2008-10-23       8           0.761 
2008-10-30 - 2008-11-25      18          0.716 
2009-01-09 - 2009-01-30      16          0.948 
2009-02-18 - 2009-03-18      21          0.904 
2009-03-24 - 2010-06-17     311         0.986 
2010-07-07 - 2010-08-09      23          0.933 
2010-08-25 - 2010-08-30       4           0.663 
2010-09-28 - 2010-10-07       8           0.772 
2011-01-19 - 2011-01-28       8           0.852 
2011-02-24 - 2011-03-03       6           0.784 
2011-04-12 - 2011-04-20       7           0.690 
2011-05-02 - 2011-05-11       8           0.870 
2011-06-30 - 2011-07-11       7           0.681 
2011-12-06 - 2011-12-13       6           0.767 
2012-01-23 - 2012-01-30       6           0.787 
2012-02-09 - 2012-02-24      12          0.880 
2012-03-19 - 2012-03-20       2           0.511 
2012-04-18 - 2012-05-09      16          0.871 
2012-06-11 - 2012-06-14       4           0.635 
2012-08-21 - 2012-09-10      14          0.871 
2012-10-01 - 2012-10-09       6           0.833 
Notes: The dependent variable USD/CNY is the change in the 100-log difference of the historical 
exchange rates of the renminbi against the dollar. The standard errors are shown below the estimates. 
The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and *for 10%. Source: Pacific 
Exchange Rate Service at UBC. 
  167 
 
Figure 6.3 Smoothed probabilities of two regimes for USD/CNY 
 July 2005 – December 2012 
6.3.1.2 Changes to the Currency Basket Composition 
The currency reference basket is a central feature of the new Chinese exchange rate 
arrangement (Zhang, Shi, and Zhang 2011). Instead of focusing on model parameters, 
this section measures the regime shift in currency weights in the reference basket. If 
there is a fundamental change to the currency composition of the reference basket, 
that can be interpreted as a regime shift. 
For our research investigation, this research begin with the question: To what extent 
does the Chinese government adopt a managed floating RMB exchange rate regime 
based on the market supply and demand with reference to a basket of currencies? To 
find the answer, this research use the approach developed by Zeileis et al. (2010) to 
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explore the behaviour of China’s de facto foreign exchange regime shifts. Here, this 
section follow Ciubotaru (2011) to estimate the CNY (Chinese Yuan) exchange rate 
regime: 
 
      ∑    
 
   
    (6.4) 
where    is the log return of the CNY/CHF;    is the average rate of RMB 
depreciation;    is the potential currency in the reference basket;     are the weights of 
these reference basket currencies. There are three possible situations: First, if    is 
different from zero, this can be described as a crawling peg exchange rate policy. 
Second, if one of the coefficients of    is different from the unity, this indicates a peg 
to one currency. Third, if no   is significantly different from zero, the CNY is 
following a floating exchange rate regime. 
This research select for the potential reference basket the currencies whose issuing 
countries are major trade partners of China. This means our selection comprises CAD, 
CNY, USD, EUR, GBP, and JPY. All data of the currencies are transformed to use 
the CHF (the Swiss franc) as the numeraire. Following equation (6.4), the regression 
equation can be formulated as follows: 
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6.3.1.2.1 Policy Driven Exchange Rate – the CPR 
This section first follows equation (6.5) to detect regime changes in China’s currency 
basket based on the policy exchange rate, i.e. the CPR. Table 6.4 and Figure 6.4 
display the empirical results with the policy driven exchange rate using the approach 
of Zeileis et al. (2010). To begin with, this research set the optimal breakpoints from 1 
to 10 breaks with 20 observations as the minimal segment size. The NLL (Negative 
Log-Likelihood) and LWZ criteria
 
are shown in Figure 6.4.
45
 The smallest LWZ 
indicates that the optimal number of breakpoints is 4. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 Number of breakpoints for the CPR exchange rate regimes  
July 2005 – December 2012 
  
                                                 
45
LWZ is the information criterion for model selection. Its penalty is higher than the BIC. For details 
see (Bai and Perron 2003).  
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Table 6.4 Segmented CPR exchange rate regimes 
 2005/07/22-2012/10/09 
Periods 1 2 3 4 5 
Start/End 
2005/07/21 
2006/03/14 
2006/03/15 
2008/12/01 
2008/12/02 
2009/10/09 
2009/10/13 
2010/06/21 
2010/06/22 
2012/10/09 
   -0.0049** 
(0.0023) 
-0.0251*** 
(0.0040) 
-0.0011 
(0.0017) 
-0.00007 
(0.0004) 
-0.0136*** 
(0.0044) 
     1.0029*** 
(0.0059) 
0.9818*** 
(0.0100) 
0.9923*** 
(0.0027) 
0.9980*** 
(0.0009) 
0.9721*** 
(0.0116) 
     0.0014 
(0.0053) 
-0.0028 
(0.0082) 
0.0018 
(0.0021) 
0.0004 
(0.0006) 
-0.0039 
(0.0081) 
     -0.0265 
(0.0170) 
0.0102 
(0.0173) 
0.0054 
(0.0050) 
0.0014 
(0.0012) 
0.0180* 
(0.0101) 
     -0.0003 
(0.0080) 
0.0067 
(0.0092) 
-0.0025 
(0.0021) 
0.0010 
(0.0007) 
0.0199* 
(0.0112) 
     0.0081 
(0.0055) 
-0.0115 
(0.0073) 
0.00004 
(0.0023) 
0.0004 
(0.0006) 
0.0009 
(0.0092) 
  0.0278 0.1007 0.0242 0.0047 0.1007 
   0.9981 0.9770 0.9995 1 0.9860 
Notes: The dependent variable CNY/CHF is the change in the log difference of the CPR price. The 
standard errors are shown below the estimates. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** 
for 5%, and *for 10%. 
 
The four optimal breakpoints segmenting the five periods are displayed in Table 6.4. 
The coefficient   stands for the weights of potential anchor currencies. All these 
results show that the CPR price is pegged to the U.S. dollar all the time, even after the 
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reform of 22
nd
 July 2005, albeit with varying degrees of peg in different periods. 
Sometimes the peg is tight, while at others it is relaxed slightly and allows for some 
margins. The  2 is another indicator of the margins of fluctuation.  
In particular, in period 4, from 13
th
 October 2009 to 21
st
 June 2010, the U.S. dollar is 
highly significant, with a weight of 0.9938, and the  2  reaches 1. This clearly 
indicates that the CPR price is tightly pegged to the U.S. dollar, especially during the 
financial crisis period. But in the post-crisis period, from 22
nd
 June 2010 to 9
th
 
October 2012, the RMB regime slightly relaxes.  
There are two coefficients of the potential anchor currencies that are significantly 
different from zero. The euro, with a weight of 0.0180 in the reference basket, and the 
British pound, with a weight of 0.0199, are significant at 10% level. It is plausible that 
this reveals a policy preference of the Chinese monetary authority in forming the 
composition of the currency reference basket. 
6.3.1.2.2 The Market Exchange Rates 
Now, this section takes the historical data of the market exchange rates to measure the 
basket weights. Table 6.5 and Figure 6.5 display the empirical results of the 
segmented USD/CNY exchange rate regimes. From Figure 6.5, the smallest number 
of LWZ is three. Thus, there are three optimal breakpoints, and the LWZ is 
segmented into four periods. 
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Figure 6.5 Number of breakpoints for the RMB exchange rate regimes 
 July 2005 – December 2012 
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Table 6.5 The segmented RMB exchange rate regimes, 2005/07/22-2012/10/09 
Periods 1 2 3 4 
Start/End 
2005/07/22 
2007/04/27 
2007/04/30 
2009/02/17 
2009/02/18 
2010/06/11 
2010/06/17 
2012/10/09 
   -0.0119*** 
(0.0035) 
-0.0297*** 
(0.0064) 
0.00007 
(0.0020) 
-0.0152*** 
(0.0054) 
     0.9822*** 
(0.0097) 
0.9668*** 
(0.0138) 
0.9867*** 
(0.0038) 
0.9575*** 
(0.0142) 
     0.0170** 
(0.0083) 
0.0078 
(0.0105) 
0.0047* 
(0.0027) 
-0.0022 
(0.0100) 
     -0.0051 
(0.0232) 
0.0332 
(0.0210) 
0.0008 
(0.0063) 
0.0310*** 
(0.0125) 
     0.0157 
(0.0121) 
0.0071 
(0.0104) 
0.0062* 
(0.0034) 
0.0080 
(0.0138) 
     -0.0114 
(0.0084) 
-0.0034 
(0.0095) 
0.0029 
(0.0032) 
0.0130 
(0.0114) 
  0.0697 0.1313 0.0351 0.1242 
   0.9844 0.9775 0.9978 0.979 
Notes: The dependent variable CNY/CHF is the change in the log difference of the historical 
USD/CNY price. The standard errors are shown below the estimates. The significance levels are 
displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and *for 10%. Source: Pacific Exchange Rate Service at UBC. 
 
In Table 6.5, the first period has two potential anchor currencies. The U.S. dollar, with 
a weight of 0.9822, is significantly different from zero. The Japanese Yen, with a 
weight of 0.0170, is significant at 5% level. In the second period, the weight of the 
U.S. dollar remains significant at 0.9668, while in the third period this has increased 
  174 
to 0.9867. The Japanese Yen and the British Pound have weights at the 10% 
significance level. It is to be noted that the results of      indicate that the RMB 
exchange rate is mainly pegged to the U.S. dollar. In particular, from 18
th
 February 
2009 to 11
th
 June 2010, the  2 reaches 0.9978. These results are similar to those for 
the CPR price, as the market USD/CNY exchange rate price also seems tightly 
pegged to the U.S. dollar. However, this phenomenon is largely a feature of the 
financial crisis period. In the post-crisis period, the actual market USD/CNY 
exchange rates are shown to be linked not only to the U.S. dollar, but also to the euro 
at the 1% significance level. 
In summary, comparing the results of the above two methods and two types of data, 
the findings can be concluded as follows. First, both methods identify 21
st
 June 2010 
(Monday) as the regime shift date of the Chinese exchange rate arrangement, 
regardless of the number of structural breakpoints identified. The market reaction is 
three working days earlier than the new regime announcement date.
46
 Before this date, 
or during the financial crisis period, the RMB exchange rate has low variance. After 
this date, i.e. in the post-crisis period, movements of the RMB exchange rate become 
more flexible. Second, the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency to which the RMB 
exchange rate is linked throughout the whole sample period under examination, albeit 
that on 22
nd
 July 2005 the Chinese government announced the adoption of a managed 
floating exchange rate regime. Third, after 21
st
 June 2010, when the Chinese 
government reiterated its intention to reform the RMB exchange rate system, 
                                                 
46 On 19th June 2010 (Saturday) the PBOC announced that it would further promote the RMB 
exchange rate reform to enhance exchange rate flexibility. The model with the market data 
detects the final period as from 17th June 2010 (Thursday) to 9th October 2012.  See Table 6.5 for 
details of the last period. 
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movements of the market RMB exchange rate indeed become more flexible, and the 
rate is no longer pegged only to the U.S. dollar. 
6.3.2 Impacts of Exchange Rate Regime Shift across the Global Financial Crisis 
In this section this research attempt to discover the impacts of exchange rate regime 
shifts on RMB exchange rate formation, FX market spreads and the general economy. 
Due to data availability, our data sample spans from 9
th
 December 2009 to 9
th
 October 
2012. As shown before, 21
st
 June 2010 is confirmed to be the date of a critical regime 
shift in China’s exchange rate system. Before this date the RMB exchange rate is 
almost fixed. Afterwards, movements of the RMB exchange rate become more 
flexible. In this light, this section focuses on two regimes, the first operating from 9
th
 
December 2009 to 18
th
 June 2010, and the second from 21
st
 June 2010 to 9
th
 October 
2012.  The former is identified as the financial crisis period, and the latter as the post-
crisis period. 
6.3.2.1 FX Price Formation 
The foreign exchange pricing model tested here is the one proposed by Evans and 
Lyons (2002b). It has been established in the literature that this microstructural model 
is empirically successful in indicating movements of many currency pairs, while order 
flow has been found to have a significant power to explain exchange rate returns. In 
addition, to characterise the impacts of exchange rate regime shift across the global 
financial crisis, this research develop Killeen et al.’s (2006) approach to introduce a 
dummy variable        into the empirical formulation. The purpose of including this 
dummy is to analyse the regime impacts of the post-crisis period. The GARCH (1, 1) 
method is adopted to capture conditional heteroskedasticity, and both order flow and 
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interest rate differential are examined in the variance equation. The model 
specification is shown as follows: 
 
                𝑂     𝑂                          𝜀  
               𝑂     𝑂              
              𝜀   
2           
(6.6) 
 
where     is 100 times the difference of log exchange rate at time  ,        is defined 
as unity if   is later than 21st June 2010 and 0 otherwise. Moreover, 𝑂   is order flow 
at time  ,     is the interest differential, which is the difference of Chinese interest 
rate minus the U.S. interest rate, at time  , 𝜀    is residual at time     and      is 
conditional variance at time    . Equation (6.6) distinguishes both the intercepts 
and slope of the post-crisis period from those of the whole sample. This research 
introduces a benchmark model which contains constant only. Table 6.6 reports the 
results. 
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Table 6.6 FX price formation under exchange rate regimes, 2009/12/10-
2012/10/09 
Mean Equation 
                   
Benchmark 
0.00008 
(0.00073) 
-0.0077** 
(0.0038) 
    
3.5741*** 
(0.1079) 
Equation 
(6.6) 
0.0025 
(0.0016) 
-0.0054 
(0.0047) 
0.0005** 
(0.0002) 
-0.00006 
(0.0003) 
-0.0220 
(0.0222) 
0.0128 
(0.0270) 
4.0621*** 
(0.1254) 
Variance Equation 
                    
Benchmark 
0.00006*** 
(0.0000003) 
0.0053*** 
(0.0017) 
    
0.5942**** 
(0.1194) 
0.3207*** 
(0.1090) 
Equation 
(6.6) 
0.00007*** 
(0.000003) 
0.0061*** 
(0.0016) 
0.0000 
(0.000003) 
-0.0001*** 
(0.000005) 
0.00004 
(0.0002) 
-0.0011 
(0.0013) 
0.4271*** 
(0.1098) 
0.1908* 
(0.1092) 
Notes: The estimated coefficients in equation (6.6) are shown in the first row of each model. Standard 
errors are in the parentheses below.    is the student distribution statistic. The significance levels are 
displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and *for 10%.  
 
Table 6.6 shows the estimation results of the benchmark model and of equation (6.6). 
Both models follow a GARCH (1, 1) process with      . The student 
distribution statistic is significant, which indicates that exchange rate returns do not 
follow normal distribution. The benchmark model tells us that the RMB exchange rate 
in the post-crisis period undergoes a significant appreciation. However, the mean of 
the whole sample is not significant, which may be due to the regime dependency of 
the parameters of exchange rates, particularly the changing parameter values in the 
financial crisis. In addition, the volatility in the post-crisis period is much larger than 
that of the whole sample. This is consistent with our finding that the RMB exchange 
  178 
rate is quite stable with low volatility during the financial crisis and becomes more 
fluctuating in the post-crisis period. 
As can be seen in the estimation result of equation (6.6), order flow is positively 
significant at the 5% level. However, there is no difference in the explanatory power 
of order flow on exchange rate return between the post-crisis period and the whole 
sample. Attention is to be paid to the coefficient   , as it becomes insignificant when 
this research introduce order flow into the mean equation. This indicates that the 
appreciation of RMB exchange rate in the post-crisis period is order flow driven. In 
addition, order flow in the post-crisis period is negatively significant in the variance 
equation. After 2010, the Chinese government is reported to have set an appreciation 
target rate of RMB based on the situation of the general economy and on certain 
policy considerations, for example to guard against an increase of CPI, to relieve the 
political pressure from the USA, or to prepare for the internationalisation of RMB. 
Order flow explains the asymmetry effect on exchange rate volatility against the 
background that the market expects the RMB exchange rate to appreciate. An increase 
of net buying of the U.S. dollar will slow the appreciation of RMB and reduce its 
volatility. An increase of net selling of the U.S. dollar will speed the process of 
appreciation of RMB and make it more fluctuant. 
6.3.2.2 The Dynamic Conditional Correlation GARCH Model 
This section further analyses the impacts of regime shifts in the Chinese exchange rate 
system using the DCC methodology, the Dynamic Conditional Correlation model 
(Engle 2002). This chapter apply the method first to explore the dynamic relation 
between the market spread and the possibility of government intervention. Then, this 
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research deploys the model to gauge the economic significance of exchange rate 
exposure in China. The tests are conducted across the global financial crisis with two 
regimes, and then individually in the financial crisis and post-crisis periods. 
Numerous studies use the ARCH-type models to investigate the volatility of the 
foreign exchange market. Engle (1982) introduced the seminal ARCH-type model for 
estimation and forecasting of the volatility of time series data. Many extensions of this 
model have emerged and are widely used in financial studies. The models can be 
classified into two main types: the univariate and multivariate GARCH models. 
According to a survey by Laurent (2009), the univariate GARCH models include the 
GARCH, EGARCH, GJR, FIEGARCH and HYGARCH. The multivariate GARCH 
models include the BEKK, CCC, DCC, DECO and GOGARCH. Following Engle 
(2002) the DCC model can be defined as: 
            
 2⁄       (6.7) 
 
          
       (   , 
  2⁄     , 
  2⁄ )      (   , 
  2⁄     , 
  2⁄ ) 
           , 
  2⁄     , 
  2⁄   
(6.8) 
where the past observations’ vector {  } is a  ×  matrix, the       is the conditional 
mean vector of    and the   
 2⁄     is a  ×   positive definite matrix; the  ×   
random vector    is the standardised residuals,    is the conditional variance of   ,    
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is a  ×   symmetric dynamic correlations matrix and finally    is a diagonal matrix 
of conditional standard deviations. Then, the Glosten et al. (1993) GJR (p, q) can be 
displayed as: 
 
        ∑    𝜀 ,   
2         
 
  
   
𝜀 ,   
2   ∑         
  
   
 
   , ,   
(6.9) 
where   
  is a dummy variable; when     is negative (positive) it is valued as 1 (0). In 
the DCC model, the  ×   symmetric matrix       ,   is given as: 
 
           ̅           
        
(6.10) 
where,       √    ,  ̅ is the  ×   unconditional variance matrix of   ;   and   
are non-negative scalar parameters, and      is the condition for stationary 
unconditional correlation. Therefore, for the two markets the conditional correlation at 
time t for the DCC of Engle (2002) can be defined as 
 
  2 
 
        ̅ 2     ,    2,       2,   
√         ̅      ,   
2      ,             ̅22    2,   
2    22,    
 (6.11) 
  181 
Where   2 is the element on the 1
st
 row and 2
nd
 column of the matrix   . According to 
Laurent’s (2009) survey of Engle’s (2002) DCC model, the estimation includes two 
steps. The first step is to estimate the univariate GJR (1, 1) model to get the standard 
residuals. The second step is to use the intercept parameters of conditional correlation 
to estimate the coefficients of the dynamic correlation. 
6.3.2.3 Market Spreads and Intervention Possibility  
There are many studies investigating the intervention effect in the foreign exchange 
market with intraday frequency. In a recent study, Melvin et al. (2009) collect 5 days’ 
data to investigate the effect of exchange rate intervention by the Russian Central 
Bank on market spread in 30 second intervals. Their results show that intervention 
does widen the intraday market spread. Fatum et al. (2013) study the intervention by 
the Danish central bank, intended to manage the currency with a crawling band 
around a major currency. They find that the intervention effect on exchange rate 
spread is asymmetric when the market expects the currency to appreciate. In this case, 
intervention purchase of the currency decreases exchange rate spread, while 
intervention sale increases the spread. 
Owing to the lack of availability of intraday data of Chinese monetary authority 
intervention, it is impossible for us to focus directly on intervention effects on market 
spread. Instead, this research introduce a variable, deviation of transaction price from 
the CPR, to indicate the possibility of intervention and study its dynamic correlation 
with market spread in two exchange rate regimes: from 9
th
 December 2009 to 18
th
 
June 2010 as the financial crisis period, and from 21
st
 June 2010 to 9
th
 October 2012 
as the post-crisis period. Following the findings of Fatum et al. (2013), this section 
  182 
divide this new variable into positive deviation and negative deviation to study the 
asymmetric relation between the deviation and the bid-ask exchange rate spread. 
While the construction of PDC and NDC is asymmetric, this research adopts a DCC 
AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model to study the relation with spread in half day intervals. Our 
model also considers order flow.  
Table 6.7 shows the results of the DCC AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model for bid-ask spread, 
PDC, NDC and order flow. From Panel A, we see that the asymmetric effect on 
variance of all the variables is not significant during the financial crisis period. It is 
however significant for PDC and NDC in the post-crisis period. The GJR model 
captures the asymmetric construction of PDC (NDC), which is the distance of 
deviation from the CPR when the transaction price is larger (smaller), and is 0 
otherwise. The multivariate residual follows a student distribution, while    and 
normality test in Panel B are significant in both the financial crisis and post-crisis 
periods.  
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Table 6.7 DCC-GJR of market spread, order flow and possibility of intervention,  
2009/12/09-2012/10/09 
Panel A. The Univariate GJR (1,1) Model with Student-t distribution 
 Financial Crisis Period Post-Crisis Period 
 
Spread PDC NDC OF Spread PDC NDC OF 
   988.26 
(11065) 
635.8 
(2650.9) 
18153.77 
(44767) 
9.7222* 
(5.5689) 
0.00007 
(0.0004) 
0.0050* 
(0.0027) 
0.0011 
(0.0007) 
9.3233 
(8.5385) 
   0.0246 
(0.0441) 
1.5906*** 
(0.6019) 
0.1915 
(1.1997) 
0.6009** 
(0.2772) 
0.1157 
(0.1453) 
0.3715** 
(0.1447) 
-0.0296 
(0.0250) 
0.0012 
(0.0236) 
   0.8414*** 
(0.1848) 
0.2928*** 
(0.0679) 
0.7689*** 
(0.1526) 
0.5441*** 
(0.1435) 
0.7806*** 
(0.0929) 
0.7740*** 
(0.0809) 
0.8216*** 
(0.0464) 
0.9307*** 
(0.0433) 
   46.1582 
(128.88) 
2.9556 
(2.0297) 
-0.1443 
(1.0675) 
-0.3989 
(0.3519) 
1.7426 
(1.1501) 
-0.3341*** 
(0.1164) 
0.4080*** 
(0.1344) 
0.0420 
(0.0417) 
Panel B. The DCC-GJR (1, 1) Model 
                             
Financial 
Crisis 
Period 
0.4079*** 
(0.0663) 
0.2317*** 
(0.0659) 
0.0361 
(0.0569) 
0.3269*** 
(0.0468) 
0.1276** 
(0.0585) 
0.2677*** 
(0.0522) 
0.0204 
(0.0238) 
0.2123 
(0.2337) 
Post-Crisis 
Period 
0.4522*** 
(0.1292) 
0.1004 
(0.1623) 
-0.0770 
(0.0648) 
0.0798 
(0.1107) 
0.0339 
(0.0732) 
0.0616 
(0.0667) 
0.0109*** 
(0.0023) 
0.9856*** 
(0.0032) 
The DCC-GJR (1, 1) Model (Continued) 
    Log-likelihood 
Vector normality 
[Prob.] 
Financial 
Crisis 
Period 
3.0102*** 
(0.1273) 
956.968 
1236.6*** 
[0.0000] 
Post-Crisis 
Period 
3.3605*** 
(0.1002) 
-2426.701 
6642.1*** 
[0.0000] 
Notes: The variable ‘Spread’ is the ask price minus the bid price at the end of the half day, 
corresponding to the last transaction price multiplied by 100. ‘PDC’ is the positive deviation of 
transaction price from the CPR at the end of the half day multiplied by 100. ‘NDC’ is the negative 
deviation of transaction price from the CPR at the end of the half day multiplied by 100. ‘OF’ is net of 
the buyer initiated and seller initiated trades. The standard errors are shown below the estimates. The 
significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** for 5%, and *for 10%. The subscripts ‘S’, ‘P’, ‘N’ 
and ‘O’ denote market spread, PDC, NDC and order flow, respectively. df is the student distribution 
statistic. 
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During the financial crisis, both PDC and NDC are positively correlated with bid-ask 
spread. It can be seen from Figure 6.6 that the CPR is almost unchanged during the 
financial crisis. As a management tool, the Chinese government maintains an almost 
fixed CPR, which delivers a strong political signal to the market that the government 
intends to keep the exchange rate stable. Any deviation of the transaction price from 
the CPR will probably lead to intervention from the Chinese government. The 
possibility of intervention thus increases and the exchange rate spread widens.  
A larger coefficient of correlation between PDC and the spread than that between 
NDC and the spread indicates that the market expects the Chinese government to 
prefer appreciation of the RMB exchange rate rather than depreciation. A plausible 
reason for this is that depreciation of the RMB will decrease the returns and increase 
the risk to foreign investment. This could make foreign investment and international 
capital flow out of China and further worsen the economy during the financial crisis. 
Consistent with the price formation of the exchange rate, order flow has positive 
correlation with both PDC and NDC. Net of buyer initiated and seller initiated trades 
will push the transaction price to deviate from the CPR. The correlation mentioned is 
constant, while   and   are not significant. 
In the post-crisis period, only PDC is significantly correlated with the bid-ask spread, 
and the correlation is time-varying. As can be seen in Figure 6.6, the CPR becomes 
more flexible in the post-crisis period and gradually appreciates. Either the Chinese 
government makes the CPR appreciate and then pushes the RMB exchange rate to 
appreciate in order to achieve the annual appreciation target, or the market expects the 
RMB exchange rate to appreciate and then forces the CPR to appreciate. In either case, 
the RMB exchange rate is rarely far below the CPR in the post-crisis period of our 
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sample. However, after August 2011, we see frequent disagreement between the 
market and government. The CPR gradually appreciates and becomes stable, but the 
market exchange rate is frequently higher above the CPR. Government control and 
politics are perhaps the main reasons for the deviation, while     and     are no 
longer significant. The frequently large PDC, contrary to the government’s intention, 
increases the possibility of intervention and widens the bid-ask spread. 
 
 
Figure 6.6 Time series of CPR, deviation from CPR and CPR crawling band 
2009/12/09-2012/10/09 
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6.3.2.4 The Economic Significance of the RMB Exchange Rate Exposure 
Before investigating the economic significance of the exchange rate exposure during 
the financial crisis and post-crisis periods, this section first review the theoretical 
linkage between the exchange rate and the stock index price. Two main approaches 
have been used to investigate this linkage. First, the ‘flow oriented’ model assumes 
that there is a positive relation between the exchange rate and the stock index price 
(Dornbusch and Fischer 1980).
47
 If the value of domestic currency is decreased, 
exports become cheaper and so will increase. Firms in international trade will gain 
more income from the increased exports, thus their stock price will be increased. 
Second, the ‘portfolio balance model’ indicates that there is a negative relation 
between the exchange rate and stock prices (Frankel 1987).
48
 If local stock price 
appreciates, this will prompt investors to adjust their portfolio. They will sell foreign 
assets in order to have enough domestic currency to buy more domestic assets; thus 
the domestic currency will depreciate.  
To acquire further insights regarding the Chinese exchange regime shifts across the 
global financial crisis, this research explore whether currency exposure is 
economically significant and relevant to investors during the financial crisis and post-
crisis periods. Following Muller and Verschoor (2007), this research adopt the AR 
(1)-GJR (1, 1) model to specify conditional heteroskedasticity in the basic regression 
model. The RMB currency exposure can be computed by the following equation: 
                                                 
47
 For details, see Dornbusch and Fischer (1980); see also Aloui (2007). 
48 The complete portfolio balance model is given by Frankel (1987). 
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  ,       ,      𝜀  
     𝜀     √             𝜀   
2           
 𝜀   
2  
(6.12) 
where,   ,  denotes the returns to the equity index, here the MSCI China index;
49
   is 
the constant;   ,  is the returns to the overall stock market index, here the MSCI 
Emerging Market index;   stands for the sensitivity of market fluctuations;    is the 
returns of the RMB exchange rate against the U.S. dollar;
50
   then indicates the RMB 
currency exposure to fluctuations of the USD/CNY exchange rate;    is the 
conditional variance of the residuals; 𝜀   
2  is the squared residual from the mean 
equation;   
  is a dummy variable: when   is negative (positive) it is valued as 1 (0); 
   is the error term. 
  
                                                 
49 MSCI China index as a benchmark of the overall performance of the Chinese stock market. 
50 In previous work, this research find USD/CNY is the dominant currency pair in the China FX 
market. 
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Table 6.8 Estimation results of RMB currency exposure 2009/12/09-
2012/10/09 
Panel A: The AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model 
 Mean Equation Variance Equation  
Parameters                  
Financial 
Crisis 
Period 
0.0002*** 
(0.000002) 
0.9733*** 
(0.0000005) 
-4.059*** 
(0.000009) 
0.5359*** 
(0.0000005) 
-0.159*** 
(0.0000005) 
0.3774*** 
(0.0000006) 
0.1321*** 
(0.00000003) 
391.26*** 
(1.1344) 
Post-crisis 
Period 
-0.0001 
(0.0003) 
1.0114*** 
(0.0476) 
0.1752 
(0.3706) 
0.0112* 
(0.0067) 
0.0901*** 
(0.0243) 
0.9400*** 
(0.0271) 
-0.0967* 
(0.0524) 
18.1607 
(11.493) 
Panel B: The DCC AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model 
Parameters                    
Log-
likelihood 
Vector 
normality 
[Prob.] 
Financial 
Crisis 
Period 
0.7944*** 
(0.0261) 
-0.2259*** 
(0.0874) 
-0.1812** 
(0.0867) 
0.0490 
(0.0633) 
0.0000 
(0.2157) 
11.8566* 
(6.3594) 
1739.831 
32.335*** 
[0.0000] 
Post-crisis 
Period 
0.7952*** 
(0.0139) 
-0.2975*** 
(0.0389) 
-0.3005*** 
(0.0371) 
0.0307 
(0.0219) 
0.4016*** 
(0.1413) 
10.5863*** 
(2.1071) 
6712.127 
91.909*** 
[0.0000] 
Notes: The RMB currency exposure   is reported in the Table. The variable     is change of the log 
USD/CNY exchange rate. Log difference of the Emerging Market Index and the MSCI China index are 
denoted as variables   ,  and   , , respectively. Panel A of the table shows the estimation results of 
equation (6.12) based on the AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model while Panel B shows the DCC-GJR model 
estimation of   ,   ,  and   , . Subscripts ‘C’, ‘E’ and ‘P’ denote the MSCI China index   , , Emerging 
Market index   ,  and RMB exchange rate   , respectively.    is the student distribution statistic. The 
standard errors are shown below the estimates. The significance levels are displayed as *** for 1%, ** 
for 5%, and *for 10%. 
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Table 6.8 shows the estimation results of economic significance of the RMB currency 
exposure. The table includes two panels. Panel A reports the estimation results of 
equation (6.12) based on the univariate AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model, which is assumed to 
follow the student t distribution. It can be seen that the coefficient on the exchange 
rate   indicates that the RMB currency exposure is negatively significant at the 1% 
level in the financial crisis period. The negative coefficient on the exchange rate   
suggests that the USD/CNY exchange rate has a negative impact on the returns of the 
Chinese stock market. However, the results show insignificant effects of currency 
exposure on the Chinese stock market during the post-crisis period. In this period, the 
Chinese stock market is less exposed to exchange rate movements, possibly because 
by manoeuvring the currency weights of the reference basket the Chinese monetary 
authority has minimised the effect of dollar movements. In the variance equation the 
squared residual term   and the coefficient on the variance term   are all statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  
Panel B of the table 6.8 shows the correlation between the RMB exchange rate, the 
MSCI China index and the Emerging Market index specified in the DCC AR (1)-GJR 
(1, 1) model. In all periods, the returns of both the MSCI China index and the 
Emerging Market index are negatively correlated with the RMB exchange rate at the 
1% significance level. These results are consistent with the portfolio balance model. 
Meanwhile, the coefficients of correlation between each market index are positively 
significant at 1% level. There are no significant differences in the correlation between 
each market index and the exchange rate during the two periods. The results of this 
Chapter can be summarized in the following table: 
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Table 6.9 The major findings of regime shifts 
A. Identify the exact timing of regime shifts (22/07/2005 – 09/10/ 2012) 
a) The Markov Switching Model  
(Engle and Hamilton, 1990) 
The CPR:  
Regime 0 (high frequency), 22/6/2010 to 
09/10/2012; 
Regime 1 (low frequency), 22/12/2008 to 
21/06/2010 (Mon) 
The market exchange rate:  
Regime 1, 24/03/2009 to 17/06/2010  
b) Currency Basket Composition 
(Zeileis et al., 2010) 
The CPR:  
4 breakpoints;  
Last period, 22/06/2010 to 09/10/2012 
The market exchange rate:  
3 breakpoints;  
Last period, 17/06/2010 to 09/10/2012 
B. The different impacts of regime shifts (09/12/2009 – 09/10/2012) 
a) FX price formation 
The financial crisis period: low volatility 
The post-crisis period: RMB appreciation is 
order flow driven 
Larger volatility 
b) Market spreads and intervention 
possibility 
The financial crisis period: PDC and NDC 
positively correlated with bid-ask spread 
Preference for RMB appreciation. 
The post-crisis period: only PDC is positively 
correlated with bid-ask spread 
CPR becomes more flexible. 
c) Economic significance of RMB 
exchange rate exposure 
The financial crisis period: Exchange rate has 
negative impact on stock markets 
The post-crisis period: Insignificant effects of 
currency exposure 
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6.4 Conclusions 
This chapter examines the regime shift in the Chinese exchange rate system from a 
microstructural perspective. Our findings shed critical light on the behaviour of the 
Chinese exchange rate policy and its responses to the global financial crisis. Two 
complementary methods are deployed to detect and date the regime shifts in the 
Chinese exchange rate system, one based on the policy driven exchange rate (CPR), 
and one on the market exchange rate.  
Under both approaches, two policy regimes are detected during the sample period. 
The date of the regime switching is identified as around 21
st
 June 2010, which is also 
the first business day after Saturday 19
th
 June, the date when the Chinese central bank 
restated its intentions for reform of the exchange rate system. Compared to the first 
reform statement, this time the Chinese central bank declared more forcefully the 
intention for a bolder and deeper exchange reform. More importantly, since that date 
the actual policy course has changed.  
Evidence unearthed by this study shows that there is a ‘fear of floating’ in China. 
Despite the public declaration of the adoption of a ‘managed floating exchange rate 
system’, at this stage the system shows only a timid process of RMB appreciation.  
Exchange rate flexibility, an essential quality of a managed floating rate system, is 
essentially absent.  It is only recently that flexibility has been instilled into the system 
and our evidence shows that prior to 21
st
 June 2010, the RMB exchange rate remained 
almost fixed. Since that date, it has shown more flexibility. System flexibility is also 
reflected in the changing composition of the Chinese basket of currencies. While 
  192 
generally the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency in the basket, the evidence shows 
that after 21
st
 June 2010 the RMB is no longer pegged only to the U.S. dollar. 
Our test for the impacts of China’s shift of exchange rate regime starts with the 
estimation of the foreign exchange pricing model from a microstructural perspective. 
This chapter find that order flow has significant power to explain changes in exchange 
rate returns under different regimes. However, the appreciation process of the RMB 
exchange rate in the post-crisis period is found to be largely order flow driven. In 
addition, order flow has an asymmetric impact on exchange rate volatility, while 
RMB exchange rate is expected to appreciate. 
A DCC AR (1)–GJR (1, 1) model is applied to investigate the dynamic relation 
between the bid-ask spread and the intervention possibility proxied by deviations of 
the transaction price from the CPR. In the financial crisis period, the Chinese 
government’s intention to keep the exchange rate stable means that deviations from 
the CPR tend to increase the possibility of intervention, and thus the possibility of 
intervention correlates with the bid-ask spread. Furthermore, PDC (positive deviation 
from CPR) is found to be less favoured by the government than NDC (negative 
deviation from CPR). In the post-crisis period, deviation of transaction price from the 
CPR is still asymmetrically correlated with the bid-ask spread. When the Chinese 
government prefers a gradual appreciation process PDC is significant but NDC is not, 
and the correlation becomes time-varying. 
Using the AR (1)-GJR (1, 1) model, this chapter examine the economic significance 
of currency exposure in China across the regimes and in different periods of the 
global financial crisis. Evidence indicates that, at the national level, currency exposure 
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is highly significant and negative in China during the crisis period. However, in the 
post-crisis period, the exposure becomes insignificant. This may be a result of China’s 
changing the composition of the reference currency basket, which reduces the effects 
of fluctuations of the dollar on the variability of the Chinese official CPR and the 
market exchange, and of the pass-through of currency exposure to domestic financial 
markets. 
This chapter tries to detect the de facto exchange rate regime of China and to estimate 
the impact of the regime shifts. The results indicate that the government has a general 
appreciation target on the RMB exchange rate. Behind this trend, there are two main 
factors driving the regime changes. First, the Chinese government is attempting to 
ease the political pressure from the USA. According to a recent Reuters News report 
(6
th
 June 2013), the US government has tried to renew Senate pressure against China 
currency manipulation, declaring that the Chinese RMB remains undervalued. As part 
of the efforts of relieving such kind of pressure, the Chinese government is inclined to 
change the nation’s exchange rate regime. Second, and most importantly, the Chinese 
government changes the exchange rate regime with a view to making preparations for 
the rise of the RMB as an international currency. Deputy governor Mr Yi Gang has 
stated that the central bank should adopt a global perspective because the RMB will 
become one of the world’s important currencies (PBOC, 2008). That is consistent 
with the evidence of this research showing that the RMB exchange rate is no longer 
pegged only to the US dollar. 
The findings of this chapter reveal the Chinese government’s changing focus on the 
exchange rate arrangements. Working in tandem with the previous chapter, research 
in this chapter sheds critical lights on the critical aspects of the Chinese exchange rate 
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policy, i.e. how intervention operation is conducted by the Chinese monetary 
authority on the foreign exchange market and the property of the de facto Chinese 
exchange rate regime. Findings about these aspects help advance our knowledge of 
the Chinese exchange rate policy. 
 
Chapter 7 
 
 
 
Chapter 7 Conclusions 
 
 
 
This chapter summarises the main findings 
and implications of this thesis, and makes 
suggestions for future work. 
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Chapter 7  
Conclusions 
7.1 Main Findings  
This thesis aims to better our understanding of China’s exchange rate policy in a 
period of fundamental economic transition and global financial crisis. Taking a 
market microstructural perspective, this research investigate the long-term 
determination and short-run dynamics of the RMB exchange rate, the intervention by 
the Chinese monetary authority in the marketplace, and the regime shifts in the 
Chinese exchange rate system. 
This thesis begins by presenting an overview of the microstructure of the Chinese 
foreign exchange market, and the evolvement of the country’s exchange rate regime. 
This lays down the institutional foundation for our later discussions. Next, this 
research estimates the explanatory power of order flow for exchange rate movements 
in a structural VAR setting. The focus is the relation between order flow and 
exchange rate in the long run and short run. This research test for the empirical 
implications of the Portfolio Shift model (Evans and Lyons 2002b) and estimate the 
cointegrating relations in the system with the trace test (Johansen 1995). A graph-
theoretic method is applied to find the instantaneous causal relations (Demiralp and 
Hoover 2003).  
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In the variable space containing order flow, macro influences and the exchange rate, 
this research find evidence of the long-term cointegrating relation among order flow 
and the other variables under examination. The short-run dynamics show that, in the 
new regime of Chinese exchange price formation, order flow as a measure of 'signed' 
trading volume is able to explain a significant part of the short-term fluctuations in the 
RMB-dollar exchange rate. 
The outcome of impulse responses analysis indicates that order flow responds 
immediately and more strongly than other variables (excluding exchange rates 
themselves) to the exchange rate movements over the short horizon. In the long run, 
the interest rate differential has a stronger influence on exchange rate movement. 
Country risk premium shows a similar tendency but to a lesser extent (Zhang, Chau, 
and Zhang 2012). 
The study of foreign exchange intervention is always and everywhere a challenging 
task. This is especially so in the Chinese case, because the government tends to cover 
its intervention activity with great secrecy. This thesis explores Chinese intervention 
in a framework that allows for multiple perspectives based on high-frequency data.  
This research first identifies the intervention from an extensive range of news media 
reports, and establishes the typology of China’s intervention. Then, reduced-form 
estimation is conducted to examine the effects of intervention on the order flow and 
on the exchange rate. Next, this research tests the sensitivity of exchange rate returns 
to order flow when intervention occurs. Interactions between the exchange rate return 
and order flow are tested in a VAR model. A set of five success criteria is deployed to 
examine the effectiveness of the Chinese intervention. Finally, a GARCH analysis is 
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conducted to check the robustness of our empirical findings. In the process, the tests 
shed additional insight on the impacts of intervention on volatility. 
In general, the Chinese intervention takes the form either of setting the central parity 
rate and the allowed band for RMB exchange rate fluctuation (CPR intervention); or 
of the central bank issuing instructions or guidance regarding market transactions via 
the state-owned banks, or engaging directly in sales or purchase of foreign currencies 
(CB intervention). This research find that intervention not only impacts directly on 
changes in the exchange rate, but also affects the buying – selling pressure, or order 
flow. Intervention is more likely to occur when there are heavy selling orders with 
little liquidity, and where the exchange rate deviates from the central bank’s tolerable 
level. In other words, it is more likely that the Chinese authority would move to arrest 
currency devaluation. 
Order flow is found to be positively and significantly correlated with the exchange 
rate when intervention occurs. Order flow carries additional information under CB 
intervention, while CPR intervention tends to cause a change of the impact sign when 
the government resorts to devaluation-targeting intervention. Decomposition analysis 
shows that the portion of intervention effect that is directly impounded into the 
exchange rate plays a more prominent role than that via the order flow. CB 
intervention can effectively influence both the exchange rate and the order flow, while 
CPR intervention is effective in keeping the exchange rate within the fluctuation band.  
The robust test confirms the main findings of the thesis, and reveals additional 
evidence that while CB intervention can influence the exchange rate and order flow, it 
tends to increase the volatility. Meanwhile, CPR intervention can play some role in a 
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‘leaning against the wind’ policy, in that it may slow the net order flow out of the 
dollar, but it cannot reverse the trend. 
This thesis next examines the Chinese government’s changing of its exchange rate 
regime in a time of global financial crisis.  To detect the switch to a de facto regime 
and its timing, this research apply two complementary regime switching models, by 
Engel and Hamilton (1990) and by Zeileis et al. (2010). Having identified the dates of 
regime shift and the currency weights in the reference basket, this research deploy a 
multiple GARCH model to find the impacts of the exchange rate regime shift across 
the global financial crisis.  
This research find that the exchange rate of RMB had low variance, so that it was 
almost fixed, before 21
st
 June 2010, but that the exchange rate volatility became more 
flexible after that date. The US dollar maintained the greatest weight in China’s 
reference basket throughout the entire period. However, there is significant evidence 
that since 21
st
 June 2010, the RMB has no longer pegged only to the US dollar. 
The RMB exchange rate appreciation process is largely order flow driven in the post-
crisis period, but the pricing model shows no evidence of any different characteristics 
in the post-crisis period. Meanwhile, order flow has asymmetric impacts on the RMB 
exchange rate volatility when the exchange rate is expected to appreciate. 
This research finds that Positive Deviation from the central parity price (PDC) has 
been less favoured by the government than Negative Deviation from the central parity 
(NDC). The PDC is significant, indicating that the Chinese monetary authority prefers 
to promote a gradual appreciation of the RMB exchange rate. However, the NDC is 
not significant and the correlation becomes time-varying. It is interesting to note that 
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deviations of transaction price from the central parity would increase the possibility of 
Chinese intervention; thus intervention correlates with bid-ask spreads. The empirical 
results show that, in the financial crisis period, the currency exposure is 
predominantly negative. 
7.2 The Implications of This Research 
The implications of this research can be summarized as follows: First, employing a 
microstructure approach based on high-frequency data, the research sheds critical 
lights on the RMB determination in the market transaction process. It shows that 
consideration of the trading system in the study of the Chinese exchange rate 
behaviour can provide a deeper understanding of the foreign exchange policy of 
China, while focus on buying and selling pressure allows a closer examination of the 
exchange rate movements. The results indicate that order flow has significant 
explanatory power to capture the RMB exchange rate variability. The results bring to 
the attention of the Chinese monetary authority the importance that should be attached 
to the market microstructure.  
Second, in unveiling the mystery of Chinese intervention with a multi-dimensional 
approach based on high-frequency data, this research establishes how the Chinese 
monetary authority works to intervene in the market place, and the consequences of 
government activity in this area. The results show the efficiency of the Chinese 
government intervention. Policy makers should note that central bank interventions 
can increase volatility and that while CPR intervention plays a role in ‘leaning against 
the wind’, it cannot reverse the basic trend.  
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Further, this research provides evidence of the de facto exchange rate regime of China 
and the findings about the impacts of the exchange rate regime shift in China across 
the global financial crisis. The outcome unveil the true property of Chinese exchange 
rate system and its consequences, which offers an important input to a better 
understanding of the Chinese exchange rate policy by the global policy circle, 
academic community and international business world. 
7.3 Future Research 
Several interesting areas have emerged for further research.  In addition, the 
limitations of this research can be listed below. 
Firstly, data availability permitting, increasing the number of currency pairs seems a 
promising direction, to test for the China foreign exchange market in cross section and 
to see a fuller picture of how the Chinese foreign exchange market works and 
interacts with the government. Another promising area for study would be research 
into the empirical techniques of detecting the macroeconomic news impact on the 
RMB exchange rates against the dollar and other currencies. This may also shed new 
critical light on how differently the RMB-dollar and RMB-other currency rates 
respond to the same type of shock.  
Secondly, the limitations the research on intervention in China has two aspects. First, 
future work should consider more market forces variables. It will be interesting to see 
how robust the estimation of the intervention is when controlling for market variables. 
The second limitation of this research is the lack of government intervention 
information. Future work should further dig out relevant information in this area, 
particularly discussions by economists and think tanks. Making comparison between 
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the officially stated intention and the research evidence will offer critical insight on 
the Chinese foreign exchange policy. 
Thirdly, this research applies the microstructure approach to analyse the Chinese 
foreign exchange market. However, this thesis is limited with regard to drawing 
insights for the research in the macro models, especially the research on intervention 
from the macroeconomic perspective. Future research should seek to deploy relevant 
variables that can reflect information of the macroeconomic fundamentals but can 
also have micro data availability. 
Furthermore, future research may divide a longer sample into several sub-periods 
based on the regime shifts in the Chinese exchange rate system. This will facilitate 
discovery of the fuller impacts of regime shifts, with particular reference to the 
periods before and after the global financial crisis, and will also allow investigation of 
the time-varying effects of order flow on the formation of the exchange rate.  
In assessing the consequences of regime shifts in the exchange rate system, one may 
take into consideration new developments in asset pricing models, such as new 
CAPM models or APT models, and also incorporate other factors such as the degree 
of exchange rate pass-through or evolving pricing practices in different countries and 
at different stages within a country.  
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Appendix 
Data Sources 
Data sources Data type & Official website 
CFETS (China 
Foreign Exchange 
Trading System) 
Foreign exchange rates 
http://www.chinamoney.com.cn/en/index.html 
Thomson Reuters 
DataStream 
Professional 
Integrated economic research data 
https://forms.thomsonreuters.com/datastream/ 
Factiva 
Online news databases 
http://www.dowjones.com/factiva/index.asp 
Federal Reserve 
System: Foreign 
Exchange Rates 
Foreign exchange rates 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Hist/ 
Olsen Data 
Databases of tick-by-tick prices 
http://www.olsendata.com/data_products/welcome/ 
Pacific Exchange 
Rate Service Foreign exchange rates http://fx.sauder.ubc.ca 
PBOC (The 
People’s Bank of 
China) 
Government public information 
http://www.pbc.gov.cn/publish/english/963/index.html 
Reuters China Reuters China headlines http://cn.reuters.com 
Reuters 3000 Xtra 
Information and transaction service 
http://www.trpropresearch.com/products/Reuters3000Xtra/ 
SAFE (State 
Administration of 
Foreign Exchange) 
China’s foreign exchange public information 
http://www.safe.gov.cn 
Wind Info. 
Financial information of the Chinese market 
http://www.wind.com.cn/En/Default.aspx 
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